This interview seems as pertinent to this blog as everything else I am presenting. It touches on areas we’ve already confronted on the blogs such as the idea of “WE” , the individual and the social. It places us in the present of a dialogue between these intellectuals. I am simply giving a superficial look at all this material. It should be studied more deeply by me and those involved. I include notes where the parallels with the cult are obvious. I will take those notes out and repeat them in another post for the clarity of it.
Foucault Studies
© Jacques Donzelot and Colin Gordon 2008
ISSN: 1832‐5203
Foucault Studies, No 5, pp. 48‐62, January 2008
ISSN: 1832‐5203
Foucault Studies, No 5, pp. 48‐62, January 2008
INTERVIEW
Governing Liberal Societies – the Foucault Effect in the English‐
speaking World1
Jacques Donzelot, University of Paris X‐Nanterre
Colin Gordon, Royal Brompton & Harefield NHS Trust
speaking World1
Jacques Donzelot, University of Paris X‐Nanterre
Colin Gordon, Royal Brompton & Harefield NHS Trust
JD: In the two volumes of his lectures of 1978 and 1979, we see Michel Foucault
making a major intellectual change of direction, moving away from an analysis of
power as the formation and production of individuals towards an analysis of
governmentality, a concept invented to denote the ‘conduct of conducts’ of men and
women, working through their autonomy rather than through coercion even of a
subtle kind. Out of this concept and the extended analysis of political economy
which provides the material for its elaboration, Foucault never produced a published
work. He broke off this series of investigations to occupy himself up to his death in
1984 with the writing of two books, which were evidently closer to his heart, of a
history of the subject passing by way of the Care of the self and the Use of Pleasure
(Foucault 1989a 1989b). This however did not prevent this concept of
governmentality from meeting with great success in the English‐speaking world, in
many ways stimulating there an intellectual dynamic more intense than in the case of
his published works, which rapidly became classics and were treated as such and
with the deference that status entailed, but not with the excitement which met the
lectures on governmentality. In 1991, your volume The Foucault Effect (Burchell, Gordon, Miller 1991) set off this dynamic by centring the “effect” in question precisely on this notion of governmentality. But in France Foucault’s lectures on the subject were not published until 2004 and without at first arousing great interest. So what accounts for this singular success of Foucault’s reflection on governmentality in the Anglo‐Saxon world?
making a major intellectual change of direction, moving away from an analysis of
power as the formation and production of individuals towards an analysis of
governmentality, a concept invented to denote the ‘conduct of conducts’ of men and
women, working through their autonomy rather than through coercion even of a
subtle kind. Out of this concept and the extended analysis of political economy
which provides the material for its elaboration, Foucault never produced a published
work. He broke off this series of investigations to occupy himself up to his death in
1984 with the writing of two books, which were evidently closer to his heart, of a
history of the subject passing by way of the Care of the self and the Use of Pleasure
(Foucault 1989a 1989b). This however did not prevent this concept of
governmentality from meeting with great success in the English‐speaking world, in
many ways stimulating there an intellectual dynamic more intense than in the case of
his published works, which rapidly became classics and were treated as such and
with the deference that status entailed, but not with the excitement which met the
lectures on governmentality. In 1991, your volume The Foucault Effect (Burchell, Gordon, Miller 1991) set off this dynamic by centring the “effect” in question precisely on this notion of governmentality. But in France Foucault’s lectures on the subject were not published until 2004 and without at first arousing great interest. So what accounts for this singular success of Foucault’s reflection on governmentality in the Anglo‐Saxon world?
CG: We had a few advantages in Britain. In the first place, Foucault in his lifetime
was more easygoing about foreign translations of his interviews and lectures than he
was about their publication or reprinting in France. There may also have been more
was more easygoing about foreign translations of his interviews and lectures than he
was about their publication or reprinting in France. There may also have been more
1
Translated with minor revisions from Esprit, Novembre 2007, 82‐95: ‘Comment gouverner les
sociétés libérales? L’effet Foucault dans le monde Anglo‐Saxon’.
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
Translated with minor revisions from Esprit, Novembre 2007, 82‐95: ‘Comment gouverner les
sociétés libérales? L’effet Foucault dans le monde Anglo‐Saxon’.
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
editorial latitude for juxtaposing this material with the work of people who were
collaborating, virtually or actually, with Foucault. Some of Foucault’s important later
lectures and texts dealing with government were given in America and originally
published there. In The Foucault Effect I was able to publish a summary, based on
lecture notes and tapes, of his governmentality lectures: many people could certainly
have done the same in France.
Secondly, there is the difference in the national political conjuncture. In France
after 1981, the dominant preoccupation remained socialism rather than liberalism,
whereas Foucault had seen the importance of liberalism as a political issue and (I
believe) conceived his 1979 lectures partly in response to the conjuncture of the Left’s1978 electoral defeat at the hands of Giscard d’Estaing. It is reasonable to suppose he
would not have greatly lamented the defeat of a Left coalition in which the
Communist Party played a major role. Here Foucault presents neoliberalism as a
modern political rationality worthy of attention and a certain intellectual respect,
while commenting that democratic socialism for its part has failed to engender a
distinctive governmental rationality. This seemed a prescient and pertinent
observation to some of us in Britain who were entering in 1979 on 18 years of
Conservative government, whereas in 1981 France was to enter on twenty years of
mainly socialist government, endowed with the legacy of the “trente glorieuses”, the
three French post‐war decades of notable socio‐economic progress. Viewed from
across the Channel, the French socialist governments seemed to be protecting, and
indeed extending these enviable accomplishments, while a right‐wing British
government was busy dismantling the semi‐corporatist post‐war national system,
and other English‐speaking countries over the same period were getting a dose of the
same medicine.2
collaborating, virtually or actually, with Foucault. Some of Foucault’s important later
lectures and texts dealing with government were given in America and originally
published there. In The Foucault Effect I was able to publish a summary, based on
lecture notes and tapes, of his governmentality lectures: many people could certainly
have done the same in France.
Secondly, there is the difference in the national political conjuncture. In France
after 1981, the dominant preoccupation remained socialism rather than liberalism,
whereas Foucault had seen the importance of liberalism as a political issue and (I
believe) conceived his 1979 lectures partly in response to the conjuncture of the Left’s1978 electoral defeat at the hands of Giscard d’Estaing. It is reasonable to suppose he
would not have greatly lamented the defeat of a Left coalition in which the
Communist Party played a major role. Here Foucault presents neoliberalism as a
modern political rationality worthy of attention and a certain intellectual respect,
while commenting that democratic socialism for its part has failed to engender a
distinctive governmental rationality. This seemed a prescient and pertinent
observation to some of us in Britain who were entering in 1979 on 18 years of
Conservative government, whereas in 1981 France was to enter on twenty years of
mainly socialist government, endowed with the legacy of the “trente glorieuses”, the
three French post‐war decades of notable socio‐economic progress. Viewed from
across the Channel, the French socialist governments seemed to be protecting, and
indeed extending these enviable accomplishments, while a right‐wing British
government was busy dismantling the semi‐corporatist post‐war national system,
and other English‐speaking countries over the same period were getting a dose of the
same medicine.2
JD: One can entirely accept this explanation of the success of governmentality
studies in the Anglo‐Saxon countries. There, neoliberalism triumphed and became an
object of study whereas in France, given the relative dominance of the Socialist Party,we had to struggle for twenty years to produce a reflection on the social which
uncoupled it from socialism and addressed it in terms of the governability of
democracy. Showing that there existed an acceptable exit from socialism seemed to
us more important than grasping the subtleties of liberalism as a political rationality.
I have in mind a series of authors working to that agenda, including Robert Castel
and myself, who were for a time close to Foucault, and others like Pierre
Rosanvallon, who were not, who exemplify this national particularity of our relation
to the question of government, in contrast to what you say about the destiny of that
question in the English‐speaking countries.
studies in the Anglo‐Saxon countries. There, neoliberalism triumphed and became an
object of study whereas in France, given the relative dominance of the Socialist Party,we had to struggle for twenty years to produce a reflection on the social which
uncoupled it from socialism and addressed it in terms of the governability of
democracy. Showing that there existed an acceptable exit from socialism seemed to
us more important than grasping the subtleties of liberalism as a political rationality.
I have in mind a series of authors working to that agenda, including Robert Castel
and myself, who were for a time close to Foucault, and others like Pierre
Rosanvallon, who were not, who exemplify this national particularity of our relation
to the question of government, in contrast to what you say about the destiny of that
question in the English‐speaking countries.
2
Though Thatcher had fallen from power by the time The Foucault Effect was published; in the 80s the British Left’s preferred intellectual guide for the understanding of Thatcherism was Gramsci, not Foucault.
49
Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
Though Thatcher had fallen from power by the time The Foucault Effect was published; in the 80s the British Left’s preferred intellectual guide for the understanding of Thatcherism was Gramsci, not Foucault.
49
Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
One can also wonder if the fact that Foucault’s reflection was at odds with this
French conjuncture might not have contributed to a certain hardening of his political
stance in this terrain, a difficulty in positioning himself which led to abandoning this
aspect of his reflection to concentrate on the care of the self? Because the context wasa very delicate one : he had parted company with his “revolutionary” links without
lapsing into the kind of political philosophy which he hated, the question of regime,
of the State, of all those official objects which he had been so well able to bypass. It
was also the moment when the circle of friends around him in the 70s broke up and
he contented himself with a few close supporters. In a way you invented a French
Foucauldian school which never existed, or no longer exists in France, but, with this
“Foucault effect” where you assembled texts from this loose group of friends in the
70s, weren’t you fabricating an artefact which gave the illusion in Anglo‐Saxon countries of a dynamic which no longer existed in France…. and therebymanaged to produce one in those countries? Hence my second question –what was it that led to this interest in governmentality there?
French conjuncture might not have contributed to a certain hardening of his political
stance in this terrain, a difficulty in positioning himself which led to abandoning this
aspect of his reflection to concentrate on the care of the self? Because the context wasa very delicate one : he had parted company with his “revolutionary” links without
lapsing into the kind of political philosophy which he hated, the question of regime,
of the State, of all those official objects which he had been so well able to bypass. It
was also the moment when the circle of friends around him in the 70s broke up and
he contented himself with a few close supporters. In a way you invented a French
Foucauldian school which never existed, or no longer exists in France, but, with this
“Foucault effect” where you assembled texts from this loose group of friends in the
70s, weren’t you fabricating an artefact which gave the illusion in Anglo‐Saxon countries of a dynamic which no longer existed in France…. and therebymanaged to produce one in those countries? Hence my second question –what was it that led to this interest in governmentality there?
