I try to work a little on what I get by chance everyday while at the same time move on in my own understanding as I look at other people's work. The previous two articles were found through links of things people were researching on when they found this site. I would like to take up this work on separation from Violent partners from a different perspective to the one presented here but using what is here as a perfectly legitimate ground to build on.
One of the difficulties that these papers present is the fact that they do not frame their work on what it is they are standing up for but leave it implicit: more human relationships between couples and society as if they were afraid of formulating the actual aim of any of these papers that so clearly question the inhumanity involved in the abusive relationship.
There’s a great understanding presented in this paper where it states that:
“For instance, a New Zealand writer, Kay Douglas, offers
this definition:
An abusive relationship is characterized by inequality. When one partner
consistently controls, dominates or intimidates the other by means of
manipulative, punishing or forceful behavior, abuse is occurring. (Douglas
1994: 24)
The advantage of this definition is that it suggests that the significance of a range of
behavior lies in their use to consistently exercise power over another.”
The understanding is great because it places us in the sphere or realm of the self that is the realm in which power exercises itself. When we understand this we’ll already be halfway on the road to freedom for it’ll be a first step to acknowledging the objective reality of the self in individuals as much as in communities, institutions and corporations.
Another aspect I’d like to look at about this text is that accurate as the text is, it fails to acknowledge the objective forces that bind the abuser and the victim together that have been traditionally looked at as subjective: “love”
Love in couples is the main objective force that keeps them together but in such relationships, “love” is simply an expression of the two individual’s relationship to their own self and a reflection of their position in society. Immature individuals who have not developed a strong enough sense of their own self meet in an embrace that is determined by that immaturity and will consequently determine the abusive outcome.
The “privileged” position of the male is already a position of power in the sphere of the egos and when identified with it, he will fail to overcome the temptation to reenact his status and reaffirm it in his inability to supply the full acknowledgement of his commitment as a constant affirmation and realization of his “love”. But what is crucial to understand here is that the male in our societies is as badly manipulated as women in the family. He is as much the victim of the status quo as the perpetrator of the status quo within the family. He plays the same role that women play in relation to him, but in society. In other words, if women are submitted by men, men are being equally submitted by the status quo and their life force is being consumed in society as women's "life force" is being consumed in the family. Men cannot bring to the marriage what they cannot have in their society, they simply repeat the process on the subservient circle. Having lost the “community” the sphere of their own life and work has been truncated, they cannot bring to the marriage their own sense of well being that can guarantee his families well being. In his unconsciousness, he simply reproduces the same abusive behavior in which he himself has developed and in which he is being asked to participate with compliance and good behavior. He unconsciously expects the woman to as submissively as he does, with the same compliance and good behavior and in this confrontation social as much as marital life live themselves out. Both men and women mirror each other. The confrontation with the woman and the fact that societies today tend to support the male’s superior economic position will inevitably reassure him in his sphere of power or his self. This mechanism is self defeating to any more human relationships because the vicious circle of employment unemployment, status and lack of status will continue to keep women in submissive conditions and men in abusive and abused conditions. I don't know the statistics and studies related to the role of women when it is they who are in the economic position of power but it is clear that they tend to adopts equally abusive relationships with their family, particularly their children in the detachment that they incur in to be able to follow their career. It is a different kind of abuse but it affects the family equally pervasively. My generation and my children's generation has much suffered from this conditions for I was, like other women, much more identified with life outside the family than inside of it but not enough to leave them. I studied at home most of the time.
I am an ignorant in detailed sociological studies but I would venture the theory that capitalism with its industrialization made the family implode and it is now making the individuals themselves implode which is what we are seeing in the massive suicide in our societies. It is no longer the family that is being destroyed, it hardly counts, it’s the individuals themselves who are of no value if they cannot adjust and participate in the status quo that is perfectly inhuman. We should call our present times, the Age of Desolation but hopefully it is from this desolation that we will reach the Age of the Logos, from this suffering that we will never again turn against our selves.
I'm tired now, this paper lends itself to much more but it's enough for today. May the day's light shine joyfully on you!
http://www.iiav.nl/ezines/web/JournalofInternationalWomensStudies/2003/Vol4Nr3May/violent_partners.pdf
Separating From Violent Male Partners:
A Resistant Act in the Midst of Power Relations.
By Vivienne Elizabeth1
Introduction
Women who seek love and survival for our families and ourselves are
treated as if our only choices are to ëstayí or ëleaveí. ëStayingí is a socially
suspect choice ó often perceived as acceptance of violence ó though
ëleavingí is often unsafe (Mahoney 1994: 60)
ëWhy doesnít she leave?í has become the almost automatic response in contemporary
Western cultures to revelations of male partner abuse.2 Its recitation invites an
explanation of a phenomenon ó her failure to leave ó that many find inexplicable.
Through this question, the issue of leaving is defined as a key problem, perhaps even
the central problem, of male partner violence. Yet, not only does this question suggest
that women are responsible for ending the abuse, it also implies that leaving is the
definitive solution to his violence (For examples of counter-arguments see Mahoney
1991, 1994; Kirkwood 1993).
