The Separation between State and Religion

In time we will realize that Democracy is the entitlement of individuals to every right that was in its times alloted to kings. The right to speak and decide, to be treated with decency, to serve and be served by people in a State of “love” that is, to serve with one’s work for the development of ‘life’. To belong to the Kingdom of Human Beings without racial, national, social or academic separations. To love and be loved. To die at the service of the whole and be honored in one’s death, for one’s life and work was legitimately valued. To be graceful and grateful. To have the pride and the humility of being One with the Universe, One with every realm of Existence, One with every living and deceased soul. To treat with dignity and be treated with dignity for One is dignified together with All others and Life itself. To walk the path of compassion, not in the sorrow of guilt but in the pride of being. To take responsability for one’s mistakes and sufferings and stand up again and again like a hero and a heroine and face the struggle that is put at one’s feet and in one’s hands. Millions of people, millions and millions of people might take many generations to realize the consciousness of our humaneness but there is no other dignified path for the human being.

The “work” as I conceive it is psychological and political. Psychology is the connection between the different dimensions within one’s self and Politics is the actualization of that consciousness in our practical lives. Religion is the ceremony that binds the connectedness between the individual and the Universe. The separation between religion, politics and science, the arts and sports is, in the sphere of the social, the reflection of the schizophrenia within the individual and the masses. The dialogue between individuality and the "human" belongs to consciousness. The tendency to develop cults resides in the shortcomings we’are finding in life as it is structured today. “Life” has become the private property of a few priviledged who cannot profit from it because as soon as it is appropriated it stops to be “life” or “life-giving”.

We are all the victims of our own invention and each one is called upon to find solutions. The only problem is believing our selves incapable of finding them. We are now free to use all Systems of knowledge objectively, sharing them without imposing our will on each other. To become objective about our lives means to understand that the institutions that govern its experience are critically important. That we are one with the governments, one with the religious activities that mark its pace, that the arena’s in which we move our bodies and the laboratories in which we explore our possibilities are ALL part and parcel of our own personal responsibility. That WE ARE ONE WITH EACH OTHER AND EVERYTHING AROUND US and acknowledge for ourselves a bond of love in conscious responsibility. That we human beings know ourselves part of each other and are willing and able to act on our behalf for the benefit of each and every individual. That we no longer allow governments, industries, universities or any other institution to run along unchecked by the objective principles of humaneness. That we do not allow gurus to abuse their power or governors to steal the taxes and use them to their personal advantage in detriment of the whole. That we do not allow abuse from anyone anywhere because life is too beautiful to do so and that we are willing to stop the rampant crime with the necessary compassion Conscious knowledge is every individual's right. Conscious action is every individual's duty.

Blog Archive

Monday 22 November 2010

The Potential of Crime to Undermine Australia’s National Security1

Security Challenges 
Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  - 131 - 
The Potential of Crime to Undermine 
Australia’s National Security1 
Peter Grabosky and John McFarlane 
National security entails more than a country’s ability to withstand military invasion.  A wider 
conception of national security includes the burdens on the state that are imposed as a result of 
crime.  Domestic criminality can weaken a society and its economy, with obvious implications 
for national security.  Even crime that occurs on the other side of the world, whether it entails 
major financial crime or the cultivation of opium, can have domestic ramifications.  So too can 
crime that occurs in neighbouring nations, whose own security problems may have unfortunate 
spillover effects.  This article explores crime and its impact on Australia’s national security.  It 
observes that a degree of convergence in Australian policing and security institutions has 
become apparent, and is likely to continue.  
Introduction: A Wider Conception of National Security 
At first blush, aside from the traditional offences of treason and sedition, 
crime and national security would appear to be different fields of inquiry.  
However, the concept of national security has expanded significantly in 
recent years, and the term now means many things to many people.  Today, 
national security entails more than merely the capacity to defend one’s 
territorial borders against the invading armed forces of rival nation states.2  
Even to the defence establishment, strategic threats today are very different 
today from those of 1939.  With the end of the Cold War and the actual or 
impending collapse of a number of states around the world, Australia’s 
strategic environment has changed dramatically.3  Today, two of the most 
significant (if not the most significant) threats to Australia are posed by a 
loose coalition of non-state actors,4 and by a strain of influenza.5  
The end of the Cold War has seen an increase in the prevalence of state 
failure.  State failure can result from, and in turn, facilitate, various kinds of 
criminal activity.  The term “asymmetric warfare”6 embraces a good deal of 
                                                 
1 
 The authors would like to thank Douglas Kinnard, Michael Stohl, Stephan Frühling and an 
anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft. 
2 
 Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005, New York, Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
3 
 See, for example, ‘The Failed States Index,’ Foreign Policy, no. 145 (May/June 2006), pp. 50- 
58. 
4 
 A. Dupont ‘Transformation or stagnation? Rethinking Australia's defence,’ Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 57 no.1 (April 2003), pp. 55-76. 
5 
 M. Perdue and D. Swayne, ‘Public Health Risk from Avian Influenza Viruses,’ Avian Diseases, 
vol. 49, no. 3 (September 2005), pp. 317–327. 
6 
 I. Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005.  In 1999, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff defined 
“Asymmetric Warfare” as “Attempts to circumvent or undermine U.S. strengths while exploiting 
Security Challenges 
- 132 - Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  
activity that is punishable under conventional criminal law.  And the nature of 
crime itself has changed significantly in recent years.  The rapid mobility of 
people, ideas, finance, commodities, and viruses (both the microbial variety 
and those that infect one’s hard drive), driven in large part by the revolution 
in information technology and telecommunications, has been accompanied 
by criminal opportunities that were unimaginable not long ago.  The 
successful exploitation of these opportunities can weaken a state.  So the 
relationship between crime and national security may be closer than 
apparent at first glance.7 
While a wider conception of national security may be novel in living memory, 
it is by no means new to the 21st century.  Consider the following thoughts, 
more than 2000 years old: 
Plans and projects for harming the enemy are not confined to any one 
method.  Sometimes entice his wise and virtuous men away so that he has 
no counsellors.  Or send treacherous people to his country to wreck his 
administration.  Sometimes use cunning deceptions to alienate his ministers 
from the sovereign.  Or send skilled craftsmen to encourage his people to 
exhaust their wealth.  Or present him with licentious musicians and dancers 
to change his customs.  Or give him beautiful women to bewilder him.8  
As Sun Tzu perceived so long ago, there are many ways to harm a country 
short of a military invasion.  Sun Tzu may still have had eventual military 
attack in the back of his mind, but was looking at the multidimensional 
strength of a nation as the basis of security.  A state is not necessarily 
conquered by force of military dominance, but may also collapse for want of 
popular support.  The demise of the Soviet Union is illustrative.9  Today, 
national security may be conceptualized to include not only defence of one’s 
territory, but also the ability of governments to provide basic services to their 
citizens, or at the very least, a stable platform for the functioning of free 
markets.10  Whether one subscribes to this minimalist conceptualization or 
                                                                                                                   