CG: It is quite true that in our volume we did not inform our readers about some
political and personal disagreements between our authors, where we could not see
that these were linked to a clear intellectual difference. My introduction to our book
was (as I admitted) an attempt to construct a plane of consistence between the work
of individuals who, in some cases, had never met, and in others were no longer
collaborators or desiring to be perceived as such. 3 The fabrication of our artefact
ended up taking some time, nearly a decade in all: Foucault’s death in 1984
complicated and changed the terms of the project, which had been begun with his
knowledge and approval, in various ways. Now that five volumes of Foucault’s
lectures from the 1970s have been published, however, one can more easily see how
much of what became, for a time, a shared research programme was already well
developed in his own work, in parts well before 1978. As to Foucault’s trajectory, I think it is with his 1976 lectures, at the latest, that
he starts to distance himself from the militant ideal of the time. The discussion in
those lectures of Sieyès and the Third Estate seems already to prefigure his later
reflection on the formidable capabilities of liberalism as a political rationality. The
intellectual path that led Foucault from the analysis of disciplines to that of
governmentality is perfectly consistent, just as the theme of governmentality
connects consistently in turn with his later themes of care of the self and truth‐telling.
Let’s also remember that this ‘late’ Foucault, who is supposed to have retreated into
solitary study of the Church fathers and the history of the sacraments of penitence,
was also the treasurer of the French branch of Solidarnosc, engaged in public
political and personal disagreements between our authors, where we could not see
that these were linked to a clear intellectual difference. My introduction to our book
was (as I admitted) an attempt to construct a plane of consistence between the work
of individuals who, in some cases, had never met, and in others were no longer
collaborators or desiring to be perceived as such. 3 The fabrication of our artefact
ended up taking some time, nearly a decade in all: Foucault’s death in 1984
complicated and changed the terms of the project, which had been begun with his
knowledge and approval, in various ways. Now that five volumes of Foucault’s
lectures from the 1970s have been published, however, one can more easily see how
much of what became, for a time, a shared research programme was already well
developed in his own work, in parts well before 1978. As to Foucault’s trajectory, I think it is with his 1976 lectures, at the latest, that
he starts to distance himself from the militant ideal of the time. The discussion in
those lectures of Sieyès and the Third Estate seems already to prefigure his later
reflection on the formidable capabilities of liberalism as a political rationality. The
intellectual path that led Foucault from the analysis of disciplines to that of
governmentality is perfectly consistent, just as the theme of governmentality
connects consistently in turn with his later themes of care of the self and truth‐telling.
Let’s also remember that this ‘late’ Foucault, who is supposed to have retreated into
solitary study of the Church fathers and the history of the sacraments of penitence,
was also the treasurer of the French branch of Solidarnosc, engaged in public
3
Sylvain Meyet points out, accurately, that no contributor to our volume except Foucault himself
and the editors explicitly uses the term ‘governmentality’. Travailler avec Foucault. Retours Sur Le
Politique, eds. Sylvain Meyet, Marie‐Cécile Naves, Thomas Ribémont, L’Harmattan, Paris 2005.
50
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
Sylvain Meyet points out, accurately, that no contributor to our volume except Foucault himself
and the editors explicitly uses the term ‘governmentality’. Travailler avec Foucault. Retours Sur Le
Politique, eds. Sylvain Meyet, Marie‐Cécile Naves, Thomas Ribémont, L’Harmattan, Paris 2005.
50
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
discussion with the socialist trade union leader Edmond Maire, and in an institutional project with the law reformer and justice minister, Robert Badinter. It seems, as Michel Senellart rightly notes in his excellent editorial postface to the 1978‐ 79 lectures, that Foucault’s interest in liberalism and neoliberalism is very much connected, around 1978, with his support for the East European dissidents. There is a marked anticommunist context in his lectures of 1978‐9.
I have always been surprised that there was so little contemporary resonance
at the time in France for Foucault’s work on governmentality. In 1979, Foucault said that he would work in the following years’ lectures on the genealogy of political parties – especially, I believe, that of the French Socialist party. I suspect that he was discouraged from pursuing this plan by the limited success of his dialogue with friends in, or close to, the Socialist Party. Perhaps his anticommunism still posed too many problems. But there was never any sign that he had repudiated this series of analyses. In the following years, he encouraged and supported some young researchers he taught at Berkeley who did research into governmentality in America.
I have always been surprised that there was so little contemporary resonance
at the time in France for Foucault’s work on governmentality. In 1979, Foucault said that he would work in the following years’ lectures on the genealogy of political parties – especially, I believe, that of the French Socialist party. I suspect that he was discouraged from pursuing this plan by the limited success of his dialogue with friends in, or close to, the Socialist Party. Perhaps his anticommunism still posed too many problems. But there was never any sign that he had repudiated this series of analyses. In the following years, he encouraged and supported some young researchers he taught at Berkeley who did research into governmentality in America.
At the time of his death, he had a book announced for with Editions du
Seuil entitled Le gouvernement de soi et des autres. I never thought that Foucault would have been in serious political disagreement with your work at around this time or indeed that you would be likely to dissent from his views about security and autonomy in the Welfare State, as set out in his discussion with Robert Bono of the CFDT. Indeed I tried to show that Foucault’s analyses of liberalism were consistent with the approach of your L’invention du social (Donzelot [1984] 1994), notably in the lecture he gave in 1979 on
Fergusson’s History of Civil Society where he sees emerging a notion of society as a “transactional reality”, a mobile surface of engagement between the practices of government and the universe of the governed which constantly tends to escape their grasp. Whereas he had clear political differences with Deleuze – who was another philosophical genius, but no genius in politics. Nowadays, as you know, there as are many people in the world, academics in particular, who favour a Deleuzian Foucault interpreted by Antonio Negri, as there are people interested in governmentality studies. While the successive waves of posthumous publication and circulation of Foucault’s work are reaching and inspiring new generations of readers, some of those who responded to his by now be looking elsewhere for stimulating novelty.
Seuil entitled Le gouvernement de soi et des autres. I never thought that Foucault would have been in serious political disagreement with your work at around this time or indeed that you would be likely to dissent from his views about security and autonomy in the Welfare State, as set out in his discussion with Robert Bono of the CFDT. Indeed I tried to show that Foucault’s analyses of liberalism were consistent with the approach of your L’invention du social (Donzelot [1984] 1994), notably in the lecture he gave in 1979 on
Fergusson’s History of Civil Society where he sees emerging a notion of society as a “transactional reality”, a mobile surface of engagement between the practices of government and the universe of the governed which constantly tends to escape their grasp. Whereas he had clear political differences with Deleuze – who was another philosophical genius, but no genius in politics. Nowadays, as you know, there as are many people in the world, academics in particular, who favour a Deleuzian Foucault interpreted by Antonio Negri, as there are people interested in governmentality studies. While the successive waves of posthumous publication and circulation of Foucault’s work are reaching and inspiring new generations of readers, some of those who responded to his by now be looking elsewhere for stimulating novelty.
As for the results of English‐speaking governmentality studies (not to speak of work in the rest of the world outside France), it is hard to give a short and summary answer. Nikolas Rose and Mitchell Dean published books which have been seen as aiming to systematise governmentality, to make it into a theoretical programme. But many people (and probably both of these authors) would deny that there is or was a ‘governmentality school’ in any clear‐cut sense. Apart from the reference to a limited set of canonical texts by Foucault, there is typically a focus round the issue of
51
Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
51
Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
liberalism and liberty, signalling the need to take liberalism seriously as an
intellectual force which is also subject to historical transformation. Some original
fields of research have been developed, such as the work of Peter Miller on the
genealogy of management, and of Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose on
biotechnologies; links have been made with other approaches, notably with Latour
and actor network theory, in work on “government at a distance”. James Tully,
Duncan Ivison, Tom Osborne, Graham Burchell, and I have been interested in the
affinities between Foucault’s works on governmentality and certain currents of
English‐language history of political thought, such as John Pocock’s work on civic
republicanism. Then there is work by people who were taught by Foucault at
Berkeley, including interesting studies of modern governmentality by David Horn
and Keith Gandal, and Jonathan Simon’s important work on American penal justice.
In recent years it is also becoming clearer that Foucault’s legacy, and particularly his
work on governmentality, has had major international impacts in the rapidly
changing disciplines of geography4 and anthropology and the new and important
sector of postcolonial studies.
intellectual force which is also subject to historical transformation. Some original
fields of research have been developed, such as the work of Peter Miller on the
genealogy of management, and of Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose on
biotechnologies; links have been made with other approaches, notably with Latour
and actor network theory, in work on “government at a distance”. James Tully,
Duncan Ivison, Tom Osborne, Graham Burchell, and I have been interested in the
affinities between Foucault’s works on governmentality and certain currents of
English‐language history of political thought, such as John Pocock’s work on civic
republicanism. Then there is work by people who were taught by Foucault at
Berkeley, including interesting studies of modern governmentality by David Horn
and Keith Gandal, and Jonathan Simon’s important work on American penal justice.
In recent years it is also becoming clearer that Foucault’s legacy, and particularly his
work on governmentality, has had major international impacts in the rapidly
changing disciplines of geography4 and anthropology and the new and important
sector of postcolonial studies.
Does this work imply a distinctive political orientation? In broad terms we are a
loose faction in the post‐New Left diaspora which is still in search of its moral and
ideological identity; more particularly, an episode in the experience of a Left coming
to terms with a fresh advent and partial triumph of liberalism. There is not much
evidence of a direct impact of this body of work on the political domain. I am not
aware that Blair ever read Foucault. Anthony Giddens, for a time the Blair‐Clinton
court philosopher, usually includes a caricatural account of Foucault only as a
marginal item in his doctrinal digests. But I think parts of the formulae of Clinton
and Blair for a ’third way’ may have effectively carried out a form of the operation
which Foucault might have been taken as challenging the socialists to contemplate –
the selective incorporation, in an updated and corrected social democracy, of certain
elements of neoliberal analysis and strategy. In some ways, it is the continuation of a
trend initiated in the 70s by Schmidt in Germany, Giscard in France and Healey in
Britain, and in her different way by Thatcher – the truth‐telling role of government,
in a world of global economic uncertainty and competition, as moral tutor of citizens
in an ethic of enterprise and responsibility. The success of this formula in Britain
seemed for a long time to be limited only by the irritability of citizens and the claims
of the fourth estate, the media, to make and unmake governmental power (both of
these reactions being severely aggravated, of course, by Blair’s extension of his governmental agenda to include the neoconservative enterprise of civilisational confrontation and global war on terror).
loose faction in the post‐New Left diaspora which is still in search of its moral and
ideological identity; more particularly, an episode in the experience of a Left coming
to terms with a fresh advent and partial triumph of liberalism. There is not much
evidence of a direct impact of this body of work on the political domain. I am not
aware that Blair ever read Foucault. Anthony Giddens, for a time the Blair‐Clinton
court philosopher, usually includes a caricatural account of Foucault only as a
marginal item in his doctrinal digests. But I think parts of the formulae of Clinton
and Blair for a ’third way’ may have effectively carried out a form of the operation
which Foucault might have been taken as challenging the socialists to contemplate –
the selective incorporation, in an updated and corrected social democracy, of certain
elements of neoliberal analysis and strategy. In some ways, it is the continuation of a
trend initiated in the 70s by Schmidt in Germany, Giscard in France and Healey in
Britain, and in her different way by Thatcher – the truth‐telling role of government,
in a world of global economic uncertainty and competition, as moral tutor of citizens
in an ethic of enterprise and responsibility. The success of this formula in Britain
seemed for a long time to be limited only by the irritability of citizens and the claims
of the fourth estate, the media, to make and unmake governmental power (both of
these reactions being severely aggravated, of course, by Blair’s extension of his governmental agenda to include the neoconservative enterprise of civilisational confrontation and global war on terror).