While not wishing to legitimate this reaction, I want to make leaving or, as I prefer,
separation my central focus.3 In so doing, I seek to counter a widespread tendency to
explain womenís decisions about separation from abusive male partners in terms of
their personal inadequacies or pathologies. As such, I argue for a shift in viewpoint
away from the realm of the individual to the realm of the social. My interest in
relocating womenís decisions within a social field emerged during many hours of
conversation, both with women who had past experiences of violent relationships and
with a variety of people who have worked with these women, over a three year period
whilst in the employ of a health promotion organization in New Zealand.4 These
conversations indicated that, although differences in legal protections, policing
practices, child custody proceedings, and social welfare and housing policies etcetera
establish a need for locally based research, the dominant cultural norms and
assumptions through and against which New Zealand women (particularly Pakeha5
women) must negotiate their relationships with violent male partners are similar to those
encountered by women (especially White women) living in other English-speaking
western countries.
Some writers in the field have sought to make the social dimensions of womenís
responses to male partner violence apparent through an examination of womenís
stay/leave decisions (Brown 1997; Choice & Lamke 1997), while others have
documented the obstacles women confront once they have separated (Hoff 1990;
Kirkwood 1993). Still others have critically engaged with how we understand
separation and its aftermath (Kelly et al., 1996; Mahoney, 1991, 1994). With the
exception of the latter work, much of it is descriptive or uses explanatory models that, in
failing to analyze the many and varied interactions associated with separation from the
perspective of power, are unable to consider how such interactions impact on how
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 62
power is exercised between violent men and their partners. Given the centrality of
power and control to feminist definitions of abuse this failure is somewhat perplexing.
In contrast, I suggest an orientation to the question of separation that embeds it
within a Foucauldian framework of power relations. As will become clear in the
following section, Foucauldian theory offers a conceptual ëtoolkití that has much to
recommend itself for the purposes just outlined. In particular, Foucaultís work
emphasizes the ubiquitous nature of power relations (Foucault 1978 [1990]; Jones &
Guy 1992: Sawicki 1991). Hence Foucauldian theory, like second-wave feminism,
encourages us to recognize a wide range of interpersonal encounters as constituted
through power (see Elizabeth 1992; Kondo 1990). Yet in an important departure,
exercises of power within Foucauldian theory are understood to be contingent and
therefore inherently unstable. Given the focus of this paper, this latter point is highly
significant in that it suggests the possibility of contesting and disrupting the way power
relations have been formulated within a given site; for example, the home.
As a result of this turn to Foucauldian theory, I have been able to bring together two
strands of inquiry ñ the personal and the social ñ that tend to be treated as discrete
entities. The framework that I am proposing insists on the importance of paying
attention to the social context within which women operate (see also Mahoney 1994;
Choice & Lamke 1997). In addition, this framework has the advantage of incorporating
a concept of agency that argues for its dual character: in simple terms, that as socially
located beings individuals are simultaneously actors and acted upon, determined and
determining (Butler 1990, 1992; Hekman 1990, 1991; Davies 1991).
My purpose, in establishing this analytical approach, is to offer alternative ways of
comprehending what is happening at this juncture of an abused womanís life.
Throughout, I consistently raise questions that interrogate some of the commonly held
assumptions about the process of separation. In this, I have followed the lead of people
like Mahoney (1991, 1994) and Kelly, Burton and Regan (1996), but I build on their
work by foregrounding the importance of a number of other social relationships in a
abused womanís network, relationships that Foucault reminds us are simultaneously
power relationships. Configured through power, the relationships that make up her
social network can, like her relationship to her partner, become vehicles for the exercise
of power over her. Thus the character of these social relationships has a direct and
indirect bearing on the process of reconstructing both her personhood and her
relationship to her partner post-separation.
With these objectives in mind, the next section contains an introduction to some of
the core theoretical concepts that underpin my discussion. Specifically, I explore
Foucauldian notions of discourse, power, subjectivity and resistance. Although outlined
in brief, this introduction should permit those who are unfamiliar with this body of
thought to track my argument. I move in the following section to definitions of abuse
and violence. My attention then shifts to separation as I contemplate its use as a
strategy of resistance to abuse by male partners. I suggest that the complexities of
separation are submerged by the common usage of the stay/leave construct. While
some authors have developed a staged approach to leaving (for example, Landenburger
1998; Kelly 1995), emphasizing that leaving should be seen as a process rather than a
one off event (Ulrich 1998), they nevertheless present us with a narrative sequence that
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 63
inscribes leaving as the appropriate ending of an abused womanís story (see also
Goetting [1999] 2000; Lawless 2001). In so doing, the exploration of other possible
avenues for achieving violent free lives is foreclosed. Unfortunately, it is beyond the
scope of this article to address these other avenues of change.
In a continuation of my claim that separation is used as a strategy of resistance, I
argue in the final sections that, in the aftermath of having separated from an abusive
male partner, questions of identity and needs emerge as significant sites of struggle.
While a womanís ex-partner typically remains a significant player in such struggles,
family members, friends and professionals are just as likely to be key agents. I argue
that these sites of struggle need to become the object of scrutiny if we are to come to a
better understanding of how separation, as a potentially transformative act, can be used
with success.