U.S. weaknesses, using methods that differ significantly from the U.S.’ expected method of 
operations. … [Asymmetric approaches] generally seek a major psychological impact, such as 
shock or confusion, that affects an opponent’s initiative, freedom of action, or will.  Asymmetric 
methods require an appreciation of an opponent’s vulnerabilities.  Asymmetric methods often 
employ initiative, non-traditional tactics, weapons and technology, and can be applied at all 
levels of political warfare – strategic, operational and tactical – and across the spectrum of 
military operations.” CJCS, Joint Strategic Review, Washington, DC, 1999, p. 2. 
7 
 J. McFarlane, ‘Transnational Crime as a Security Issue’, in Carolina G. Hernandez and Gina 
R. Pattugalan (eds.), Transnational Crime and Regional Security in the Asia Pacific, Manila, 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific/Institute for Strategic and Development 
Studies, 1999, pp. 23-57. 
8 
 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, transl. Samuel B. Griffith, London, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp 
113-114. 
9 
 R. Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993. 
10 
 A. Dupont, East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Security Challenges 
Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  - 133 - 
rather to the multidimensional foundations of a strong state, powerful and 
autonomous, consider the following as components of national security;  
Economy 
Political legitimacy 
Health 
Education 
Social welfare 
Social cohesion 
Interpersonal trust 
Environmental quality11 
All of these impact upon a nation’s ability to defend itself territorially.  A 
serious deficit in any of these areas can weaken a country significantly.  It is 
not accidental that the economy heads this list, and dominates the policy 
agendas of many nations.  The famous observation “It’s the economy, 
stupid”,12 made during the 1992 US presidential election, applied well 
beyond American politics.  A wealthy country can afford not only guns and 
butter, but also schools, hospitals, clean water, and honest public servants.  
To the extent that the wealthy country is ethnically or religiously diverse, 
there will be enough of “the pie” to go around, and diverse elements will 
have less cause to fight each other for a share.   
Ours is a complex world, and it is popular nowadays to remark that 
everything is related to everything else.  While this may be a slight 
                                                 
11 
 The World Bank considers many of these issues in terms of “governance” which it defines as 
“a set of traditions and institutions by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; 
formulate and implement sound policies; demonstrate respect of citizens and the state for 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”  The World Bank has 
also established six “governance indicators” to measure the effectiveness and stability of 
political systems, including their vulnerability to crime.  The six Indicators are: 
1. Voice and Accountability – i.e. the political process, freedom of the press, human rights, etc.; 
2. Political Stability and the Absence of Violence – i.e. the physical strength or vulnerability of 
the state; 
3. Governance Effectiveness – including the independence of the bureaucracy; 
4. Regulatory Quality – i.e. policies on contracts, prices, banks, trade, etc.; 
5. Rule of Law – i.e. the incidence of crime, the quality of the criminal justice system, etc.; 
6. Control of Corruption – defined as “the exercise of public power for private gain.” 

771165~menuPK:1866365~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html> 
[Accessed 26 March 2007]. 
12 
 Attributed to Democratic Party strategist, James Carville. 
Security Challenges 
- 134 - Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  
exaggeration, crime can adversely impact on each of the above factors, 
which bear upon the strength of the state and on the ability of the state to 
defend itself and to provide for its citizens.  The following pages will explore 
these relationships in greater detail, and their relevance to Australia’s 
national security.  
Local and Global Manifestations of Crime 
STREET CRIME 
Crime is a mansion with many rooms.  Some is entirely local.  The term 
“street crime” has been coined to refer to conventional crime in public 
places.  Of course, a great deal of crime is committed in private between 
acquaintances and intimates.  Homicide, assault, rape, robbery, burglary are 
all classic street crimes.13  
WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
The term “white collar crime” was coined nearly seventy years ago to refer to 
crimes committed by persons of relatively high social status in the course of 
their occupation.14  The term is now used more often to refer to the offence 
rather than to the offender, and embraces a range of criminal activities of a 
financial nature, including embezzlement, fraud, insider trading, tax evasion 
and corruption.15 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME16 
Some crimes are transnational.  The criminal act itself may involve the 
crossing of national frontiers, as in smuggling, illegal immigration, or the 
unauthorized incursion of fishers into one’s territorial waters.17  Alternatively, 
the advent of digital technology may enable a crime to be committed in one 
                                                 
13 
 A. Graycar and P. Grabosky (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Australian Criminology
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
14 
 E. Sutherland, White Collar Crime: The Uncut Version, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1983. 
15 
 R. Smith ‘White Collar Crime,’ in A. Graycar and P.Grabosky (eds.), The Cambridge 
Handbook of Australian Criminology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 126- 
156.  See also Kip Schlegel and David Weisburd (eds.), White Collar Crime Reconsidered, 
Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1992; Stephen Rosoff, Henry Pontell and Robert Tillman 
(eds.), Profit Without Honor: White-Collar Crime and the Looting of America, 4th Ed., Upper 
Saddle River, NJ, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007; and James Gobert and Maurice Punch, 
Rethinking Corporate Crime, London, Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003. 
16 
  Transnational crime exists where: 
- It is committed in more than one state, 
- It is committed in one state, but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or 
control takes place in another state 
- It is committed in one state but involves a criminal group that engages in criminal activities in 
more than one state, 
- It is committed in one state, but has substantial effects on another state. 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, New York, United Nations, 
2000, Art 3, para 2. 
17 
 M. Galeotti, Global Crime Today, London, Routledge, 2005. 
Security Challenges 
Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  - 135 - 
country against a target in another.18  For example, when an extortionist in 
Country A threatens to shut down the information system of a bank in 
Country B unless an electronic funds transfer payment is made, or when a 
hacker in Country A gains unauthorized access to the servers of a defence 
installation in Country B, it is information in digital form, rather than human 
actors or physical matter, which crosses boundaries. 
Degrees of State Involvement in Crime 
Not all crime is exclusively the work of private individuals.  State involvement 
in crime, and in the effects of such crime on the security of other states, can 
vary.19  
At one extreme, the state is a criminal actor.  The criminal activity in question 
is state sponsored.  The most obvious example is state-sponsored 
terrorism.20  When agents of the Libyan Government blow up a commercial 
airliner over Lockerbie, or where agents of the French Government sink the 
Rainbow Warrior, this is explicit state action.  States may also be directly 
involved in the commission of other types of transnational crime, as when 
crew of a North Korean ship, the Pong Su, attempted to deliver drugs to 
Australia.21 
Just short of explicit state action is state complicity in private criminal activity.  
Here, the state will encourage proxies to engage in criminal acts.  The Iran- 
Contra scandal arose from arrangements to place the executive branch of 
the US Government at arm’s length from criminal activity.  The emergence of 
the private military industry may create further risks of the state’s complicity 
in crime.22 
Next, there are circumstances where the state may be aware of criminal 
activity, but will turn a blind eye.23  Most criminal justice systems have more 
                                                 