4
Space, Knowledge and Power. Foucault and Geography, ed. Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden,
Ashgate 2007.
52
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
Space, Knowledge and Power. Foucault and Geography, ed. Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden,
Ashgate 2007.
52
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
“Governmentality studies”, where they are identifiable as such, have been an
academic activity governed by prevailing institutional and discursive norms;
Foucault’s work, while inspiring to many, does not have the capacity to turn lead into gold. As part of this discursive order, there has been an ongoing discussion about which side such investigations are, or should be, on: that of a new rationalisation of government, or that of a critique of such rationality? No one has quite followed the trajectory of Francois Ewald, from a genealogy of social insurance to an ethical ontology of risk as the noble spirit of the enterprising class. All the same, the theme of governmentality has become involved in a debate where some are accused by others of seeking to legitimate, rather than to problematise, the idea of a “risk society” considered as the ineluctable contemporary form of collective reality which all citizens and governmental techniques are necessarily obliged to confront.
The reception of Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism unfortunately often
seems to be flattened into a set of polemical, ideological, and globalising generalities, dispensing with the kind of descriptive investigation Foucault undertook in 1979 of the different avatars of neoliberalism with their national, historical, and theoretical specificities. Indeed, neglect of post‐war history seems to bea frequent feature of this polemical discourse: from a recent book on neoliberalism by David Harvey, a post‐ modern geographer who views Foucault’s work as obsolete, one might think that neoliberalism had been invented in the 1970s. I hope the full publication of these lectures will revitalise this area of research. I think their publication will also show that this notion of governmentality can usefully be applied alongside Foucault’s earlier and later ideas (power/knowledge, discipline, government of self, perihelia). The theme of governmentality certainly needs to be seen in its continuity with the themes of the “late” or “final” Foucault (we are only talking here of an interval of five or six years): ethics, care of self, parrhesia or truth‐telling, the conditions of existence of critical discourse. To understand these implications in full we will have to await the publication of the final lectures.
academic activity governed by prevailing institutional and discursive norms;
Foucault’s work, while inspiring to many, does not have the capacity to turn lead into gold. As part of this discursive order, there has been an ongoing discussion about which side such investigations are, or should be, on: that of a new rationalisation of government, or that of a critique of such rationality? No one has quite followed the trajectory of Francois Ewald, from a genealogy of social insurance to an ethical ontology of risk as the noble spirit of the enterprising class. All the same, the theme of governmentality has become involved in a debate where some are accused by others of seeking to legitimate, rather than to problematise, the idea of a “risk society” considered as the ineluctable contemporary form of collective reality which all citizens and governmental techniques are necessarily obliged to confront.
The reception of Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism unfortunately often
seems to be flattened into a set of polemical, ideological, and globalising generalities, dispensing with the kind of descriptive investigation Foucault undertook in 1979 of the different avatars of neoliberalism with their national, historical, and theoretical specificities. Indeed, neglect of post‐war history seems to bea frequent feature of this polemical discourse: from a recent book on neoliberalism by David Harvey, a post‐ modern geographer who views Foucault’s work as obsolete, one might think that neoliberalism had been invented in the 1970s. I hope the full publication of these lectures will revitalise this area of research. I think their publication will also show that this notion of governmentality can usefully be applied alongside Foucault’s earlier and later ideas (power/knowledge, discipline, government of self, perihelia). The theme of governmentality certainly needs to be seen in its continuity with the themes of the “late” or “final” Foucault (we are only talking here of an interval of five or six years): ethics, care of self, parrhesia or truth‐telling, the conditions of existence of critical discourse. To understand these implications in full we will have to await the publication of the final lectures.
JD: After this harangue, I plunged into the “governmentality studies” for which you had pointed me to some of the key protagonists. And I emerged – at least for the moment – with mixed feelings of pleasure and unease.
The pleasure was especially in reading sections of the books co‐edited and written by
Nikolas Rose – Foucault and Political Reason, The Powers of Freedom, and the articles of Thomas Lemke. All of these show the pertinence of analysis in terms of governmentality in addressing neoliberalism. They all rely on the Foucaldian refutation of a fixed distinction between the domain of the State and the domain of civil society, between the domain of power and the domain of subjectivity. They use it to show that the “retreat of the State” which is supposed to constitute neoliberalism in fact corresponds to an extension of government.
53
Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
Nikolas Rose – Foucault and Political Reason, The Powers of Freedom, and the articles of Thomas Lemke. All of these show the pertinence of analysis in terms of governmentality in addressing neoliberalism. They all rely on the Foucaldian refutation of a fixed distinction between the domain of the State and the domain of civil society, between the domain of power and the domain of subjectivity. They use it to show that the “retreat of the State” which is supposed to constitute neoliberalism in fact corresponds to an extension of government.
53
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This extension is made possible by replacing the direct government of society
by the State with a form of government at a distance. There is a destatification of
government which goes in hand with the appearance of social technologies which
delegate responsibility for individuals to other autonomous entities: enterprises,
communities, professional organizations, individuals themselves. The use of
contractual agreements, defined of objectives, measures of performance, combined
with local autonomy, allows this shift of responsibility to governmental action at a
distance. In this perspective, “Individuals are to become “experts of themselves”, to
adopt an educated and knowledgeable relation of self‐care in respect of their bodies,
their minds, their forms of conduct and that of the members of their own families”
(Rose in Foucault and Political Reason (1997, 59f)). Individuals become “entrepreneurs of themselves”, and it is as such that they are bonded into society through the choices they make, the risks they take, and the responsibilities for themselves and others
which thereby arise and which they are required to assume. Citizenship is
consequently no longer exercised in a relationship with the State or within a public
space (such a space becoming indeed difficult to discern as such), so much as a
varied range of private, corporate or quasi‐public practices, ranging from work to
consumption : “the consumer citizen becomes an active agent in the regulation of
professional expertise ; the prudent citizen becomes an active agent of security, the
citizen as employee becomes an active agent in the regeneration of industry” (ibid.)
It is at this point, at this equation of the simultaneous growth of individual
autonomy and responsibility – one believes oneself autonomous: what is worse, one
is; but this autonomy is designed to make us into agents of the system – that my
unease begins. Not because the analysis is false – I entirely endorse it as a necessary
stage, as far as it does – but because it is presented as sufficient, whereas the
underlying questions start just at the point where it stops, sure of itself and of its
intellectual effect. The sophisticated social technologies of advanced neoliberal
society, it tells us, contain an enlarged component of freedom along with an enlarged
component of required responsibility in comparison with those of the Welfare State.
Just as the latter marked an advance on old‐style political economy, so political
economy had represented a move beyond the model of reason of state. Each new
model is evaluated only against the performance of its predecessor: they are always
analysed at their ‘technical’ level, never in terms of a political criterion or in terms of
value. This is the cost of the ability of governmentality studies to describe the
materiality of social technologies while avoiding, for instance, the habitual
denunciations of neoliberalism as an ideological rhetoric designed to mask a false
economic theory and a practical anti‐humanism, as Marxists and antiglobalisers like
to put it. But doesn’t the avoidance of that kind of simplification lead, in its turn, to a
central ambivalence at the core of this kind of analysis? Isn’t that what you yourself
point out when you say that this kind of analysis can lead either to a critique of
political rationality or to a rationalisation of this same set of policies?
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Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
by the State with a form of government at a distance. There is a destatification of
government which goes in hand with the appearance of social technologies which
delegate responsibility for individuals to other autonomous entities: enterprises,
communities, professional organizations, individuals themselves. The use of
contractual agreements, defined of objectives, measures of performance, combined
with local autonomy, allows this shift of responsibility to governmental action at a
distance. In this perspective, “Individuals are to become “experts of themselves”, to
adopt an educated and knowledgeable relation of self‐care in respect of their bodies,
their minds, their forms of conduct and that of the members of their own families”
(Rose in Foucault and Political Reason (1997, 59f)). Individuals become “entrepreneurs of themselves”, and it is as such that they are bonded into society through the choices they make, the risks they take, and the responsibilities for themselves and others
which thereby arise and which they are required to assume. Citizenship is
consequently no longer exercised in a relationship with the State or within a public
space (such a space becoming indeed difficult to discern as such), so much as a
varied range of private, corporate or quasi‐public practices, ranging from work to
consumption : “the consumer citizen becomes an active agent in the regulation of
professional expertise ; the prudent citizen becomes an active agent of security, the
citizen as employee becomes an active agent in the regeneration of industry” (ibid.)
It is at this point, at this equation of the simultaneous growth of individual
autonomy and responsibility – one believes oneself autonomous: what is worse, one
is; but this autonomy is designed to make us into agents of the system – that my
unease begins. Not because the analysis is false – I entirely endorse it as a necessary
stage, as far as it does – but because it is presented as sufficient, whereas the
underlying questions start just at the point where it stops, sure of itself and of its
intellectual effect. The sophisticated social technologies of advanced neoliberal
society, it tells us, contain an enlarged component of freedom along with an enlarged
component of required responsibility in comparison with those of the Welfare State.
Just as the latter marked an advance on old‐style political economy, so political
economy had represented a move beyond the model of reason of state. Each new
model is evaluated only against the performance of its predecessor: they are always
analysed at their ‘technical’ level, never in terms of a political criterion or in terms of
value. This is the cost of the ability of governmentality studies to describe the
materiality of social technologies while avoiding, for instance, the habitual
denunciations of neoliberalism as an ideological rhetoric designed to mask a false
economic theory and a practical anti‐humanism, as Marxists and antiglobalisers like
to put it. But doesn’t the avoidance of that kind of simplification lead, in its turn, to a
central ambivalence at the core of this kind of analysis? Isn’t that what you yourself
point out when you say that this kind of analysis can lead either to a critique of
political rationality or to a rationalisation of this same set of policies?
54
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
In terms of political rationalities, in France we can all think of Francois
Ewald’s celebration of risk written from his current standpoint as a leading official of
the national employers’ organization. This is a classic case of counter‐transference where the analyst falls blindly in love with his object, in this case thetechnology of insurance, and finds in it the key to all problems of social and political life. But the other standpoint, the critique of political rationality, can be no less irritating when it is presented as a self‐sufficient conclusion. I will givetwo examples which have struck me from my recent remedial reading course in governmentality studies.