Getting Orientated To Theory
The starting point for the theoretical framework that underpins this paper is
poststructuralist feminism, especially its Foucauldian variant. Foucauldian feminism,
along with other strands of poststructuralist theory, offers new ways of thinking about
language, power, subjectivity6, and resistance. As such poststructuralism, offers a
repertoire of theoretical tools that can be deployed with, what I believe to be, great
benefits for the work at hand. A poststructuralist perspective on discourse, subjectivity,
power and resistance is set out below in necessarily skeletal form.
According to Foucauldian feminism, language is organized in the form of competing
discourses. Discourses are defined as meaning constituting systems, both verbal and
visual, that systematically ëform the objects of which they speakí (Foucault 1972:49;
see also Weedon 1987; Scott 1988; Valverde 1991; Fraser 1992). In forming objects -
be it individual subjects, social relations, or practices - discourses operate to structure
the social worlds we inhabit (Foucault 1980; Weedon 1987; Gavey 1989).
Discourses that compete to structure similar aspects of our social worlds ñ for
example, family relationships or child-rearing practices - are located within discursive
fields. Competing discourses contain alternative subjectivities and/or alternative
relationships between the same subjectivities. For example, the field of marital relations
encompasses a modern discourse that establishes egalitarian relationships, a
conventional discourse that produces hierarchical relations between husbands and
wives, and a pathological discourse of violence that constructs extreme asymmetries of
power between partners.
Within any discursive field, one discourse is likely to be dominant or hegemonic.
Not only do hegemonic discourses generally appear commonsensical, normal or natural,
they are also given expression within social institutions and practices (Weedon 1987;
Gavey and McPhillips 1999). In spite of its hegemonic status, the power of a discourse
to order social relationships is not inevitable (Weedon 1987; Fraser 1992). Discourses
that govern the constitution of identities and relationships within a particular social
context are always susceptible to being overturned and replaced by another discourse,
producing new subjectivities and /or a new relational order between subjectivities in the
process.
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 64
One of the key objects constituted through discourse is that of the subject (Henriques
et al 1984; Weedon 1987). Within Foucauldian theory, a subject is someone who is
simultaneously enabled and constricted. Not only does our constitution as a certain kind
of subject delimit the kinds of actions we can take, it also enables us to carry out these
actions (Foucault 1980, 1982; Weedon 1987; Davies 1991, 1992). Furthermore, to
become a subject means that our understandings of ourselves and our relationships,
together with our emotions, conforms to the dictates of the particular discursive
framework in which we are currently located.
The subject of Foucauldian feminism is understood to be inherently in flux,
constantly open to reconstitution in response to shifts in context or changes to the power
relations (Kondo 1990). Produced across a range of conflicting discourses, the subject
is precarious, contradictory and complex (Weedon 1987; Kondo 1990; Valverde 1991;
Fraser 1992). This view of the subject overcomes some of the dilemmas that
characterize much of the literature in the domestic violence field. It concurs with Kelly
et alís (1996) argument that ësurvivorí and ëvictimí are identities that can co-exist
within the same individual at the same time. In other words, ësurvivorí and ëvictimí do
not have to refer to two different stages of a womanís life as suggested by ëthe recovery
narrativeí, a commonly used descriptor of the process women undergo as they re-
establish themselves outside of the nexus of a violent relationship.
Because every discourse offers a range of subjectivities variously structured in
relation to each other, discourses operate as a major vehicle for the establishment and
maintenance of power relations (Foucault 1980; Weedon 1987; Gavey 1989; Elizabeth
2000). Which discourse comes to govern a social setting is therefore politically
significant. In fact, contests over discursive ascendancy, together with the power to
enforce that discourse, form a major avenue of political struggle, both in everyday
encounters and in social policy arenas (Fraser 1989; Kondo 1990; Yeatman 1990).
Bearing this point in mind the question then becomes, why do certain discourses (and
the relations between subject positions they produce) gain dominance within a setting?
Or to put it slightly differently, what resources ñ both discursive and non-discursive ñ
can actors bring to bear in order achieve the installation of their preferred discursive
framework?
In order to answer these questions I want to turn to Cooperís (1994, 1995) notion of
the existence of four interlocking modes of power. These Cooper names as: ideologies,
or hegemonic discourses; force, that is ëthe subjugation of the will or the body of
another by physical or psychological means that include coercion, threats and violenceí;
disciplinary practices of surveillance and control; and resources, for instance skills, time
and/or wealth, that enable actors to ëcreate a material advantageí (Cooper 1995:21-22;
see also 1994). While Cooper discusses each mode of power separately she is at pains
to argue that they are entwined and that they operate synergistically (Cooper 1994,
1995).
The utilization of these modes of power enables what Kondo calls the ëdisciplinary
production of ìselvesîí (Kondo 1990: 29 & 43). That is, the enforcement of particular
discursive productions of another, irrespective of the otherís previous constitutions and
preferences. At this point in the flow of my discussion it is necessary to entertain yet
another question: Are different categories of people, for instance men and women,
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 65
similarly placed with respect to their ability to deploy these modes of power? Cooperís
response to this question is to argue that access to these modes of power is reflective of
existing social power relations and hence it is socially mediated (Cooper 1994, 1995).
More specifically, Cooper argues (and I and many others agree) we continue to exist in
a patriarchal7 social context that advantages men ëenabling men to exercise power in
ways not similarly open to womení (Cooper 1995:10). To this I might add, that
exercises of power by men and women are differentially interpreted thereby reinforcing
a gendered ability to operate as powerful agents.