18 
 P. Grabosky, ‘The Global Dimension of Cybercrime,’ Global Crime, vol. 6, no.1 (February 
2004), pp. 146-157. 
19 
 Robert J. Bunker and Pamela L. Bunker, ‘Defining Criminal-states’, Global Crime, vol. 7, no. 
3-4 (August-November 2006), pp. 365-378; and Mark T. Clark, ‘Does Clausewitz Apply to 
Criminal-States and Gangs?’, Global Crime, vol. 7, no. 3-4 (August-November 2006), pp. 407- 
427. 
20 
 M. Stohl and G. Lopez, The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and 
Repression, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1984. 
21 
 Bureau 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party has been engaged in revenue enhancement through 
various criminal activity for some time.  A. Spaeth, ‘Kim’s Rackets,’ Time Asia Magazine, 2 June 
2003, [Accessed 12 October 
2005]; R. Perl, ‘State Crime: The North Korean Drug Trade,’ Global Crime, vol. 6, no. 1 (Febrary 
2004), pp. 117-128. 
22 
 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 2003. 
23 
 Peter Lupsha, ‘Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation-State,’ in Transnational 
Organized Crime, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 21-48; and Tamara Makarenko, ‘The Crime- 
Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and 
Terrorism,’ in Global Crime, vol. 6, no. 1 (February 2004), pp. 129-145, particularly pp. 135-139. 
Security Challenges 
- 136 - Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  
business than they can handle.  Each country sets its own priorities, which 
may not be entirely consistent with those of other countries.  Poor countries 
for example, may have other things to worry about than the fact that their 
ports are used for the transshipment of contraband.  
One step beyond this is where the state is aware of criminal activity but lacks 
the capacity to do anything about it.  The poorest countries may simply be 
unable to interdict the activities of powerful criminal organizations.  Where 
corruption is endemic, or where norms of reciprocity are deeply engrained in 
local culture, the state may be powerless to respond.  Circumstances in the 
Solomon Islands prior to the RAMSI intervention reflected this degree of 
governmental impotence.24 
Crime in a Shrinking World 
Some crimes are local, both in motive and in deed, but may have cross- 
border ramifications.  One may look to events of a decade ago in Albania to 
see an example of the trans-national impact of domestic criminality.  A 
massive fraud resulted in a significant number of Albanians losing their life 
savings.  This in turn precipitated the collapse of the government, and a 
substantial exodus of Albanians seeking refuge in neighbouring Italy, with 
consequent strains on Italian law enforcement, emergency services, and 
immigration resources.25  
Even if Australians are not directly involved as victims or offenders 
elsewhere in the world, overseas crime can have significant implications for 
Australian interests.  There are crimes that, although they occur abroad, 
reverberate strongly in Australia.  To the extent that illegal trafficking in 
firearms overseas contributes to conflict and instability in our region, 
Australia’s national security is at risk.26  Of no less significance is the 
potential for corruption to facilitate some forms of the transnational criminal 
activity noted above.27  The weakening of law enforcement or regulatory 
                                                 
24 
 E. Wainwright, ‘Responding to state failure--the case of Australia and Solomon Islands,’ 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 57, no. 3 (November 2003), pp. 485-498.  See 
also Makarenko, op. cit. 
25 
 D. Bezemer, ‘Post-socialist financial fragility: the case of Albania,’ Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, vol. 25, no. 1 (January 2001), pp. 1-23; T. Perlmutter, ‘The Politics of Proximity: The 
Italian Response to the Albanian Crisis,’ International Migration Review, vol. 32, no. 1 (Spring 
1998), pp. 203-222. 
26 
 Philip Alpers and Conor Twyford, Small Arms in the Pacific, Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 
2003; David Capie, ‘Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia,’ Canberra Papers 
on Strategy and Defence, no. 146, Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, 2003; See generally R. Stohl, M. Schroeder, and D. Smith, The Small Arms 
Trade, Oxford, Oneworld Publications, 2007.  
27 
 Margaret E. Beare, ‘Corruption and Organized Crime: A Means to an End,’ and Brice de 
Ruyver and Tom van der Beken, ‘Corruption and Organized Crime,’ both in Barry Rider (ed.), 
Corruption: The Enemy Within, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, pp. 65-76 and 77- 
84, respectively; David L. Herbert and Howard Tritt, Corporations of Corruption: A Systematic 
Study of Organized Crime, Springfield, IL, Charles C. Thomas, 1984; and Pasuk Phongpaichit, 
Security Challenges 
Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  - 137 - 
capabilities in one of Australia’s near neighbours can greatly enhance the 
capacity of criminals to use that jurisdiction as a “safe haven”, a staging area 
for a variety of criminal or terrorist activities, or as a trans-shipment point for 
contraband.  What appears at first glance to be an internal matter in a 
nearby nation may ultimately impact on the streets of Sydney or Melbourne.  
This alone is justification for the creation of Australian Federal Police (AFP)- 
funded Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation in Semarang, 
Indonesia, and the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre in Fiji, 
and Transnational Crime Units in several other locations in the Asia- 
Pacific.28 
In general, Australia’s economic and strategic interests are best served by 
world economic growth and political stability.  To the extent that an overseas 
nation’s economy is crippled by crime and corruption, it is a less attractive 
market for Australian exports.  Abroad and at home, crime—and 
corruption—is bad for business. 
More generally, large scale financial crimes such as those which lead to the 
collapse of major financial institutions can shake the confidence of global 
markets.  In recent years, the demise of Barings Bank29 and the Sumitomo30 
copper scandal have had significant reverberations for Australian institutions.  
The Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, arising in no small part from 
criminal fraud, extortion, bribery and corruption in a number of nations that 
are major purchasers of Australia’s exports, had a noticeable (if temporary) 
impact on Australia’s domestic economy.31  By contrast, the massive size of 
the US economy enabled it to withstand the Savings and Loans and Enron 
scandals.32 
                                                                                                                   