The first is from Nikolas Rose’s book Powers of Freedom. In a chapter called
“the community‐civility game“, he tries to establish a parallel between Bentham’s famous Panopticon and the virtues claimed for it by Bentham in terms of preserving morality, stimulating industry and spreading education, and the qualities attributed to the notion of community promoted by authors like Etzioni, Putnam, Fukuyama and Belloch (already a somewhat hastily amalgamated group), or with that of the idea of associational networks considered as new diagrams of power, promoting “moral” conducts in likewise subtly imperious ways. The “we” of community is shown as exercising a technico‐moral authority akin to that of the penitentiary Panopticon. At a stroke the Foucauldian analysis of governmentality as ”conduct of
conducts”, as action at a distance, loses its distinction from the disciplinarising
techniques of the 19th century. But more serious is the way this assimilation serves the cultivation of a posture of radical critique.
In Barbara Cruikshank’s analysis of the function of the notion of empowerment in the USA, I found this same inclination to adopt a posture of radical
critique at the cost of losing the subtle capabilities inherent in of this notion of the ‘conduct of conducts’. When she denounces the invitation to self‐empowerment, she is not so far from our own Jean Baudrillard and his celebration of the inertia of the silent majority as a form of resistance to the modern injunctions to participation and expression. One needs to be aware that she is analysing Californian ”Welfare to work” programmes which are more systems of forced labour under harsh conditions than steps to the empowerment of individuals over themselves or in their relation
with others: whereas this theme of empowerment does also and above all have a dimension of acquisition of power over oneself thanks to the power which the collective one belongs to is able to produce.
Ewald’s celebration of risk written from his current standpoint as a leading official of
the national employers’ organization. This is a classic case of counter‐transference where the analyst falls blindly in love with his object, in this case thetechnology of insurance, and finds in it the key to all problems of social and political life. But the other standpoint, the critique of political rationality, can be no less irritating when it is presented as a self‐sufficient conclusion. I will givetwo examples which have struck me from my recent remedial reading course in governmentality studies.
The first is from Nikolas Rose’s book Powers of Freedom. In a chapter called
“the community‐civility game“, he tries to establish a parallel between Bentham’s famous Panopticon and the virtues claimed for it by Bentham in terms of preserving morality, stimulating industry and spreading education, and the qualities attributed to the notion of community promoted by authors like Etzioni, Putnam, Fukuyama and Belloch (already a somewhat hastily amalgamated group), or with that of the idea of associational networks considered as new diagrams of power, promoting “moral” conducts in likewise subtly imperious ways. The “we” of community is shown as exercising a technico‐moral authority akin to that of the penitentiary Panopticon. At a stroke the Foucauldian analysis of governmentality as ”conduct of
conducts”, as action at a distance, loses its distinction from the disciplinarising
techniques of the 19th century. But more serious is the way this assimilation serves the cultivation of a posture of radical critique.
In Barbara Cruikshank’s analysis of the function of the notion of empowerment in the USA, I found this same inclination to adopt a posture of radical
critique at the cost of losing the subtle capabilities inherent in of this notion of the ‘conduct of conducts’. When she denounces the invitation to self‐empowerment, she is not so far from our own Jean Baudrillard and his celebration of the inertia of the silent majority as a form of resistance to the modern injunctions to participation and expression. One needs to be aware that she is analysing Californian ”Welfare to work” programmes which are more systems of forced labour under harsh conditions than steps to the empowerment of individuals over themselves or in their relation
with others: whereas this theme of empowerment does also and above all have a dimension of acquisition of power over oneself thanks to the power which the collective one belongs to is able to produce.
Elena’s note:
Barbara Cruikshank’s work needs to be looked at for that kind of “invitation to self-empowerment” is what is laid out for a lifetime in cults. Members do exactly that: concentrate on their own self empowerment while they give up their social empowerment to the guru which turns against them so radically that they’ll end up committing suicide in a classically perfect cult!
What I am after is showing that there is no healthy development of the individual or society if they are conceived of independently of each other as this neoliberal paradigms seem to be affirming. Looked at superficially as I am doing, the cult is an extension of neoliberal society, its coherent consequence, because the state neither assumes the responsibility it is endowed with leaving the individual at a loss and the individual does not assume his social responsibility, leaving the community at the hands of the guru who, inevitably will structure it to his own benefit and according to his talents as much as his limitations. In the transaction, all parties avidly promote self-destruction. End of note
The collective in this case is not thought of as demanding a sacrifice from the individual, but rather as a necessary support for individual self‐affirmation. But the choices as examples of these caricatural initiatives may also serve as indicating a wish to cultivate an exclusively critical posture. One can also wonder if this ambivalence of these analyses in terms of governmentality may not lead them to incline towards one side or the other, the critical or the laudatory side, depending on the location where it is conducted. In Anglo‐Saxon countries where neoliberalism was imposed from the start of the 80s, Foucault studies provide the means of a sophisticated critique, albeit one which is
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Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
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Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
visibly lacking a capacity to propose alternatives. Does this political ambivalence in
the notion of governmentality not condemn it to serving an ideological function,
determined by political circumstance, whereas it aspires to be precisely the antidote
of an ideological reading of forms of government?
the notion of governmentality not condemn it to serving an ideological function,
determined by political circumstance, whereas it aspires to be precisely the antidote
of an ideological reading of forms of government?
CG: One negative feature of the Foucauldian diaspora is that people can be
seduced by the idea of revealing the truth of the present, but this is can be
contaminated by a taste for hyperbolic discourses which exceed any critical purchase
on the real. The leading example of this is no doubt the work Giorgio Agamben, who
detects in all government a virtual programme of extermination, and views the
condition of the governed as universal reduction to the condition of homo sacer, and
the like‐minded commentators who in the UK see every Blairite innovation in the
policing of families as a step on the road to serfdom.
seduced by the idea of revealing the truth of the present, but this is can be
contaminated by a taste for hyperbolic discourses which exceed any critical purchase
on the real. The leading example of this is no doubt the work Giorgio Agamben, who
detects in all government a virtual programme of extermination, and views the
condition of the governed as universal reduction to the condition of homo sacer, and
the like‐minded commentators who in the UK see every Blairite innovation in the
policing of families as a step on the road to serfdom.
Elena’s note:
This is very interesting. It parallels the cult’s extreme condition. That reality is carried out in the cult as a microcosmic experiment of the neoliberal status quo. All government would be a virtual programme of extermination only if the economic interests are disconnected to the well being of the whole. What the neoloberal status quo is promoting is production for the benefit of the opportunist which is no foundation for a society or the well being of the many unprepared people, not necessarily in the lower classes which turn out to be more practically efficient in the long run, precisely because of the economic pressure they are in. End of note.
As for the question behind your question, that is to say Foucault’s critical
standpoint vis‐à‐vis governmentality in terms of its potentiality for progressive
technical invention, I suggest this brings us back to the distinctive quality of
liberalism itself. Foucault says that the liberal art of government consists in the production and consumption of freedom, the creation and destruction of freedom. It is (as some say) the government of freedom and (as others remind us) the
government of unfreedom – or rather, the government of a freedom which is itself
an unfreedom. Liberals (Keynes and Beveridge) were architects of the Welfare State:
other liberals have been its critics and reformers. It is the paradox of liberalism in all
its forms (neo, advanced, post…) that much action is necessary before one can laisser
faire – action even to the extent of acting to bring into existence the reality (freedom,
society) which it is desired to laisser faire “faire société”, as indeed you have it in the
title of your recent book. Hence, one might partly counter some of your reproaches
by saying that this kind of analysis brings out the ambiguity and ambivalence of
liberal realities, in advance of any question of the practical consequences one chooses
– or fails to choose – to infer from the analysis.
standpoint vis‐à‐vis governmentality in terms of its potentiality for progressive
technical invention, I suggest this brings us back to the distinctive quality of
liberalism itself. Foucault says that the liberal art of government consists in the production and consumption of freedom, the creation and destruction of freedom. It is (as some say) the government of freedom and (as others remind us) the
government of unfreedom – or rather, the government of a freedom which is itself
an unfreedom. Liberals (Keynes and Beveridge) were architects of the Welfare State:
other liberals have been its critics and reformers. It is the paradox of liberalism in all
its forms (neo, advanced, post…) that much action is necessary before one can laisser
faire – action even to the extent of acting to bring into existence the reality (freedom,
society) which it is desired to laisser faire “faire société”, as indeed you have it in the
title of your recent book. Hence, one might partly counter some of your reproaches
by saying that this kind of analysis brings out the ambiguity and ambivalence of
liberal realities, in advance of any question of the practical consequences one chooses
– or fails to choose – to infer from the analysis.
The detached, Weberian value‐freedom of Foucault’s description of the constitutive
operations of liberalism as a governmentality may look to some like a disarming of
the power of critique. You are asking whether and how, having unlearned the easy
rhetoric of denunciation, one can then reintroduce a pertinent basis for critical
evaluation.
In the first place, the very experience of a degree of discomfort at the
paradoxes, antinomies and aporias of liberal liberty may help lead to healthy lucidity
rather than moral incapacitation. Further, this element of detachment does not
prevent, but even encourages the introduction of certain counter‐analyses within the
operations of liberalism as a governmentality may look to some like a disarming of
the power of critique. You are asking whether and how, having unlearned the easy
rhetoric of denunciation, one can then reintroduce a pertinent basis for critical
evaluation.
In the first place, the very experience of a degree of discomfort at the
paradoxes, antinomies and aporias of liberal liberty may help lead to healthy lucidity
rather than moral incapacitation. Further, this element of detachment does not
prevent, but even encourages the introduction of certain counter‐analyses within the
5
Hindess, B. (2001) ‘The Liberal Government of Unfreedom’, Alternatives: Social Transformation
and Humane Governance, 26: 93‐111.
56
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
Hindess, B. (2001) ‘The Liberal Government of Unfreedom’, Alternatives: Social Transformation
and Humane Governance, 26: 93‐111.
56
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
terms of the liberal paradigm: for instance, the theory of social capital invented by Robert Putnam (that is, of the resources which individuals draw from relational networks of solidarity and local and private forms of mutual support), or again, in relation to the Lockean theory of self‐ownership as the necessary foundation of the liberal economy, the requirement that each person be endowed with the necessary resources to enable that self‐ownership to be effective in practice (as Robert Castel argues in his recent book on Social Insecurity, in terms interestingly similar to those of Amartya Sen’s work on “capability rights”).
Having said this, many who work in governmental studies do not feel called upon to
take up the tasks you propose to them. In the book you quote, Nikolas Rose writes that in this type of work the aim is to destabilize and think beyond “all those claims made by others to govern us in the name of our own well‐being”, and that studies of governmentality ”do not try to put themselves at the service of those who would govern better” [59‐60]. This sounds like a form of knowledge which wants to serve only on the side of contestation. However, while recognising the critical contribution which his analyses have indeed made, others might wish at least to qualify those statements of position (which Nikolas himself firmly refuses to assert as group doctrines). Because it is hard to see why it should be a necessary axiom of the study of governmentality that all government (even one which claims to take account of the good of the governed) is an evil in itself, or that the wish to govern better should
necessarily be something from which one ought ethically to disassociate oneself.