As part of her argument Cooper goes on to provide an important proviso to this
statement that is quoted below:
Some exercises of power involve dominating women, that is, using women
specifically as a resource in the furtherance of menís own objectives.
However, male dominance is wider than specific domination of women. It
includes a gendered ability to exercise agency and achieve desired outcomes
in ways not available to women, although women may not necessarily be
subjugated or exploited in the process. While not all men choose to exploit
this advantage ñ to exercise power ñ an individualís abstention does not
make the advantage disappear. Neither men nor women can simply opt out
of genderís organizing framework, although both can find ways of
disrupting or transforming it. (Cooper 1995:10)
When applied to the context of heterosexual partnerships, these ideas suggest that
men and women do not undertake their relational negotiations on a level playing field.
Men enter into relationships in a favorable position (although many do not feel this
way!). As a consequence, their discursive construction of their partnerships ñ the
identities assumed and the relations of power between these identities ñ is likely to
prevail. Furthermore, the privileged access men enjoy to the various modes of power
outlined by Cooper (1994, 1995) means that any challenges their partners might make to
the gendered order men seek to install will in all likelihood be surmounted.
Neither Cooperís statements, nor my own, should be taken to rule out the possibly of
resistance (Cooper 1994, 1995; Elizabeth 1997, 2000). As Foucault (1980, 1982,
[1978]1990) often argued, exercises of power are constantly met by acts of resistance.
This does not mean that resistance is necessarily a consciously political act, or that it is
necessarily successful (Gordon 1980; Henriques et al., 1984; Kondo 1990; Sawicki
1991; Elizabeth 1992; Faith 1994). Nevertheless, the capacity to engage in resistance is
dependent upon the ability to gain access to the modes of power outlined above (Cooper
1995).
In particular, I want to foreground the importance of access to rival discourses for
effective resistance because it is through discourse that the use of other modes of power
becomes a purposeful activity with a greater chance of success (Cooper 1995; Gavey &
McPhillips 1999). In order for resistant subjects to have access to rival discourses, such
discourses need to be present within the, either past or present, social orbit of the
individual (Henriques et al., 1984; Weedon 1987; Yeatman 1990; Valverde 1991;
Elizabeth 1992; Elizabeth 2000; Fraser 1992;). Where situations of power continue to
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 66
be defined as ënormalí (as some women describe their partnerís violence against them)
or inevitable it indicates that alternative discourses, which would name the situation
otherwise, have been small in number, difficult to access and/or of limited effect (Gavey
& McPhillips 1999).
In this paper, I set the stage for an exploration of womenís acts of resistance against
abusive male partners. But, as many womenís stories of dealing with violent partners
attest, acts of resistance are not always effective in disrupting the exercise of power, or
in preventing the installation of inequitable and asymmetrical power relations.
Moreover, the consequences of any act of resistance cannot be accurately predicted in
advance. Ascertaining the effectiveness of a particular strategy of resistance can only
be done on a case-by-case basis. It is also important to pay heed to the associated costs
of resistant acts such that they are abandoned in favor of strategies of accommodation
and compliance. These statements point to the need to take a complex approach to the
question of resistance and compliance. Dorinne Kondo summed this position up nicely
when she said: ëÖ apparent resistance is riven with ironies and contradictions, just as
coping and consent may have unexpectedly subversive effectsí (1990:224).
Resistance, or agency, within the poststructuralist framework that I am proposing
here assumes a specific character. It is no longer defined in terms of an ability to act
outside the social order. This more widely held understanding links meaningful choice
with freedom from social constraint. However, in this article, agency is understood as
active negotiation within shifting contexts of constraint (see Butler 1991, 1992; Davies
1991; Kondo 1990; Hekman 1991, 1992; Moore 1994; Elizabeth 1997;). The subject of
this version of agency both acts, and is acted upon; she both exercises power and is
subject to exercises of power.
This view of agency encourages a more complex reading of womenís experiences of
male partner abuse. Typically agency and victimization are juxtaposed such that
ëagency is exercised by a self-determining individual, one who is not victimized by
othersí (Mahoney 1994:60). Defined oppositionally, the absence of agency becomes a
marker of oneís status as a victim. As Mahoney argues, this approach to the question of
agency dichotomizes womenís experiences of male partner violence in problematic
ways (Mahoney 1994; see also Kelly et al 1996). To develop a fuller exploration of the
meaning of agency in the lives of battered women requires rejecting the all-victim
approach and the all-agency stance, a position that is advanced here (see also Mahoney
1994).
Concepts and Terminology
As Linda Gordonís highly informative history of the help-seeking efforts of poor
abused women living in New York State makes clear, the boundary between ëacceptable
and unacceptable attempts to coerceí (1988:291) has been the subject of historical, and I
might add cultural, fluctuations. Gordon states:
Unlimited family violence was never tolerated, and there were always
standards as to what counted as excessive violence. (Gordon 1988: 256)
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 67
In other words, it is not that a boundary has not existed, but its exact location along a
continuum of coercive behaviours has been dependent on the discourses available
within the social and historical context within which these acts gain their meaning.8
Historical shifts are, according to Gordon (1988), largely attributable to the emergence
and success of feminist discourses on heterosexuality, power and violence. Feminism,
with its attack on male dominance, has been a prime force in the discursive constitution
of acts of violence, intimidation and other forms of control within heterosexual
relationships as abusive, and hence illegitimate.