Sungsidh Piriyarangsan and Nualnoi Treerat, Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja: Thailand’s Illegal 
Economy and Public Policy, Chiang Mai, Silkworm Books, 1998.  
28 
 John McFarlane, ‘Regional and International Cooperation in Tackling Transnational Crime, 
Terrorism and Disrupted States’, Journal of Financial Crime, vol. 12, no. 4 (August 2005), pp. 
301-309.  
29 
 The Barings Bank, a venerable British institution which had helped finance the Napoleonic 
Wars, collapsed in February 1995 after one of its traders lost US$1.3 billion in disastrous trading 
in derivatives contracts.  In the immediate aftermath of the collapse, Japan's Nikkei 225 index 
fell 3.8%, and the British pound plunged to a record low against the Deutsche Mark.  Michael 
Lim Choo San, and Nicky Tan Ng Kuang, Barings Futures (Singapore) Pte Ltd : Investigation 
pursuant to section 231 of the Companies Act (Chapter 50): the report of the Inspectors 
appointed by the Minister for Finance, Singapore, Ministry of Finance, 1995. 
30 
 An employee of the Sumitomo Corporation was blamed for single-handedly losing $1.8 billion 
trading copper.  Following the announcement, world copper prices fell to their lowest point in 
over two years.  See J. Kharouf, ‘The Copper Trader Who Fell from Grace,’ Futures Magazine
vol. 25, no. 10, (August 1996), pp. 66-70. 
31 
 John McFarlane, ‘Corruption and the Financial Sector: The Strategic Impact,’ Journal of 
Financial Crime, vol. 9, no.1 (September 2001), pp. 8-21 
32 
 K. Calavita, H. Pontell, R. Tillman, Big Money Crime: Fraud and Politics in the Savings and 
Loan Crisis, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997; R. Tillman and M. Indergaard, Pump 
and Dump: The Rancid Rules of the New Economy, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University 
Security Challenges 
- 138 - Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  
CRIMES COMMITTED BY AUSTRALIANS ABROAD 
Australians travelling abroad do not always conduct themselves with perfect 
decorum.  Hundreds of Australians are arrested overseas each year, and 
between 150 and 200 are held in foreign prisons at any given time.  Perhaps 
the most common cases from an Australian perspective involve persons 
unwise enough to be found trafficking or in possession of drugs in those 
nations where such activity is met with very severe punishment.  The most 
recent misfortunes of Schapelle Corby and the so-called “Bali Nine” are but 
two examples.33  Certain other forms of conduct on the part of Australians 
overseas, may, for a variety of reasons, escape the full force of law in the 
host country, but are nevertheless regarded as seriously repugnant.  Most 
prominent among these in recent years has been child sex tourism. 
Crime by Australian expats may be regarded as unseemly (or worse) by 
citizens or authorities in host countries, but it has not triggered the moral 
outrage that (for example) crimes by US military personnel in Japan have 
generated.34  Tensions have arisen, however, from Australian reactions to 
perceived inappropriate treatment of fellow citizens in the arms of foreign 
legal systems, which in turn may be perceived as patronizing or arrogant by 
citizens or officials of the host state.  The resulting strain on diplomatic 
relations can be significant.35  The Corby and Bali Nine cases are illustrative, 
and particularly significant given the importance of cooperation between 
police services of Australia and Indonesia in the light of regional terrorist 
activity. 
Australian companies doing business in conflict-ridden countries also run the 
risk of becoming implicated in illegal activities.  By lending financial or 
material support to a party (be it government or opposition) that is corrupt, 
criminal or otherwise violates human rights, a company can create bad will 
that can stain Australia’s international reputation.36 
                                                                                                                   

Press, 2005. 
33 
 Schapelle Corby was convicted of attempting to import cannabis into Indonesia and 
sentenced to twenty years prison in 2005.  Nine Australians were arrested in Indonesia in April 
2005 and charged with possessing heroin.  At the end of 2007, nine were still imprisoned and 
six were facing the death penalty. 
34 
 A 1969 attack by an Australian messianic Christian on the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem 
might have had wider ramifications had it occurred today.  See E. Sprinzak, Y. Ariel, U. 
Ne'eman, and A. Ramon, ‘Internal Report Submitted to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel 
Studies’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 14, no. 1 (2002), pp. 61-94. 
35 
 The execution of a Filipina expatriate in Singapore severely strained diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. Dupont, East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security
note 7, p. 164.  Similarly, when the Melbourne resident, Van Tuong Nguyen, was hanged in 
Singapore on 2 December 2005 for possession of 396.2 mg of heroin, for a short while there 
were serious tensions in the bilateral relationship with Singapore 
36 
 Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation to the UN Oil-For-Food Programme, 
Canberra, Attorney General’s Department, 2006.  
[Accessed 23 April 2007]. 
Security Challenges 
Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  - 139 - 
CRIME AGAINST AUSTRALIANS ABROAD 
Of the hundreds of thousands of law abiding Australians who are overseas 
at any given time, most manage to stay out of harm’s way.  But a few do not, 
and fall victim to offences from purse snatching to homicide.37  While 
certainly unfortunate, such incidents do not effect Australia’s national 
security.  But crimes against Australian business interests may be a different 
matter.  The globalization of commerce means that more Australian 
businesses are active overseas than ever before.  The intensely competitive 
nature of world commerce is such that Australian companies face a 
significant risk of becoming victims of a variety of offences.  One potential 
threat is that of industrial espionage.  Competitors, and at times, foreign 
governments, seek to acquire strategic economic intelligence, trade secrets, 
or intellectual property by illegal means.  Indeed, for many nations, corporate 
intelligence collection may be more important than defence intelligence 
collection.38 
Another risk, less related to global competitiveness than to political and 
social factors, is that of extortion.  In some locations around the world where 
public security is a major problem, expatriate executives and staff are 
targeted for ransom kidnapping.39  In the case of minor offences, a tourist or 
businessperson might be able to shrug off the experience as just an 
unfortunate aspect of overseas travel.  But depending on the gravity of the 
incident, there may be a call on Australian consular services for emergency 
assistance.  In the case of crimes against businesses, security measures will 
increase the cost of doing business, and may detract from the profitability of 
an investment.   An important consideration here from a national security 
standpoint can be the extent to which a state is seen as giving in to 
blackmail.  
                                                 