Certainly, Foucault himself said that critique is not obliged to harness itself to the programming of a reform designed only to maintain an existing relation of forces, but he also said that in talking with a government one can be “debout et en face” – that is, engage in dialogue as independent and equal interlocutor. In this view of things, critique, struggle, discussion and collective invention are compatible and complementary tasks. I suppose that it was not out of pure malice that Foucault suggested to the French Socialists in 1979 the project to invent a governmentality of their own; he indeed subsequently showed some evidence of willingness to assist with that task.
The seductive element in Foucault’s rereading of liberalism was the thought
that the art of better government was presented as the art of governing less, and that in this sense liberalism forms an autocritique of governmental reason: a governmentality which develops and corrects itself through its own critique.
Alongside this there was his other seductive notion of critique (inspired by Kant’s definition of Enlightenment as an emancipation from tutelage) as an indocility of the governed, a will not to be governed so much or in such a way. That is where the permanent task of critique would demand an inventive sequel: how to govern in order to be governed less, how to govern in order to be governed or to govern oneself in the way one wishes? Here we meet Foucault’s refusal of the double blackmail, by the policy experts for whom a critique is invalidated if not
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Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
take up the tasks you propose to them. In the book you quote, Nikolas Rose writes that in this type of work the aim is to destabilize and think beyond “all those claims made by others to govern us in the name of our own well‐being”, and that studies of governmentality ”do not try to put themselves at the service of those who would govern better” [59‐60]. This sounds like a form of knowledge which wants to serve only on the side of contestation. However, while recognising the critical contribution which his analyses have indeed made, others might wish at least to qualify those statements of position (which Nikolas himself firmly refuses to assert as group doctrines). Because it is hard to see why it should be a necessary axiom of the study of governmentality that all government (even one which claims to take account of the good of the governed) is an evil in itself, or that the wish to govern better should
necessarily be something from which one ought ethically to disassociate oneself.
Certainly, Foucault himself said that critique is not obliged to harness itself to the programming of a reform designed only to maintain an existing relation of forces, but he also said that in talking with a government one can be “debout et en face” – that is, engage in dialogue as independent and equal interlocutor. In this view of things, critique, struggle, discussion and collective invention are compatible and complementary tasks. I suppose that it was not out of pure malice that Foucault suggested to the French Socialists in 1979 the project to invent a governmentality of their own; he indeed subsequently showed some evidence of willingness to assist with that task.
The seductive element in Foucault’s rereading of liberalism was the thought
that the art of better government was presented as the art of governing less, and that in this sense liberalism forms an autocritique of governmental reason: a governmentality which develops and corrects itself through its own critique.
Alongside this there was his other seductive notion of critique (inspired by Kant’s definition of Enlightenment as an emancipation from tutelage) as an indocility of the governed, a will not to be governed so much or in such a way. That is where the permanent task of critique would demand an inventive sequel: how to govern in order to be governed less, how to govern in order to be governed or to govern oneself in the way one wishes? Here we meet Foucault’s refusal of the double blackmail, by the policy experts for whom a critique is invalidated if not
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Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
accompanied by a prescription for reform, and by those who use the converse charge
of recuperation, for whom every unprejudiced discussion of what is possible or
desirable comes down to a capitulation of critique before the status quo.6
It is true that most of us have remained at a certain distance from the attempts,
in the English‐speaking world as in France, to “remoralise” politics through the
injection of new or revived doctrines of civic and democratic virtue. Some thinkers,
like William Connolly and James Tully, have made interesting attempts to
incorporate values of difference and multiplicity in political ethics. My reading of
your recent book Faire société suggests to me that you also subscribe to that general
project.
Why have we kept our distance from these initiatives (apart from the
consideration that today’s civic pedagogues are sometimes too easily recognisable as
recycled revolutionary ideologues)? For heuristic reasons Foucault drew a distinction
between his field of research on governmental practices and the history of the
political doctrine of sovereignty and its legitimate foundation, the history of citizens
and their rights. This may have been initially necessary and effective as a means to
establish and make visible a new object of study (except in respect of making that
new object visible to historians of political thought), but I think it is time now for a
more connected approach so that we can look, for instance, at what relation there
might be between a certain notion of citizenship and a certain way of being
governed7. This might help us to think more effectively about what we are becoming
and what we wish or do not wish to become.
Another benefit of Foucault’s initiative which has been noticed recently is that
it anticipates the effects of globalisation in relativising the status of national state
institutions.8 It surprised me that François Ewald and Blandine Kriegel said recently
that Foucault was concerned with problems of his time and that now we have other
concerns. Foucault’s concerns in his later years seem to me to include notably
neoliberalism, Islam, security, ethics, and the rights and global solidarity of the governed, all issues which I think we still recognise as pertinent today.
of recuperation, for whom every unprejudiced discussion of what is possible or
desirable comes down to a capitulation of critique before the status quo.6
It is true that most of us have remained at a certain distance from the attempts,
in the English‐speaking world as in France, to “remoralise” politics through the
injection of new or revived doctrines of civic and democratic virtue. Some thinkers,
like William Connolly and James Tully, have made interesting attempts to
incorporate values of difference and multiplicity in political ethics. My reading of
your recent book Faire société suggests to me that you also subscribe to that general
project.
Why have we kept our distance from these initiatives (apart from the
consideration that today’s civic pedagogues are sometimes too easily recognisable as
recycled revolutionary ideologues)? For heuristic reasons Foucault drew a distinction
between his field of research on governmental practices and the history of the
political doctrine of sovereignty and its legitimate foundation, the history of citizens
and their rights. This may have been initially necessary and effective as a means to
establish and make visible a new object of study (except in respect of making that
new object visible to historians of political thought), but I think it is time now for a
more connected approach so that we can look, for instance, at what relation there
might be between a certain notion of citizenship and a certain way of being
governed7. This might help us to think more effectively about what we are becoming
and what we wish or do not wish to become.
Another benefit of Foucault’s initiative which has been noticed recently is that
it anticipates the effects of globalisation in relativising the status of national state
institutions.8 It surprised me that François Ewald and Blandine Kriegel said recently
that Foucault was concerned with problems of his time and that now we have other
concerns. Foucault’s concerns in his later years seem to me to include notably
neoliberalism, Islam, security, ethics, and the rights and global solidarity of the governed, all issues which I think we still recognise as pertinent today.
JD: I agree with this idea that the concept of governmentality has a prescient value
in relation to globalisation, because it registers, in a sense in advance, the
relativisation of States and nations, and I would also see in this advantage an
enhanced possibility of linking the ”technical :” analysis of governmentality with the
‘moral’ analysis of forms of citizenship corresponding to this new historical context.
in relation to globalisation, because it registers, in a sense in advance, the
relativisation of States and nations, and I would also see in this advantage an
enhanced possibility of linking the ”technical :” analysis of governmentality with the
‘moral’ analysis of forms of citizenship corresponding to this new historical context.
6
To state what may be obvious: Foucault’s insistence on recognising the critical and anti‐essentialist components of liberalism and neoliberalism does not mean that these doctrines are therefore to be considered as the permanent homeland of critical thinking in general.
7
As early as Histoire de la Folie, Foucault had identified the modern political problem of reconciling the two incarnations of the citizen, the “man of law” and the “man of government”.
8
CF. W Larner and W Walters eds. Global Governmentality. Governing International Spaces. (2004)
58
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
To state what may be obvious: Foucault’s insistence on recognising the critical and anti‐essentialist components of liberalism and neoliberalism does not mean that these doctrines are therefore to be considered as the permanent homeland of critical thinking in general.
7
As early as Histoire de la Folie, Foucault had identified the modern political problem of reconciling the two incarnations of the citizen, the “man of law” and the “man of government”.
8
CF. W Larner and W Walters eds. Global Governmentality. Governing International Spaces. (2004)
58
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
The analysis of neoliberal governmentality shows a common orientation of
developed countries striving to adapt to new realities. This orientation involves
reducing the direct role of States in the economy and social relations, in favour of a new economy of social relations which emphasises autonomy and individual responsibility at all the local levels where autonomy and responsibility can be brought into interaction. In this sense, neoliberal governmentality is indeed a pure ”technical” product of critiques addressed to the Welfare State for the past forty years: left critics denouncing the creation in the name of progress of an order ever more disposed to control individuals, reducing their effective autonomy under the guise of an enhanced solicitude, and critics on the right who indicted the dismantling of the order necessary for progress through the deresponsibilising of individuals living under the increasing care of the State. The difficulty of sustaining
an ever‐rising burden of State revenues without affecting the global competitiveness of enterprises prompted governments to use and play off these two critiques against each other, to counter the growth of demands and recriminations addressed at the State.
developed countries striving to adapt to new realities. This orientation involves
reducing the direct role of States in the economy and social relations, in favour of a new economy of social relations which emphasises autonomy and individual responsibility at all the local levels where autonomy and responsibility can be brought into interaction. In this sense, neoliberal governmentality is indeed a pure ”technical” product of critiques addressed to the Welfare State for the past forty years: left critics denouncing the creation in the name of progress of an order ever more disposed to control individuals, reducing their effective autonomy under the guise of an enhanced solicitude, and critics on the right who indicted the dismantling of the order necessary for progress through the deresponsibilising of individuals living under the increasing care of the State. The difficulty of sustaining
an ever‐rising burden of State revenues without affecting the global competitiveness of enterprises prompted governments to use and play off these two critiques against each other, to counter the growth of demands and recriminations addressed at the State.
The ‘civic’ question is so little foreign to this ‘technical’ solution that it arises out of the very fact of its application. For it is all very well to govern at a distance, relegating to the local level the play of encounters between the needs for autonomy and the demand for responsibility. That still requires that these “localities”, these diverse groupings, communities, enterprises, collectivities, form a society, and are not too disparate, too mutually estranged, too indifferent to anything outside of their own destiny, too incapable of a shared appreciation of what is right and just for all members of these constructed collectivities. Here there arises the question of consent to shared institutions, and therefore to the shared costs they impose. This consent is a form of civic engagement (civisme), its abstract incarnation, which we can counterpose to the direct mutual trust of people and citizens within the local frame of the specific community where they live.
Trust and consent are two relative values, the balance of whose roles can vary in the production of a civic society. They are in some sense the equivalents for citizenship of what autonomy and responsibility represent in the context of governmentality. They call for a similar concern for their mutual adjustment – what is the right relation of these two registers to permit the establishment of a civic society? And the intersection of these two registers, the ”technical” register of autonomisation and responsibility, and the ”civic” relation of consent and trust determines the way the concern for governmental effectiveness succeeds or fails to connect with the realisation of a civic society. Bringing together these two demands allows us to pose the question of how to make society exist in the context of neoliberalism. It seems to me that Europe is the place par excellence for the search for
equilibrium between these two lines of transformation, the one which affects the governed and the one which affects the citizen.