Despite the influence of feminist discourses within this arena, a consensus around
where the line between ënormalí and ëabusiveí relationships should be drawn, or even
how abuse should be defined, does not exist (see Gelles & Loseke 1993). In fact, the
level of conflict over these issues is indicative of the political character of this arena.
This politicization has prompted both a proliferation of terms and definitions, and a
critical focus on the language in use. For instance, writers within the field are at odds
over whether the appropriate descriptor should be ëfamilyí or ëdomesticí, and engage in
debates over the inclusiveness of ëviolenceí in contrast to ëabuseí.
Bearing these debates in mind, I have settled on the use of ëmale partner violenceí
interchanged with ëmale partner abuseí. My preference for these phrases lies with their
clear indication of the agent of the violence and abuse. As such they indicate my
adoption of a gendered analysis within this arena. While some writers (e.g., Lapsley
1993; Mullender 1996) have expressed reservations about the use of ëviolenceí because
of the propensity to discursively construct this in physical terms alone, I, nevertheless,
favor its retention. The advantage of ëviolenceí is that it clearly conveys that force ñ
whether this is physical, sexual, economic or psychological - is being used to both
violate and harm another. On the other hand, I intend my usage of ëabuseí to prompt
readers to adopt a broad outlook, one that conceives of abuse as a situation in which ëa
person is taken advantage of [by another], but may not be physically coerced or harmed,
and may even cooperateÖí (Lapsley 1993:5).
Questions of terminology aside, what do we actually mean when we describe a
relationship as violent and abusive? Although numerous definitions of ëabuseí are on
offer within feminist circles, such definitions are set apart from others within the field
through their insistence on the relevance of gender and on locating acts of violence -
whether these are physical, psychological, sexual, and/or economic - within the context
of ongoing attempts to establish and confirm gender power relations (Mahoney 1991,
1994; Stark & Flitcraft 1996). For instance, a New Zealand writer, Kay Douglas, offers
this definition:
An abusive relationship is characterized by inequality. When one partner
consistently controls, dominates or intimidates the other by means of
manipulative, punishing or forceful behavior, abuse is occurring. (Douglas
1994: 24)
The advantage of this definition is that it suggests that the significance of a range of
behaviors lies in their use to consistently exercise power over another. It is the effect of
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 68
these behaviors, their meaning if you like, and not simply their enactment, that produce
them as abusive. The distinction between ëactionsí and their ëeffectsí (or meaning) is an
important one to bear in mind, particularly with respect to debates over whether or not
men are abused by female partners at rates approaching male partner abuse. As others
have noted, one of the major effects of having been subjected to abuse is the feeling of
fear (Lapsley 1993). The presence, or absence, of fear might therefore be used to
differentiate ëmutual fightingí from ëbatteringí.
Although the definition offered by Douglas has merit, I, nevertheless, want to
propose an alternative that explicitly draws on the assumptions about power outlined in
the previous section. Hence, I suggest that we think of an abusive relationship as one in
which the contest for power is consistently and repetitively settled in favor of the male
partner through his deployment of a variety of technologies of power and violence,
which might include physical assaults, verbal insults, psychological control, sexual
attacks and/or withholding financial resources. As a consequence, women over whom
this power is exercised experience themselves, at least within the context of that
particular relationship, as being increasingly controlled, together with the attendant
emotional states that these positionings produce such as fear, despair, shame and anger.
The construction of extremes of power occurs despite most womenís attempts to resist
his exercises of power. Conceptualizing abusive relationships in this way fosters the
recognition that the struggle for how power relations are constituted is ongoing and
hence open to change, whilst also acknowledging the extent to which power relations
can cohere into comparatively immutable forms.
Separation, power and resistance
Exercising power over another is inevitably about an attempt to control, or
determine, what another can be and do. It entails a restriction of the otherís options,
delimiting access to subjectivities and the actions enabled by these subjectivities. For
instance, women who are abused by their male partners are frequently denied access to
the position of the autonomous woman. Barred from self-determination, abused women
seldom act on the basis of their own preferences, operating instead with an eye looking
over their shoulder towards their partnerís requirements and desires (Towns & Adams
1997). In other words, abused women become self-policing subjects (Foucault [1975]
1979; 1980).
Yet, as I argued in an earlier section of this paper, exercises of power do not rule out
acts of resistance. In this instance, I am concerned with womenís acts of resistance
against abusive male partners, in particular their use of separation.9 Access to the
strategy of leaving is, however, socially and culturally mediated. The convergence of
multiple discourses on women and men in heterosexual relationship operates to produce
a gendered pattern of attachment to relationships (Duncombe & Marsden 1993, 1995;
Elizabeth 1997) According to Duncombe and Marsden this leads to a greater
unwillingness on behalf of women to abandon their relationships (Duncombe &
Marsden 1993. 1995; Elizabeth 1997; Okin 1989). In the light of these statements, it
seems important to identify how access to this strategy is variously constrained for
women of different cultures. Such constraints are formative elements in the production
of women - abused as well as non-abused - as committed to their intimate relationships
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 69
(Elizabeth 1997 & 1997b; Mahoney 1994). They also indicate sites for political action
towards social change.