37 
 Between 1995 and 2003, a total of 158 Australians were murdered in 32 overseas countries.  
Most of these (88) perished as a result of the first Bali bombing in 2002.  John Venditto and 
Jenny Mouzos, ‘The murder of overseas visitors in Australia’, Trends and Issues in Crime and 
Criminal Justice, no. 316, Canberra, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2006. 
[Accessed 23 April 2007]. 
38 
 Hedieh Nasheri, Corporate Espionage and Industrial Spying, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
39 
 C. Beer, ‘Judicial Performance and the Rule of Law in the Mexican States’, Latin American 
Politics & Society, vol. 48, no. 3 (Fall 2006), pp. 33-61.  In August 2007, a South Australian 
sheep farmer, Des Gregor, traveled to Mali to meet a Liberian refugee who he met over the 
Internet and proposed to marry.  When he arrived in Mali, he was kidnapped by men claiming to 
be the woman's relatives, physically threatened and held for a US$86,000 ransom.  Gregor's 
relatives in Australia raised the alarm when they started to get emails asking for money, and 
alerted the AFP.  After 12 days in captivity, the AFP managed to persuade Gregor's kidnappers 
to send him to the Canadian Embassy to pick up the ransom money, where Gregor was 
recovered.  This operation involved cooperation between the AFP Senior Liaison Officer in 
Pretoria, the Mali National Police, the South African Police and the Canadian Embassy in 
Bamako (Mali).  Nick Bryat, ‘Australian taken hostage in Mali’, BBC News, 13 August 2007, at 
[Accessed 11 November 2007]; 
and AFP briefing, 25 October 2007. 
Security Challenges 
- 140 - Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  
The Impact of Crime on National Security 
National security is not an either/or phenomenon.  The security of a given 
state at a given time can be located on a continuum between impregnability 
on the one hand, and collapse on the other.  Various factors, of which crime 
is but one, will determine a state’s location on that continuum and its 
movement in one direction or another.  
The nexus between crime and national security began to attract wider 
attention with the end of the Cold War.40  The collapse of the Soviet Empire 
presented criminal opportunities of considerable magnitude.  The 
ascendancy of Russian organized crime had ramifications well beyond its 
borders, and the availability of fissionable material diverted from Soviet 
arsenals represented a threat worldwide.  
But Australian criminologists have been mindful for at least three decades of 
the nexus between crime and national security.  The June 1975 issue of The 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology contains no less than 
three articles of relevance.  In one, the inaugural Director of the Australian 
Institute of Criminology (AIC) noted the rise of transnational crime.  He 
commented on  
the great gaps in international legal practice which loom more like canyons 
and caverns than the proverbial loopholes in our system or (sic) world 
security and cooperation.41 
In another, a lecturer at the University of Melbourne addressed the issue of 
terrorism and international order.  He noted that   
we have in this country powerful minority groups which reflect all the 
bitterness found in those areas of the world where terrorist operations are 
active and most violent.42 
In a third, a lecturer at the University of Sydney who currently sits as a 
District Court Judge in New South Wales warned against the possible 
criminal use of atomic or biochemical materials. He said that “As even the 
most casual observer of the terrorist scene will be aware, the spirit of 
kamikaze is still alive all over the world.”43   
                                                 
40 
B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post 
Cold War Era, Brighton, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 2001; M. van Creveld, The Transformation of 
War, New York, Free Press, 1991; W. Clinton, ‘Remarks by the President to the UN General 
Assembly,’ 22 October  1995  
[Accessed 23 April 2007]; L. Shelley, ‘Transnational Organized Crime: An imminent threat to the 
nation state’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 48, no. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 464-465. 
41 
 W. Clifford, ‘New Dimensions in Criminality-- National and Transnational’, The Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology, vol. 8, no. 2 (1975), p. 76. 
42 
 K. Milte, ‘Terrorism and International Order’, The Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology, vol. 8, no. 2 (1975), p. 102. 
43 
 G. Woods, ‘The Possible Criminal use of Atomic or Biochemical Materials’, The Australian 
Security Challenges 
Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  - 141 - 
States vary in robustness.  They differ widely in their ability to withstand 
adverse circumstances, whether natural disasters, economic adversity, or 
criminal insults.  The impact of crime on national security is largely indirect, 
and cumulative, except in states where crime is endemic.  
From this vantage point, one can begin more clearly to see the relationship 
between crime and national security.  National security can be jeopardized 
by domestic criminal threats as well as by transnational forces.  Rampant 
crime and violence on Australian soil will discourage tourism.  Rampant 
fraud and corruption will discourage investment.  Rampant drug use and 
environmental pollution can damage public health and detract from the 
productivity of one’s workforce.  In today’s increasingly competitive global 
economy, that threatens national security.  Fortunately, Australia’s 
robustness makes it well situated to withstand the criminal insults that are 
home grown. 
When transnational influences are added to the equation, the relationship 
become even more stark, especially in poorer countries.  The use of bribery 
in international business can be corrosive.  When bribery and corruption 
detract from the public’s trust in their leaders and in national institutions, that 
is harmful to national security.44  No nation today, rich or poor, can boast of a 
role model of integrity such as Nelson Mandela.  But the strength of a state 
is generally dependent upon its legitimacy.  The legitimacy of a state, the 
willingness of the public to accept the validity of the regime, will contribute to 
national security.   
When illegal international traffic in guns, drugs, people and other contraband 
place greater burdens on law enforcement and other public services, that 
threatens national security.  When the inflow of “dirty” money to a small 
nation’s economy impacts on exchange rates and reduces the 
competitiveness of traditional exports, that threatens national security.  
When extremist movements deal in contraband in order to finance terrorist 
operations, that threatens national security.  
The day is fast approaching when it will be possible to say “when China 
sneezes, the world will catch cold.”  We have begun to appreciate the extent 
to which economic well-being in Australia depends on the health of the 
Chinese economy, much as it has depended on the US economy since the 
end of WWII.  Authorities in China are acutely sensitive to the existence of 
centrifugal forces and place a great deal of importance on social stability.  A 
strong Chinese state is more likely to deliver prosperity to its people than a 
set of separate political entities.  We might suggest that any criminal activity 
within China that weakens the state, or the economy of that country, is 
                                                                                                                   