59
Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
Trust and consent are two relative values, the balance of whose roles can vary in the production of a civic society. They are in some sense the equivalents for citizenship of what autonomy and responsibility represent in the context of governmentality. They call for a similar concern for their mutual adjustment – what is the right relation of these two registers to permit the establishment of a civic society? And the intersection of these two registers, the ”technical” register of autonomisation and responsibility, and the ”civic” relation of consent and trust determines the way the concern for governmental effectiveness succeeds or fails to connect with the realisation of a civic society. Bringing together these two demands allows us to pose the question of how to make society exist in the context of neoliberalism. It seems to me that Europe is the place par excellence for the search for
equilibrium between these two lines of transformation, the one which affects the governed and the one which affects the citizen.
59
Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
CG: Consent and trust and also, if possible, respect, are certainly things which
every government today desires to produce and to enjoy – respect being incidentally
the item which others most like to deny government, at least in Britain. The
production of respect demands, in turn, persuasion and pedagogy. Persuasion for
the social classes which are resistant to change because they feel insecure, and pedagogy for the minorities who may be inclined to disorder or revolt. On these
subjects, alongside Foucault’s accounts of the pastoral function of government it is
worth reading Paul Veyne’s essay on the irritability of the governed, ”When the
individual is fundamentally affected by the power of the State“ (Economy and Society,
Vol. 34, No. 2, May 2005, translated by Graham Burchell). Veyne explains how
Roman opinion was humiliated and violated by the spectacle of a ruler, the emperor
Nero, who forced the ruled to serve as the audience of an aesthetic performance. In
Britain we until recently had a political leader who was the great tenor of what you
yourself in the 80s dubbed the coming ‘civilisation of change’: the man of truth as
‘change‐maker’, telling the truth of global competitive modernity and the consequent
obligation of all and each to be changed. But, just as Foucault taught us, it transpires
that people can resist anything, even governmental parrhesia, even the pedagogy of
reality and the ethic of change. The man of change and truth was not assassinated,
but he was accused by a vocal segment of public opinions of being a corrupter and a
liar. No governmentality will abolish resistance to government.
every government today desires to produce and to enjoy – respect being incidentally
the item which others most like to deny government, at least in Britain. The
production of respect demands, in turn, persuasion and pedagogy. Persuasion for
the social classes which are resistant to change because they feel insecure, and pedagogy for the minorities who may be inclined to disorder or revolt. On these
subjects, alongside Foucault’s accounts of the pastoral function of government it is
worth reading Paul Veyne’s essay on the irritability of the governed, ”When the
individual is fundamentally affected by the power of the State“ (Economy and Society,
Vol. 34, No. 2, May 2005, translated by Graham Burchell). Veyne explains how
Roman opinion was humiliated and violated by the spectacle of a ruler, the emperor
Nero, who forced the ruled to serve as the audience of an aesthetic performance. In
Britain we until recently had a political leader who was the great tenor of what you
yourself in the 80s dubbed the coming ‘civilisation of change’: the man of truth as
‘change‐maker’, telling the truth of global competitive modernity and the consequent
obligation of all and each to be changed. But, just as Foucault taught us, it transpires
that people can resist anything, even governmental parrhesia, even the pedagogy of
reality and the ethic of change. The man of change and truth was not assassinated,
but he was accused by a vocal segment of public opinions of being a corrupter and a
liar. No governmentality will abolish resistance to government.
Could the currents of work and reflection we have been discussing contribute to the
formation of a European political culture? ”It would be a good idea”, as Gandhi said
of Western civilisation. Foucault talked perhaps less about the common market than
the social market (expect perhaps in that enigmatic question in one of his 1976
lectures:” and what if Rome, once again, were to conquer revolution?“): is anyone
writing the history of the linkage between those two themes? 9
Foucault sketched the 20th‐century international transfers (sometimes covert,
often mediated by emigration and exile) of neoliberal techniques and formulae, much
as he had outlined the international movement of ideas around 1900 on crime,
security and social defence. It would be interesting today to continue this kind of
analysis, tracing for instance the transfer between national and political camps of
notions and techniques of social exclusion and inclusion.
Perhaps we need to enlarge our thinking even beyond the still growing
European space. It is worth noting that the global (at least Anglophone) impact of the
formation of a European political culture? ”It would be a good idea”, as Gandhi said
of Western civilisation. Foucault talked perhaps less about the common market than
the social market (expect perhaps in that enigmatic question in one of his 1976
lectures:” and what if Rome, once again, were to conquer revolution?“): is anyone
writing the history of the linkage between those two themes? 9
Foucault sketched the 20th‐century international transfers (sometimes covert,
often mediated by emigration and exile) of neoliberal techniques and formulae, much
as he had outlined the international movement of ideas around 1900 on crime,
security and social defence. It would be interesting today to continue this kind of
analysis, tracing for instance the transfer between national and political camps of
notions and techniques of social exclusion and inclusion.
Perhaps we need to enlarge our thinking even beyond the still growing
European space. It is worth noting that the global (at least Anglophone) impact of the
9
It is interesting that in his 1979 lectures on liberalism Foucault cites Kant’s Perpetual Peace on the
cosmopolitan right, prescribed by nature, of global free trade. “The guarantee of perpetual
peace is, in effect, commercial globalisation (la planétarisation commerciale)” [2004, 60: my
translation]. Cf. W Walters and J H Haahr, Governing Europe. Discourse, Governmentality and
European Integration (2005).
60
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
It is interesting that in his 1979 lectures on liberalism Foucault cites Kant’s Perpetual Peace on the
cosmopolitan right, prescribed by nature, of global free trade. “The guarantee of perpetual
peace is, in effect, commercial globalisation (la planétarisation commerciale)” [2004, 60: my
translation]. Cf. W Walters and J H Haahr, Governing Europe. Discourse, Governmentality and
European Integration (2005).
60
Foucault Studies, No. 5, pp. 48‐62.
notion and theme of governmentality has coincided and in several cases interacted
with the growth of the new discipline of postcolonial studies. The relation between
proponents of postcolonial studies and Foucault’s work have been, in a somewhat
similar way to the situation in feminist studies, contested and often contestatory;
sometimes one has the impression of a generation of fractious and needy orphans,
afraid of their own freedom, who cannot forgive Foucault for failing to write their
books as well as his, or for only having written the books he lived to write;
nevertheless, the encounter has led to some beginnings of analyses of colonial and
post‐ or neo‐colonial styles of governmentality.10 Perhaps we are also seeing the
beginnings of a new analysis of the question which preoccupied Foucault, along with
neoliberalism, in 1978‐9, namely “Islamic government”, together with the now very
current question of the possible civil and political modes of existence of Muslim
citizens in societies with a liberal regime of government. If a European political
culture was capable of accommodating and welcoming such reflections, it would be a
step forward for Europe and the world.
with the growth of the new discipline of postcolonial studies. The relation between
proponents of postcolonial studies and Foucault’s work have been, in a somewhat
similar way to the situation in feminist studies, contested and often contestatory;
sometimes one has the impression of a generation of fractious and needy orphans,
afraid of their own freedom, who cannot forgive Foucault for failing to write their
books as well as his, or for only having written the books he lived to write;
nevertheless, the encounter has led to some beginnings of analyses of colonial and
post‐ or neo‐colonial styles of governmentality.10 Perhaps we are also seeing the
beginnings of a new analysis of the question which preoccupied Foucault, along with
neoliberalism, in 1978‐9, namely “Islamic government”, together with the now very
current question of the possible civil and political modes of existence of Muslim
citizens in societies with a liberal regime of government. If a European political
culture was capable of accommodating and welcoming such reflections, it would be a
step forward for Europe and the world.
Translated by Colin Gordon
Bibliography
Barry, Andrew, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, Foucault and Political Reason:
Liberalism, Neo‐Liberalism, and the Rationalities of Government. London: Routledge,
1996.
Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, The Foucault Effect: Studies in
Governmentality. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Cruikshank, Barbara, The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Dean, Mitchell M., Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: Sage
Publications Limited., 1999.
Dean, Mitchell M. and Barry Hindess, Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary
Rationalities of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Ivison, Duncan, The Self at Liberty: Political Argument and the Arts of Government.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Rose, Nikolas, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
Steven Legg, ‘Beyond the European Province: Foucault and Postcolonialism,’ in
Liberalism, Neo‐Liberalism, and the Rationalities of Government. London: Routledge,
1996.
Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, The Foucault Effect: Studies in
Governmentality. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Cruikshank, Barbara, The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Dean, Mitchell M., Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: Sage
Publications Limited., 1999.
Dean, Mitchell M. and Barry Hindess, Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary
Rationalities of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Ivison, Duncan, The Self at Liberty: Political Argument and the Arts of Government.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Rose, Nikolas, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
Steven Legg, ‘Beyond the European Province: Foucault and Postcolonialism,’ in
10
For a useful survey see Steven Legg, ʺBeyond the European Province: Foucault and
Postcolonialismʺ In Jeremy Crampton and Stuart Elden (Eds) Space, Knowledge, and Power:
Foucault and Geography (op. cit.)
61
Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
For a useful survey see Steven Legg, ʺBeyond the European Province: Foucault and
Postcolonialismʺ In Jeremy Crampton and Stuart Elden (Eds) Space, Knowledge, and Power:
Foucault and Geography (op. cit.)
61
Donzelot & Gordon: Governing Liberal Societies
62
Jeremy Crampton and Stuart Elden, Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and
Geography. Kent: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006.
Tully, James, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Context. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Jeremy Crampton and Stuart Elden, Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and
Geography. Kent: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006.
Tully, James, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Context. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
61. Elena - March 13, 2010 [Edit]Elena’s note:
Barbara Cruikshank’s work needs to be looked at for that kind of “invitation to self-empowerment” is what is laid out for a lifetime in cults. Members do exactly that: concentrate on their own self empowerment while they give up their social empowerment to the guru which turns against them so radically that they’ll end up committing suicide in a classically perfect cult!
What I am after is showing that there is no healthy development of the individual or society if they are conceived of independently of each other as this neoliberal paradigms seem to be affirming. Looked at superficially as I am doing, the cult is an extension of neoliberal society, its coherent consequence, because the state neither assumes the responsibility it is endowed with leaving the individual at a loss and the individual does not assume his social responsibility, leaving the community at the hands of the guru who, inevitably will structure it to his own benefit and according to his talents as much as his limitations. In the transaction, all parties avidly promote self-destruction. End of note
Elena’s note 2:
This is very interesting. It parallels the cult’s extreme condition. That reality is carried out in the cult as a microcosmic experiment of the neoliberal status quo. All government would be a virtual programme of extermination only if the economic interests are disconnected to the well being of the whole. What the neoliberal status quo is promoting is production for the benefit of the opportunist which is no foundation for a society or the well being of the many unprepared people, not necessarily in the lower classes which turn out to be more practically efficient in the long run, precisely because of the economic pressure they are under. The irony of it all is that those in power will self annihilate together with the system they invented! Just like in cults! End of note.
62. Elena - March 13, 2010 [Edit]“The irony of it all is that those in power will self annihilate together with the system they invented! Just like in cults!”