Contemplating the place of separation within an abused womenís life story raises a
number of questions, not the least of which is what prompts women to separate from
abusive partners (see Kirkwood 1993; Goetting [1999] 2000). Goetting ([1999]
2000:12-13) suggests that women are motivated by a number of different catalysts
including: an escalation in the severity of his violence; violence directed towards their
children; an increased capacity to be financially independent; a renaming of the
situation as violent, unacceptable and unlikely to change; and so on.
Irrespective of the exact circumstances under which women separate, it is important
to recognize it as an attempt to effect a long-term transformation of the extreme
asymmetries in power relations to which abused women are subjected. While
separation as an act of resistance aims at transformation, there are several ways in which
separation might be deployed in the achievement of that aim. Deployed as a threat,
separation can be used in the context of an ongoing relationship as a lever to bring about
change. Alternatively, separation can be used in an attempt to simultaneously terminate
the relationship and the abuse.
Generally, the determination of the manner in which leaving is being used can only
be ascertained in retrospect. The decision to separate from an abusive partner often
needs to be made repeatedly during the period of initial separation, and possibly for
years to come. Yet, within dominant narrative conventions, returning to a relationship
converts separation into ëstayingí, resulting in the disappearance from the official record
of a key act of resistance to his power. Informed by womenís accounts, we might like
to think in terms of the plural - separations - punctuated by (often temporary)
reconciliations. In effect, this suggests that the line that distinguishes ëbeing iní a
relationship from ëbeing outí of one is not clearly demarcated. In fact, this line may be
highly blurred and subject to re-designation.10 It is therefore important to consider the
variety of ways in which the end may be marked (for example, through emotional
distancing, physical separation, and cessation of all forms of communication) and thus
the possibility of multiple and shifting endings.
This perspective fosters the recognition of the end of a relationship as a (potential)
site of contest. As many others working in this field have noted, separation and the
subsequent termination of a relationship are often the site of ongoing struggles between
women and abusive male partners. In many instances, abusive male partners insist on
the continuation of the relationship, thus doing violence to a womanís preference for the
relationship to end. This should come as no surprise. After all, the absence of respect
for her choices and preferences is one of the hallmarks of abuse (Elizabeth 1997b).
Martha Mahoney (1991) offers the term ëseparation assaultí to refer to the struggle
for control that ensues both at the time, and after, a woman decides to separate from a
partner who is abusive:
Separation assault is the attack on the womenís body and volition in which
her partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or
force her to return. It aims at overbearing her will as to where and with
whom she will live, and coercing her in order to enforce connection in a
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 70
relationship. It is an attempt to gain, retain or regain power in a
relationship, or to punish the woman for ending the relationship. (Mahoney
1991: 65-6)
Mahoney argues for the use of ëseparation assaultí over post-separation abuse because
the latter term fails to recognise the fact that the violence occurs in response to the
decision to leave rather than the act of leaving itself (Mahoney 1991).
Separation assault may entail the escalation or a diversification of the ways in which
he abuses her. ëSeparation attacksí are often located in previously untapped arenas, and
may involve other people as key players who become agents of her ongoing abuse and
victimization. As Mahoney (1991) discusses, issues of child custody and access
frequently form new sites for exercises of power. It is commonplace for men to threaten
their partners with custody suits pre and post-separation. Such tactics are indicative of
the use of the courts as an extension of the ways in which abusive men exercise control
over their ex-partners. ëBatterers use the legal system as a new arena of combat when
they seek to keep their wives from leavingí (Mahoney 1991:44). Citing work by Lenore
Walker and Glenace Edwall, Mahoney notes that at least 50% of all contested custody
cases involved families with a history of some form of domestic violence, and in
approximately 40% of these cases, fathers were awarded the custody of their children
irrespective of their history of violence (Mahoney 1991).
Clearly then, the struggle between a woman and her abusive partner over the ending
of their relationship is a source of major concern. But this concern should not blind
social researchers and practitioners from considering the part that other people play in
this struggle. As workers in the field, it behooves us to ask a number of questions. In
what other settings ñ for instance social welfare offices, the courts, and interactions with
the Police - does the status of the relationship become an issue? Is the designation of
the status of the relationship provided by an abused woman recognized by other key
figures in her social landscape ñ her parents, her social worker, the family court judge
and so on? If not, whose definition of the status of the relationship prevails? What
might this tell us about who is exercising power within that context? How does settling
on a particular definition of the end of a relationship - usually cessation of cohabitation -
impact on her ability to meet her needs and the needs of her children? What effect does
this have on her abilities to effectively use separation to renegotiate her relationship
with her (abusive) partner?
For instance, in New Zealand the availability of legal aid money to deal with custody
and access issues, obtain protection orders and so on, is typically dependent on income
level. However, unless women have ceased to reside with their former partners, their
income level is determined on a joint basis rather than on an individual basis. As a
consequence, a woman who wants to manage threats (made by her partner) over the loss
of her children post-separation by obtaining custody orders prior to a physical
separation is placed in a highly invidious situation. Does she abandon her quest for
custody and stay? Does she leave taking the children with her and risk censure from the
Family Court? Or does she continue to pursue custody, knowing that she may not be
able to afford legal representation, while her former partner is in all probability well
placed to pay for his legal bills?