and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, vol. 8, no. 2 (1975), p. 117. 
44 
 McFarlane, ‘Corruption and the Financial Sector: The Strategic Impact,’ note 20.  
Security Challenges 
- 142 - Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  
potentially harmful to Australia’s national security. Let us return to our 
dimensions of national security and explore how they may be adversely 
impacted by crime. 
ECONOMY 
Street crime can discourage economic activity at a micro-level.  It can make 
the difference between profit and loss for a small business.  It can contribute 
to the death of neighbourhoods.  At the extreme, it can chill economic activity 
across an entire city or country.  One need only look to Port Moresby for an 
example.45  White collar crime may be no less harmful.  Markets that are 
seen to be rigged will not attract investors.  Small investors may shy away 
from the stock market because they see it as the playground of insider 
traders; others may be deterred by their perception of corporate high flyers 
as looters of shareholders’ money.  To the extent that a major institution of 
the economy is seen as tainted, the economy will suffer.  Some years ago, 
the government of Albania fell after a significant proportion of the citizenry 
fell victim to a Ponzi scheme46 and as a result lost their life savings.  More 
generally, endemic tax evasion may make it more difficult for the government 
to afford both guns and butter.  So too when a corrupt head of state and 
other members of a corrupt national elite divert hundreds of millions of 
dollars to personal bank accounts offshore.47  
Australia incurs opportunity costs as a result of crime.  While not all of these 
represent dead-weight loss (those of us who are paid to study crime do not 
regard ourselves as economic burdens), a great deal of Australia’s wealth 
could be more productively spent on enhancing Australia’s national interest 
and infrastructure.  
The most rigorous analysis of the cost of crime in Australia has been 
prepared by the AIC.  A report released in 2003 found that crime costs 
Australia $19 billion while the costs in dealing with crime cost close to 
another $13 billion.  This is nearly $1,600 per person in Australia and 5 per 
cent of GDP.  It is also twice the nation’s annual defence budget.48 

                                                 
45 
 S. Dinnen, ‘Law and Order in a Weak State: Crime and Politics in Papua New Guinea,’ Pacific 
Islands Monograph Series, no. 17, Honolulu, Center for Pacific Islands Studies, University of 
Hawaii Press, 2000. 
46 
 Charles Ponzi was a North American swindler of the 1920s who promised investors 
spectacular and rapid returns.  His basic strategy was a pyramid scheme wherein the funds of 
more recent investors were used to repay earlier investors.  Such a scheme was inherently 
unsustainable, with later stage investors usually losing their investment.  The name Ponzi is 
used today as a generic term for this type of fraud. 
47 
 The recovery iof moneys diverted by corrupt elites is one of the key objectives of the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption, 2003. 
48 
 P. Mayhew, ‘Counting the Costs of Crime in Australia’, Trends and Issues in Crime and 
Criminal Justice, no. 247, Canberra, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2003; P. Mayhew,  
‘Counting the Costs of Crime in Australia: Technical Report,’ Technical and Background Paper
no. 4, Canberra, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2003. 
Security Challenges 
Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  - 143 - 
Table 1: Total Costs of Crime 
Costs in dealing with crime $ million 
Criminal justice system 6,400 
Private security industry 3,140 
Household precautions 1,830 
Provision for victims 880 
Insurance administrative costs 500 
Sub-total 12,750 
Crime costs 
Property loss 4,070 
Medical costs 250 
Lost output 2,180 
Intangible losses 3,320 
Arson 1,350 
Drugs (not elsewhere included) 1,960 
Fraud 5,880 
Sub-total 19,030 
Total 31,780 
Note: Figures may not sum to total due to rounding.  Source: P. Mayhew, ‘Counting the Costs of 
Crime in Australia’, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, no. 247, Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Criminology, 2003. 
HEALTH 
Crime is hazardous to one’s health.  The health effects (and economic costs) 
of legal drugs are bad enough.  Illicit drugs pose great risk to the mental 
health of users.  In addition they pose the risk of infectious disease.  It goes 
without saying that an unhealthy society, all else equal, is less able to defend 
itself.  The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in many developing nations has had a 
devastating impact socially and economically.  The costs of treating 
HIV/AIDS can exhaust a poor nation’s health budget.  To the extent that a 
significant proportion of persons of military age are infected, this too can 
detract from military preparedness.  An assessment in 1999 found that 50% 
of South African soldiers between 23 and 29 years were HIV positive.49  
Australia’s major health burdens arise from abuse of tobacco and alcohol, 
and to a lesser extent, from the abuse of illicit drugs.  These costs are 
significant; money spent on repairing damage arising from unfortunate 
lifestyle choices could otherwise be available for more productive national 
investments. 
                                                 