This is an even more interesting phenomenon because we are then faced with the question of who is really in power! What is in power! Where is the power?
If we look at the cult phenomenon without individual blaming without justifying because of that the lack of responsibility, in the long run the cult leaders are as corrupted and drained by the experience as the members. What ever s/he and his inner circle did, they became victims of it like the rest of the members. Beyond the blame, this is important because what we begin to realize is that “good will” is not enough. Who would convincingly affirm that there wasn’t good will in the beginnings of such enterprises?
It is a very interesting and frightening position to be in because it would practically imply that at least the western world is at a loss. A critical point in which it does not know how or where it stands. When even “good will” is not enough, “essence” is questioned and has to mature. How much suffering and destruction will be necessary before it rests on its self?
63. ton - March 14, 2010 [Edit]“Who would convincingly affirm that there wasn’t good will in the beginnings of such enterprises?”
Elena,
apologies for interrupting this very interesting conversation you’re having with yourself… based on previous experience, i know that if you are convinced of an idea then it is impossible to dissuade you, so that’s not the intention (some might view the “courage of conviction” to be a strength, but all too often it’s simply a condition of being closed minded — there are always other perspectives that are just as valid, just as ‘truthful.’ what is more to the point: “Rather than dispute world-views, it can be more beneficial to understand WHY someone holds the view they do. A view is held not because the view is more correct than another, but rather because of the outlook disposition of the person”).
apologies for interrupting this very interesting conversation you’re having with yourself… based on previous experience, i know that if you are convinced of an idea then it is impossible to dissuade you, so that’s not the intention (some might view the “courage of conviction” to be a strength, but all too often it’s simply a condition of being closed minded — there are always other perspectives that are just as valid, just as ‘truthful.’ what is more to the point: “Rather than dispute world-views, it can be more beneficial to understand WHY someone holds the view they do. A view is held not because the view is more correct than another, but rather because of the outlook disposition of the person”).
i will not pretend to “convincingly affirm” the lack of good will “of such enterprises” for a couple of reasons: one, i cannot speak to the general notion of “such enterprises” (but i will base the following comments on my own experiences about a specific example of such an “enterprise”). secondly, if you, elena, are already convinced of the ‘good will’ involved, then i know (also from experience) that any argument to the contrary will not convince you otherwise, but will in fact have the opposite effect causing you to become further entrenched in any point of view you identify yourself with.
with the above being said, ‘good will’ as applied to the “beginnings” of the FOF was not the motivating factor. from the beginning, burton was a sociopath, he was only looking for a way to satisfy his own appetites at any expense…. and he found a way to do so at the expense of others. granted he had to start somewhere, so he might have started relatively small and “humbly” enough, but as he found a way to feed his appetites and have them catered to, confidence in his power over others grew and his delusions inflated. as for the FOF ’students,’ those who did/do the ‘catering to’ — even at the beginning, were their motivations entirely based on “good will” ? let’s not mistake naivete’ and ignorance for “good will.” there might have been elements of good will that would cause a person to seek a better way of life, for self and for others, but upon closer scrutiny that does not entirely explains it. what was the lure in the first place? the promise of unlimited “consciousness” ? thinking of yourself as being better than and hoping to rise above “the masses” and beyond the ordinary? separating oneself from the rest of the human race as FOF members did/do, possessing “powers” vicariously (through burton), or hoping to develop “personal powers” that other ‘mere mortals’ did not possess… what motivates people to have power over others, to be better than others? fear and an innate drive for self-preservation factors into the equation too, burton certainly plays on peoples’ fears. i suggest that prying back the veneer of “good will” will reveal the desire for power, control, and vanity and narcissism had more to do with motivation than did genuine good will. anyone who is drawn into the web of the fof is not yet “conscious” enough for a genuine motive of good will, they do not possess the requisite self-knowledge…. you live and learn. from “the beginnings” and even in “students” as well as burton, genuine good will was at best a flimsy facade and a rationalization…. it’s a nice thought but you fool yourself (again) if you think it was about “good will.”
“Cult members can’t just be normal good people; they have to be moral titans, playing out grand heroic roles in an epic cosmic moral melodrama. Many members feel that their lives will be pointless and meaningless if they don’t play such grand roles in life — to live an ordinary life and be a normal good person is merely meaningless, pointless, existence”.
sorry again about interrupting, i’ll leave you with something from a book i’m reading:
“The way to peace is to realize that the world-outlooks conjointly, in their reciprocal action on one another, can be in a certain sense explained, but that they cannot lead into the inner nature of truth if they remain one-sided. One must experience in oneself the truth-value of the different world-outlooks, in order — if one may say so — to be in agreement with truth.”
Rudolf Steiner, Human and Cosmic Thought P. 54
Rudolf Steiner, Human and Cosmic Thought P. 54
64. Elena - March 14, 2010 [Edit]Hi Ton,
I don’t know why you feel you need to apologize so insistently when I have consistently welcomed your participation. The sarcasm is so unnecessary and does neither you nor I any good.
You do not interrupt me, I enjoy your participation! I work on a blog because I am looking for communication such as yours. Your ideas matter to me whether I agree with them or not.
So let’s bite on the question of good will.
What I understand you are saying is that Robert Burton from the beginning was an ill man looking to abuse other people and by deduction, the same could be said about Girard Haven, Linda Tulisso, Rowena and Charles Taylor, and three or four hundred other inner circle members of the Fellowship cult. Those for you are just naïve people? Like me and the rest of us who supported it for decades?
Ton: anyone who is drawn into the web of the fof is not yet “conscious” enough for a genuine motive of good will,
You seem to think that good will is an aspect of consciousness and that people who join the fof don’t have enough of it to have good will while for me, good will is an aspect of human essence, it looks for things naively and bumps itself against reality!. I stand with the idea in law that people act on good will and you must prove ill will before you can prove their criminality.
You seem to treat the fof as a “conscious” fraud perpetuated by its leaders on the members and I on the contrary believe that the fof is a tragedy precisely because of the unconsciousness of its leaders as much as its members. A “tragedy” that should nevertheless be confronted legally!
You seem to think that good will is an aspect of consciousness and that people who join the fof don’t have enough of it to have good will while for me, good will is an aspect of human essence, it looks for things naively and bumps itself against reality!. I stand with the idea in law that people act on good will and you must prove ill will before you can prove their criminality.
You seem to treat the fof as a “conscious” fraud perpetuated by its leaders on the members and I on the contrary believe that the fof is a tragedy precisely because of the unconsciousness of its leaders as much as its members. A “tragedy” that should nevertheless be confronted legally!
You and I don’t disagree in the essential understanding of the problem. What we are discussing is a difference in the why and how it happened. Perhaps it’s easier if I take sentence by sentence:
Ton: let’s not mistake naivete’ and ignorance for “good will.”
Ton: let’s not mistake naivete’ and ignorance for “good will.”
E: that’s unconsciousness to me, aspects of it. I think even Robert was naïve about the task he was aiming for. He was right about self-remembering but that was only half of the System and severed from external consideration it turned against itself. Instead of developing conscious beings, it developed slaves at his service!
Ton: there might have been elements of good will that would cause a person to seek a better way of life, for self and for others, but upon closer scrutiny that does not entirely explains it. what was the lure in the first place? the promise of unlimited “consciousness” ? thinking of yourself as being better than and hoping to rise above “the masses” and beyond the ordinary?
Ton: there might have been elements of good will that would cause a person to seek a better way of life, for self and for others, but upon closer scrutiny that does not entirely explains it. what was the lure in the first place? the promise of unlimited “consciousness” ? thinking of yourself as being better than and hoping to rise above “the masses” and beyond the ordinary?
E: Was it like that for you? Did you think you were better and wanted to rise above the masses and beyond the ordinary?
I personally don’t think that any one of us wanted that and am convinced that those inside are equally convinced that THAT is not what they are there for even though that is what they are actually doing. In other words, I don’t think they are CONSCIOUS of the fact that THAT is what they are doing: that Robert Burton and the Fellowship cult, induces their “shield personality” to become active in such direction. At the other end of the spectrum what I believe essence wants and wanted in members was to “better” themselves, rise above their own limitations and live in greater harmony with other people, in “culture” with other people!
I personally don’t think that any one of us wanted that and am convinced that those inside are equally convinced that THAT is not what they are there for even though that is what they are actually doing. In other words, I don’t think they are CONSCIOUS of the fact that THAT is what they are doing: that Robert Burton and the Fellowship cult, induces their “shield personality” to become active in such direction. At the other end of the spectrum what I believe essence wants and wanted in members was to “better” themselves, rise above their own limitations and live in greater harmony with other people, in “culture” with other people!
(You will again tell me the system’s vocabulary and ideas are not worthwhile for you so how can we progress in this discussion when for me it is pretty absurd to try to understand phenomena without a clear understanding of the human being? A child is a child. They are naive, innocent but not evil. The idea that man has an essence, develops a “shield” personality and has the capacity to develop a personality true to his own self, not just one that complies to the outside world he or she is growing up in, is simply a map to understand different moments of human development according to ideas presented in not only the system but psychology but beyond those, it is also my own experience. If we had been “mature” we wouldn’t have joined the fellowship, we weren’t. It’s very simple but how that immaturity was turned into a “legion of pimps” fostering the systematic rape of people not only sexually but economically and psychologically is what we are trying to decipher.)
Ton: …..separating oneself from the rest of the human race as FOF members did/do,
E: as you well know, separating oneself from the rest of the human race is not a fourth way idea, in fact it’s the opposite of the fourth way. The CULT separated the members from the rest of the human race and became a cancer of the human race. Where you and I simply seem to differ is in how that happened. You seem to think that these people are CONSCIOSLY choosing that, I am convinced that they are victims of their own invention, victims of our own unconsciousness, as all tragedies happen to be.
E: as you well know, separating oneself from the rest of the human race is not a fourth way idea, in fact it’s the opposite of the fourth way. The CULT separated the members from the rest of the human race and became a cancer of the human race. Where you and I simply seem to differ is in how that happened. You seem to think that these people are CONSCIOSLY choosing that, I am convinced that they are victims of their own invention, victims of our own unconsciousness, as all tragedies happen to be.
Ton: possessing “powers” vicariously (through burton), or hoping to develop “personal powers” that other ‘mere mortals’ did not possess…
E: Powers! My poor comrades in the Fellowship cult! How many years is it since you last saw them? When I remember the pathetism of people walking out of the Sunday meetings I could sit and cry! Some would come out with big, wide open eyes, convinced that they’d been to heaven and back through a third state shot of presence! We all were for different reasons! Some because we kept controlling the impulse to scream at the tediousness and domination of Robert’s never ending monologue and form. Powers! No one has been more disempowered than Fellowship members in this world. You can kill a person and still not disempower them psychologically the way they are disempowered in the Fellowship cult. Physical death is better than psychological death. Surely the I takes less time to recover its forces. Can you imagine what processes will be necessary to recover from that disempowerment? If we think that those of us who leave take a lifetime to recover from the experience, what will take for those who die still inside? What happens to the soul or the spirit of such people?