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 71
Similarly, in order to obtain the Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB)11 separating
women must satisfy an officer at Work and Income12 of the legitimacy of their need for
financial support. Such encounters are frequently characterized by contests over the
timing and permanence of a womanís separation; contests over when benefit payments
will begin thereby directly impacting on her ability to acquire food; and contests over
the size of the housing supplement she will receive thus affecting the location and
standard of accommodation she can obtain. Separating women and Work and Income
staff are not equally placed with respect to these contests. The interpretations arrived at
by a Work and Income officer will almost inevitably prevail over a womanís and are
unlikely to be overturned, except through the interventions of other powers, for example
by staff from Womenís Refuge and other community agencies.
As both of these examples highlight, interactions between a separating woman and
representatives of helping agencies need to be treated as interactions through which
power is potentially wielded over her. As ëpetitioning subjectsí women are vulnerable
to having their definition of their needs supplanted by institutionalized definitions. As
Fraser (1989) eloquently argues, defining the contents and legitimate scope of a
personís needs is a political act: it is neither neutral nor non-contentious. In the case of
women separating from violent partners, a failure to recognize the legitimacy of her
needs claims will, as a matter of course, result in a failure to meet those needs. Settings
in which this process occurs are, as Fraser (1989) reminds us, characterized by
hierarchical power relationships. When helping encounters become structured in this
manner, they assume a terrifying resemblance to the very kinds of controlling
relationships abused women have been seeking to leave behind.
Contests over her discursive locations are not confined to the public arena, however.
Family members, friends and other associates may also engage abused women in
struggles over relational identity and status. While some family members and friends
might react enthusiastically to her assumption of the identity of ëseparated womaní,
others may well engage in avid and vocal criticism (see Hoff 1990). Many New
Zealanders (of all ethnicities) continue to regard marriage as a partnership that should
be maintained at least until ëthe children have grown upí. The pre-eminence of this
discursive construction of marriage is in many instances not diminished by knowledge
of his violence. It is still not uncommon for revelations of male violence towards her to
be met with statements like, ëWhat did you do to provoke him?í followed by
recommendations that she change her behavior in order to prevent further abuse!
Invoking discourses about the needs of children for active fathering, the embarrassment
and shame that will follow separation, and the acceptable nature of a ëfew hits and
insultsí, many members of a womanís social network privilege the maintenance of the
relationship over and above freedom from violence for her and her children.
In raising objections to the dissolution of her relationship, family and friends seek to
overturn her positioning ëoutside of marriageí in order to maintain her location ëwithin
marriageí (or ëwithin partnershipí). Interventions of this sort serve as an exemplar of
the ëdisciplinary production of selvesí: the exercise of power in order to enforce a
particular discursive construction of the self (Kondo 1990: 29 & 43). Bearing such
interventions in mind, we might like to broaden the scope of the term ëseparation
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 72
assaultí to include attacks committed by those members of an abused womanís network
who oppose her reconstitution outside of the couple nexus.
Broadening the scope of ëseparation assaultí to encompass a wider range of agents
encourages us to see abused women as embedded in a whole raft of social relationships.
As stated above, these relationships operate as avenues for the exercise of power ñ both
ëpower toí and ëpower overí. As such they play a pivotal role in establishing whether or
not an abused woman can effectively use separation to both resist her partnerís excesses
of power and to reconstitute herself as an autonomous agent. In ascertaining the impact
of these social relationships it is important to recognize that they form an interlinked
web. Consequently, the outcome of transactions in one relational setting may well
reverberate throughout the rest of an abused womanís relational network, including her
relationship to her ex-partner. For example, when needs that are critical to her well-
being and the well-being of her children are not met as a result of the decisions made by
a Work and Income staff member returning to her former partner may become
ëpreferableí.
Although this example suggests that womenís difficulties are compounded as a
consequence of the interlinked nature of her social network, this is not always the case.
Interlinkage may prompt the mobilization of extra resources, both economic and
emotional, to offset the negative effects of discursive constitutions made elsewhere. To
return to the example of Work and Income, family members and friends often supply
food and other material possessions in an effort to counter the impact of the policies of
Work and Income on a womanís well-being.
Irrespective of how such interlinkages play out in the lives of women who are
separating from abusive partners, it is vital that these social agents are more centrally
located in the analytical frameworks we establish around womenís separation from
violent men. While empirical analysis of how these social agents interact with abused
women will no doubt prove highly valuable, researchers and practitioners can make an
important contribution to the process of socializing separation by telling a different
story, a story of multiple actors.
Conclusion
By consistently engaging with both popular and academic discourses on separation
from violent male partners, this article highlights the need for a more complex rendering
of the issue of separation. Telling more complex stories about separation has been
hindered by the dominance within this field of teleological discourses that inscribe
permanent separation as the desired end-point. As a result of the bifurcation of
womenís responses to violence through such discourses, womenís decisions to return to
their partners become instances of ëstayingí. And ëstayingí is read, by women
themselves and others, as a mark of their failure and weaknesses; alternatively it is
taken as a sign of his ëtotalí power and her capitulation to that power.
While not wanting to under-estimate the multiple ways in which abusive men
exercise power over their partners, especially during processes of separation, it is also
important that spaces are created within our culturally available discourses of separation
that permit the recognition of women who have been abused to act as agents.