49 
 L. Heinecken, ‘Strategic implications of HIV/AIDS in South Africa’, Conflict, Security and 
Development, vol. 1, no. 1 (2001), pp.109-115. 
Security Challenges 
- 144 - Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  
EDUCATION 
When young people conclude that they can earn a better living through 
crime than through a legitimate vocation, they may be less inclined to finish 
their education. Poor educational performance is itself a risk factor for crime.  
Schools can play an important role, not only in improving cognitive skills in 
children at risk, but also in fostering social control and social competency.  
Schools can also help to mitigate the social and economic disadvantage that 
contribute to delinquency.50  Today’s weapons systems are of such 
complexity that they require educated people to operate them.  Education is 
also essential to economic productivity.  
SOCIAL WELFARE 
The effects of crime may be regressively redistributive.  Crime tends to bear 
most harshly on those least able to pay.  Homeless people, for example, are 
disproportionately at risk of victimization from street crime.51  The ability of 
governments to provide a basic safety net for all becomes more difficult 
through crime.  The days when hordes of unemployed could be conscripted 
and sent off to fight foreign wars are gone.  Poverty impedes productivity, 
and contributes to social dislocation.  Deprived minorities may see no 
alternative to crime as a strategy for survival. 
SOCIAL COHESION  
A divided society is a vulnerable society.  Australia’s cosmopolitan, 
multicultural society is at risk of division and conflict.  Such division can arise 
from a variety of stresses, of which crime is certainly one.  While most crime 
tends to occur between people of common background, those crimes that 
occur across racial or ethnic lines pose particular risks of deepening social 
divisions.  For expressive as well as instrumental reasons, Australia has 
enacted legislation criminalizing incitement to racial hatred, and racially 
motivated violence.52 
In Australia’s multicultural society, a degree of inter-ethnic crime is 
inevitable.  But xenophobic crime is neither systematic nor widespread.  
Sexual assaults committed by males of Middle Eastern background against 
victims of European ancestry have not gone unnoticed, but have not 
threatened the social fabric.53  Imprisoned Australians from minority racial or 
                                                 
50 
 D. Farrington and B. Welsh, Saving Children from a Life of Crime, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2007; M. Klein and C. Maxson, Street Gang Patterns and Policies, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2006. 
51 
 C. Schreck, ‘Danger on the Streets: Marginality and Victimization Among Homeless People,’ 
American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 48, no. 8 (2005), pp. 1055-1081.  
52 
 Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth); Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 20C(2); Wrongs Act 1936 
(SA) s 37(1); Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 66(2); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 
124A(2); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) s 11; Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) 
s 55. 
53 
 K.Warner, ‘Gang Rape in Sydney: Crime, the Media, Politics, Race and Sentencing’, 
Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, vol. 37, no. 3 (2004), pp. 344-361. 
Security Challenges 
Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  - 145 - 
ethnic groups may also be vulnerable to radicalization whilst in prison.  The 
possibilities of prisons serving as a school for terrorists require that 
considerable care be taken in the management of correctional facilities.  
INTERPERSONAL TRUST 
Trust is not only the foundation of commerce, but it is the cement of a 
civilized society.  Almost by definition, crime involves a violation of trust.54  A 
society whose citizens are always looking over their shoulders at one 
another may be less likely to join together in the common defence AND 
citizens who defraud their government can weaken the capacity of their 
country to defend itself.  
The essence of fraud, in any of its manifestations, is the betrayal of trust.  An 
economy where violations of trust are common will be a weaker economy, 
because mistrust per se may have a chilling effect on commerce; people will 
forego risky transactions.  The future of electronic commerce, and the 
economy on which it is based, depends significantly on interpersonal trust.  
Various means of safeguard and verification will themselves entail expense, 
which will add to the cost of a transaction.   
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
While environmental quality was subordinate to economic development in 
the century following the industrial revolution, the importance of 
environmental protection is receiving increasing attention today.  Activities 
that are harmful to the environment are becoming criminalized, and as 
environmental damage intensifies, environmental crime may be expected to 
receive increasing attention.  Meanwhile, the impact of environmental 
damage on national security is becoming more apparent.  Drought-affected 
nations of sub-Saharan Africa are unable to sustain their populations.55  
Fisheries around the world have been depleted as a result of overfishing.56  
Australia’s chronic shortage of water and soil degradation have had an 
adverse impact on the economy, but not to the extent that national security is 
in jeopardy.  The long term effects of climate change are, however, another 
matter.57  
                                                 
54 
 S. Shapiro, ‘The Social Control of Impersonal Trust’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 93, 
no. 3 (November 1987), pp. 623-658. 
55 
H. Menghestab, ‘Weather patterns, food security and humanitarian response in sub-Saharan 
Africa’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, vol. 360, no. 
1463 (2005), pp. 2169-2182.  
56 
 D. Pauly, R. Watson, and J. Alder, ‘Global trends in world fisheries: impacts on marine 
ecosystems and food security’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, vol. 360, no. 1453 (2005), pp. 5–12.   
57 
 A. Dupont, ‘Heating Up The Planet: Climate Change and Security,’ Lowy Institute Paper, no. 
12, Sydney, Lowy Institute, 2006. 
Security Challenges 
- 146 - Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  
PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY 
Bribery and corruption invite imitation.  Ultimately what is at state is the 
legitimacy of government itself.  Kleptocracy is an unsustainable form of 
government.  Endemic corruption has often preceded the collapse of 
governments, indeed even states.  At the very least, individuals are less 
likely to go the extra mile in the defence of their country when they perceive 
its leadership to be corrupt.  Fortunately, Australian elected officials and 
public servants are relatively honest by world standards.58 
Crime and Terrorism 
To many commentators, today’s most explicit threat to Australia’s national 
security is terrorism.  While there are those who see terrorism and crime as 
distinct and unrelated, the connections are undeniable.59   
For example, most if not all behaviour defined as terrorism will constitute 
some breach of criminal law.  In addition, criminal activity may be a predicate 
to terrorism.  Terrorists may obtain false identification obtain explosives or 
other destructive substantives, or may engage in criminal activity to fund 
terrorist operations.  In Peru the Sendero Luminoso enaged in “protection” of 
the drug trade to support their operations.60  The Nicaraguan Contras 
generated revenue from drug trafficking.61  In 2005, IRA elements were 
involved in a significant bank robbery in Northern Ireland.62  Tamara 
Makarenko speaks of a “crime-terror continuum” in which the two forms of 
activity have begun to share common organizational features, and to learn 
from each other.63 
Terrorists may also engage the services of organized criminal for particular 
ends, such as the acquisition of high technology tracking equipment.  The 
use of defence forces to respond to certain forms of criminal activity is not 
without precedent.  For centuries, naval forces have sought to combat 
maritime piracy.  In the United States beginning in the Reagan 
administration, naval and air forces became actively involved in tracking and 
interdicting drug traffic on the high seas.64  Australian maritime constabulary 
                                                 