You and I don’t disagree Ton. Power is a two faced dragon and cults develop the evil dragon while consciousness develops consciousness!
You and I don’t disagree Ton. Power is a two faced dragon and cults develop the evil dragon while consciousness develops consciousness!
No one wanted to become a pimp supporting rape, everyone wanted to become a conscious being supporting culture! Our most human being WANTED that but developed the opposite! That is essence and good will but it isn’t enough. How and what we do to acquire conscious qualities matters and what we did was give our self, our lives and humanity up and literally sacrificed everything for the benefit of no one, not even Robert, for decadence is not a benefit. Useless suffering is useless suffering: decadence.
Ton: what motivates people to have power over others, to be better than others?
E: nice questions, you help me think about an article I was reading this morning that I’ll post subsequently. In our shielded personality to have power over others is the practice of elevating your self as a superior being in relation to the other. One who is therefore justified in “exploiting” him or her, economically, sexually, morally or ethically. Economic and sexual exploitation have much been looked at but the “energy” that passes between individuals in every interchange has hardly been discussed and it is as objective as if it were an economic or physical transaction. In an ethical realm, power is what both individuals experience when they treat each other respectfully: “power” as flow, as being, as existence. They mutually “empower” each other in the mutual acknowledgement, while when one places him or herself above the other, he or she dis-empowers the other. So going back to the FOF and the authoritarian relationship imposed by Robert, it is obviously a disempowering relationship which in classic tendencies in cults, leads to self-annihilation.
THAT is not what anyone wanted, not even Robert. THAT is what happened. THAT is what even today, exfellowship members are not willing to avoid in the fofblog and greater fellowship, by their unwillingness to take legal action against the cult.
Ton: fear and an innate drive for self-preservation factors into the equation too, burton certainly plays on peoples’ fears. i suggest that prying back the veneer of “good will” will reveal the desire for power, control, and vanity and narcissism had more to do with motivation than did genuine good will. anyone who is drawn into the web of the fof is not yet “conscious” enough for a genuine motive of good will, they do not possess the requisite self-knowledge…. you live and learn. from “the beginnings” and even in “students” as well as burton, genuine good will was at best a flimsy facade and a rationalization…. it’s a nice thought but you fool yourself (again) if you think it was about “good will.”
E. Desire for power, control and vanity
Power is a quality of the I. The power to move within different realms; the power to be one with the whole: the power of unity. Everyone is looking for that power. When that Power of Love, of unity, is turned upside down and backwards and used as a hierarchic tool of separation between people, you have a cult: a guru feeds on the power of the self the members give up to him or her. The process of evolution turns against the participants who “involute” instead and will inevitably self-annihilate even if that takes the form of cancer or other such illnesses.
E. Desire for power, control and vanity
Power is a quality of the I. The power to move within different realms; the power to be one with the whole: the power of unity. Everyone is looking for that power. When that Power of Love, of unity, is turned upside down and backwards and used as a hierarchic tool of separation between people, you have a cult: a guru feeds on the power of the self the members give up to him or her. The process of evolution turns against the participants who “involute” instead and will inevitably self-annihilate even if that takes the form of cancer or other such illnesses.
It is similar with control. Control is a form of power and can be the control of one’s self and the control of social behavior. In cults the guru controls people against their development, people control themselves against their own development. They give up the possibility to make decisions to the guru who then controls each and every aspect of their lives. No one wants that but too many people are succumbing to that. It is ingrained in the unconsciousness of our present social practices.
Vanity? Pride of being is the other side of vanity. Essence in each member, in each human being, rightfully experiences pride in being. Who would not want that? Who didn’t want that when they joined a Conscious School? But under the conditions of such structures that move under authoritarian power, that false vanity develops that stands on the role people are given by the authority instead of their own being and understanding.
We all want the power of being, the control that comes with such power and the pride it arouses. They are beautiful things to develop! The question is HOW!
The great role of cults, the unfortunate role of cults, is to have shown us what NOT to do to achieve such qualities!
65. ton - March 14, 2010 [Edit]e: “Are those for you are just naïve people?Like me and the rest of us who supported it for decades?”
elena, if we stick to the original point, “GOOD WILL IN THE BEGINNINGS OF SUCH ENTERPRISES,” i would say that in the case of these associates you’ve named, all are people like you and i, who IN THE BEGINNING, that is, when they joined, didn’t know what exactly they were getting themselves into and so in relation to “BEGINNINGS,” yes, naivete’ and ignorance (not in a pejorative sense) is the major factor. speaking personally, when i finally caught on to the scam i extracted myself from the situation. as for these others you name, including yourself, if they know and purposely perpetuate the scam, then obviously it’s not a question of naivete’ but one of complicity and criminality.
e: “You seem to treat the fof as a “conscious” fraud perpetuated by its leaders on the members and I on the contrary believe that the fof is a tragedy precisely because of the unconsciousness of its leaders as much as its members.”
then we disagree… i think it is a ‘conscious’ fraud but that certainly doesn’t make the situation any less a ‘tragedy’ — in fact it may add to the tragedy. i agree that continuation of the organization relies on a lack of awareness in the neophytes, and perpetuation of the organization relies partly on the ignorance and avoidance of the facts of the situation on the part of those who stick around beyond the neophyte stage and continue to enable. but the ‘vampires’ at the center of things, those who ‘benefit’ at the cost of others are aware of what they’re doing…. they may not know how else to live, what else to do with themselves or how else to relate to others, so in a sense they’re trapped by the situation and although you might consider that “tragic” (and it is), they’ve brought it on themselves, so i can’t feel sorry for them. i’m talking about people in positions of power in the organization, those who are in on the scam and actively perpetrating it — being trapped in a situation by their own doing does not imply ‘unconsciousness’ — it says more to me about the moral fiber of these individuals, or rather the lack thereof.
i think i can speak generally for many who like myself, figured out the scam and at that point made the choice to leave, what other options were there? stay and become ever more enmeshed in the problem ? no! after devoting my entire being to the FOF, and burning all my bridges in the process, i too, (much like the vampires who stay), didn’t know what else to do, where else to go, how to even begin to leave…. but i did it anyway. an enabler CAN quit enabling when they “grow a pair of balls” (figuratively speaking) and stand as an individual, these parasites can continue to perpetrate the fraud or they can do otherwise if/when they choose to.
e: “Was it like that for you? Did you think you were better and wanted to rise above the masses and beyond the ordinary?”
yes, in hindsight, and based on who i am now, i see that although i certainly had idealistic notions about life, what motivated me then was based on immaturity and the narcissism of youth.
e: “I don’t think they are CONSCIOUS of the fact that THAT is what they are doing: that Robert Burton and the Fellowship cult, induces their “shield personality” to become active in such direction.”
maybe i just misunderstand you… much of the allure of belonging to the FOF is based on vanity, “members” believe that they are special because of their affiliation, they are the select, the best, the ‘chosen few,’ that they’re better than everyone else on the planet, everyone else is simply moon-fodder…. this is all about vanity. if these continuing enablers catch on that they’re being “played,” then they could find a way out, or they could choose to play along and try to take advantage of the situation. of course many of us who did choose to leave know how difficult that can be, but is that an excuse?
some people like having their vanity stroked, they believe that they are in fact special, so much better than the “common” person, people can find reinforcement and support for this addiction in the fof. that IS their life, if they left the fof they would no longer be “special” — is that to say they are not “CONSCIOUS” ? i think at some point, the “unconscious” argument just becomes a lame excuse, i think many, maybe not all, but many and especially people who’ve been members for a while, know what’s going on and decide to stay on, for whatever reason… in any case, after a period of time in the organization, ignorance cannot be used as an excuse. getting back to the original point, in the beginning there were motivating factors other than what might have appeared to be “good will” — with time layers of illusion are stripped away… what changes?
66. Elena - March 14, 2010 [Edit]I agree with everything you are saying in the surface. I think where we differ is that you seem to part from a position in which you think this people are “consciously” doing evil to others; That they know that what they are doing is wrong and continue to do it. I don’t believe that is true about cults of this particular type.
To begin with I don’t believe there is conscious evil! For me evil is precisely lack of consciousness in any of its forms. I do believe that there are people who intentionally deal in black magic which is about as evil as it can get to me but that most evil in our world is simply due to unconsciousness or a lack of contact with one’s self and hence with the world!
I don’t believe that anyone in the FOF including Robert or Girard ever set out and said, we are going to make a wonderful duo or team to reap these fools off. Reap or rip? What I have seen is that they divided into different personalities and their “right side doesn’t know what their left side is doing” rather literally specially in Girard! Strange that he would completely disenable half of his physical self.
The real problem in the world today and in the cult in particular is not that people are evil and harm each other, it’s that people have no consciousness of the harms they’ve suffered and continue to reproduce the same harm unaware of what and how they are doing it. The need to believe that they are not only not doing harm but that they are doing good is so powerful that no one in any harmful institution would admit to you that they are doing harm. Harm has become an acceptable way of living with each other. We are all disappearing behind the harm because no one wishes to take responsibility for it.
Take the motor industry? Would the owner of Ford admit the harm he’s done to nature and the human being? When we get in our personal vehicle, are we willing to admit even to our selves that we are damaging the ecological balance? Are the United States willing to take responsibility for the damage that the car industry is doing in the world?
The US or any other country for that matter?
The US or any other country for that matter?
The whole economic system has and is still using people for the benefit of a few individuals. There is nothing “human” about the economic system! We know that, we are not inventing a theory. The earth belongs to all of us but a few think it belongs to them and have the power to make of that a reality. It’s not about communism, we know under communist regimes “equality” was also not possible but it is about a different consciousness that is able to acknowledge the problems and their consequences.
The problem of cults will not be solved by closing one Cult like the FOF but by addressing what in people is attracted to cult life, what made the development of such cancers possible and what stops people from leaving them. What in our societies has become so corrupt that people are escaping into a different form of addiction: the cult: an addiction that is by far more dangerous to society than any drug.
Going back to the question of good will, I continue to believe that it is not ill will what draws people to cults and not ill will what keeps them inside. Being brainwashed affects the will in such a way that people are convinced they are doing good even if they are not. They are not connected with their own self and humanity; they are living in “pockets” of reality that prone them to act against themselves and others. They are essentially immature human beings who do not have the will to stop themselves or others from perpetuating harm. They do not have enough trust on their own judgement and act in harmony with what everyone else in their milieu is doing. Millions of dollars are poured out in society each day to maintain extremely harmful practices to humanity. The cult is just a cancer, it is not the cause of the illness.
The question of goodwill, will, trust, are all important in the understanding of this issues. Seeing the phenomenon is not understanding it. We have to get in there and dig out the inner life of people to understand why the outer life is so destructive and vice-versa, we need to look at the outer practices of society to understand why our inner lives became so harmful.
Thanks for sharing.
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