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 73
Conceptualizing separation as an act of resistance marks a significant step in this
direction.
One of the effects of discursively constructing separation as an act of resistance is
that separation is no longer viewed as the solution to the problem of male partner
violence and hence the end point to which her narrative ideally journeys. Instead,
separation is located within a larger discourse of change and transformation where it is
defined as tool that can be deployed with varying degrees of success. Once understood
in this manner, returning to abusive partners may (in some instances) signify her power
to make a positive difference. More importantly, because the success with which
women can utilize separation as a tool of change is dependent upon the social context
within which they are situated and operate it is necessary to critically examine that
context.
In order to reflect critically on these social contexts, Foucauldian theories that point
to the omnipresent nature of power within social life have much to offer. Although the
emphasis on the ubiquitous nature of power relations within Foucauldian theory might
seem pessimistic, I have argued in this article that recognizing power in this manner
enables a centralization of other relationships in the cultural stories we tell of separation
from abusive partners. The repercussions of constituting other people in a womanís
social network as significant agents is that their actions are seen to matter: they too can
be agents of constraint and entrapment or agents of empowerment and positive change.
Finally, at the level of social policy, my argument suggests that recent attacks on
social welfare payments for single mothers, as has been the case in New Zealand and
elsewhere, together with assertions by national leaders about the importance of
parenting within a nuclear family setting, are likely to have a detrimental effect on those
who are victims of male partner violence. These shifts in social climate not only raise
the stakes of separating, but also make life after separation much less attractive: what if
life after separating turns out of be rather closer to life prior to separating than had been
anticipated? Clearly under these circumstances, the efficacy of separation as a tool of
transformation is seriously eroded. When this occurs, the actors who contributed to the
production of these circumstances need to be included within our analyses. The point of
this article has been to highlight the importance of this analysis and to offer a theoretical
framework within which this might occur.
1
Lecturer, Sociology, The University of Auckland, Auckland, Aotearoa New Zealand. This article was
written with the partial support of a grant from the Health Research Council of New Zealand. I would
also like to thank the following people for their input into the development of this article: Jennifer Hand,
Tim McCreanor, Carolyn Coggan, Colleen Ivory, Shona Selby, Marilyn Burton, Luisa Falanitule, Jo
Elvidge, Shona Thompson, and Wendy Larner.
2
Although it has reached the status of a given, the ëWhy doesnít she leave?í question is in fact historically
and culturally specific. For many women living in Westernized countries such as New Zealand leaving
has been an option few could entertain prior to the arrival of fault-free divorce, the recognition of the
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 74
principal caregiver (typically mothers) as the primary custodian, the introduction of state benefits for
single mothers, and the removal of discriminatory labor market laws. Such shifts and changes during the
later part of the twentieth century have created a climate in which greater numbers of women are
separating from husbands and establishing single-parent families. This does not mean, however, that
socio-economic conditions no longer have an effect on the decisions that women make about their
intimate partnerships or on what kind of standard of living they are able to provide for themselves and
their children.
3
Separation, in the context of a relationship marked by male partner abuse, may simply be one more
instance of the exercise of power when utilized by ëhimí, or, when deployed by ëherí, an attempt to resist
and contest his exercise of power. Acknowledging the possibility that women who are abused not only
leave, but are also left, forms the basis for my preference for ëseparationí as a term. The use of
ëseparationí leaves the question of who was exercising agency at this juncture open for investigation.
Given my purpose in this piece, I want to focus on ëherí use of separation in the following paragraphs,
while not dismissing the very real needs and issues that arise for women who are ëleftí.
4
My position at Public Health Promotion, Auckland Healthcare, New Zealand was funded through the
Health Research Council of New Zealand.
5
Pakeha is the indigenous name for White people, typically of Anglo-Celtic heritage, living in New
Zealand.
6
Subjectivity refers to ëthe conscious and unconscious thoughts and emotions of the individual, her sense
of herself and her ways of understanding her relations to the worldí (Weedon 1987: 32).
7
By patriarchy Cooper means ëa specifically gendered organizing framework composed through a series
of historically emergent articulations between gender and other social practicesí (Cooper 1995: 10).
8
At any point in time, the assignment of this boundary will vary both within, and between, various
social/cultural groupings. Furthermore, debates over where to set this boundary can become infused with
other debates (for instance, claims to autonomy by minority groups) occurring within particular socio-
cultural groupings. Taken up as a question of autonomy and sovereignty, attempts to address abuse
within the community may be treated with hostility.
9
Of course separation, in many instances, is also a matter of survival. In focusing on power, there is no
intention to detract from life and death issues. For many women, it is at this point in time that
unprecedented levels of violence are unleashed and she is most in danger of losing her life (see Goetting
[1999] 2000; Lawless 2001).
10
It is also important to acknowledge that in many instances, it is not possible to physically separate from
a partner who is abusive. When physically separating from an abusive man is not possible what other
Journal of International Womenís Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003 75
ways can women ëíleaveíí? Do they emotionally vacate the relationship? And how do they mark this
emotional disconnection? Do they turn to alcohol and/or drugs (see Lempert 1994)?
11
The DPB is the name given to New Zealandís state funded financial support for single parents and
others engaged in caring activities.
12
Work and Income is the current name for New Zealandís state funded income support agency.
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