58 
 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2006
org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006> [Accessed 2 March 2007].  However, the recent 
revelations, such as the Australian Wheat Board scandal, cast doubt on whether Australia will 
retain its high ranking in the TI Corruption Perceptions Index 
59 
 John T. Picarelli, ‘The Turbulent Nexus of Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism: A 
theory of malevolent international relations’, Global Crime, vol. 7, no. 1 (February 2006), pp. 1- 
24.  See also Makarenko, op. cit., footnote 22. 
60 
 C. McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s 
Shining Path, Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, p. 341. 
61 
 P. Scott and J.Marshall, Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991. 
62 
 E. O’Malley and M. Marsh, ‘Ireland’, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 45, nos. 7-8 
(2006), pp. 1132–1134. 
63 
 Makarenko, op. cit. 
64 
 P. Andreas and E. Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in 
Security Challenges 
Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  - 147 - 
operations are sufficiently common that some strategists have expressed 
concern that they detract from the capacity for war fighting.65  
The relationship between terrorism and organized crime was noted most 
recently in the Wheeler Review of Australian Airport Security.66  The Review 
suggested that criminals may assist in the provision of weapons, identity 
documents, or places of refuge for terrorists.67  It also suggested that 
criminal activity in and around airports can be helpful in identifying security 
weaknesses that might be exploitable by terrorists.  
Conclusions 
The world is becoming an increasingly interdependent place.  Those 
societies who ignore this do so at their peril.  By contrast, those who 
recognize this and plan for and adapt to a smaller world are likely to benefit 
most and suffer least.  
Crime is undeniably linked to Australian national security, and the potential 
for crime to undermine Australia’s national security is certainly real.  But 
because of its healthy economy, cohesive society and stable political 
system, contemporary Australia is sufficiently robust to withstand an 
extensive array of criminal insults, whether home grown, transnational, or 
offshore.  By contrast, states like Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands 
and Colombia are demonstrably insecure, in no small part because of crime.  
And their security problems have become our security problems.  Institutions 
traditionally concerned only with crime, and those focused only on security 
not only have a lot to learn from each other, but they will from now on find 
themselves working together.     
The global criminal environment is complex and fluid, with transnational 
crime groups active at local, national and international levels.  This requires 
innovative and adaptable measures to address the criminal challenges 
present in diverse geographical regions.  For this reason, the AFP has a 
range of international networks in place with other agencies, as well as AFP 
International Liaison Officers located strategically around the world.  There 
are currently 87 officers at 33 posts in 27 countries.  This represents one of 
                                                                                                                   

International Relations, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006.  
65 
 K. Hussain, ‘Constabulary Operations’, and N. Tate, ‘Australian Constabulary Operations’, 
both in G. Kerr (ed.), Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, no. 14, Canberra: Sea Power 
Centre, 2005, pp. 35-44 and pp. 45-58, respectively. 
66 
 J. Wheeler, An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of 
Australia, 2005,  
[Accessed 23 September 2005]. 
67 
 Ibid, p.9. 
Security Challenges 
- 148 - Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  
the largest international police liaison networks and is one of the largest 
Australian Government agency networks overseas.68 
In February 2004, the AFP International Deployment Group (IDG) was 
established “to manage the deployment of Australian police overseas” 
undertaking capacity building or peace operations.69  On 25 August 2006, 
the government authorised the increase of IDG staffing levels to 1,200 
personnel, over a period of five years.  Included in that number will be a 200- 
strong Operational Response Group (ORG) that is ready to respond at short 
notice to emerging international law and order issues and stabilisation 
operations. It will contribute to regional stability and security on behalf of the 
Government of Australia by: 
Contributing to offshore law enforcement initiatives; 
Participating in capacity development programs within the Law and 
Justice Sector.70 
This will provide a Formed Police Unit71 capacity to the IDG not dissimilar to 
that of the Italian Carabiniere, the French CRS [Republican Security 
Companies] and the Portuguese GNR [Portuguese National Guard], 
although each of these organisations are paramilitary rather than 
conventional police.72 
In its contribution to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping 
Operations, the AFP stated: 
Partner relationships in law enforcement capacity building will increase and 
demand greater coordination with AusAID.  The secondment of AFP officers 
to AusAID’s Fragile States Unit and the Office of Development Effectiveness 
builds on the cooperative efforts both organisations enjoy.   
                                                 
68 
 Australian Federal Police, International Liaison,  
[Accessed 22 April 2007]. 
69 
 In March 2007, the IDG had some 350 officers serving overseas in Cyprus, Solomon Islands, 
Sudan, Timor Leste, Nauru, Tonga, Vanuatu, Cambodia and Afghanistan.  Of this number, 
about 100 members have been seconded from Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania, 
Queensland, Northern Territory and Western Australia Police, and from thirteen Pacific Island 
Nations. 
70 
 Australian Federal Police, International Deployment Group (IDG) Fact File: Capacity Building 
and Peace Operations,
IDG_Fact_File_27_March_07.pdf> [Accessed 22 April 2007]. 
71 
 Formed Police Units are a new innovation in United Nations police peace operations.  They 
specialise in dealing with civil disturbances and are normally the only armed UNPOL units.  
Each unit numbers between 100 to 150 officers drawn from individual contributing countries.  
AFP Briefing, 25 October 2007 
72 
 A detachment of the Portuguese GNR is currently deployed in Timor Leste as part of the 
United Nations Civilian Police (UNPOL) Formed Police Unit.  There are also 50 AFP officers 
attached to UNPOL, and an additional ten involved with a bilateral capacity development project 
known as the Timor Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP). 
Security Challenges 
Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  - 149 - 
Joint operations with the Australian Defence Force as part of national 
offshore crisis response will become more frequent and increased 
interoperability will be necessary.  Progression toward this objective will 
partly be achieved this year with the embedding of AFP officers in Joint 
Operations Command and the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre, 
and the meeting of mutually agreed milestones as expressed in the 
interoperability joint Terms of Reference signed in November 2006.73 
The IDG is at the leading edge of police preparation, planning and 
operational capacity.  It will continue to engage regional and global partners 
to share experience and development of approaches to police capacity 
building, interagency coordination and deployment.74  
In recent years, the AFP has become an indispensable player in the 
Australian Government’s “whole of government” approach to foreign 
relations, overseas aid, border security, counter-terrorism policy and law 
enforcement initiatives.  It has also been a trend setter in relation to police 
peace operations overseas, as envisaged in Recommendation 10 (Civilian 
Police Personnel) of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations (Brahimi Report), of 21 August 2000.75  However, this also 
means that the IDG has become an instrument of Government policy, rather 
than a conventional element of the AFP, which is accountable to the courts, 
under the law. 
At the same time, the role of Australian Defence Forces is also becoming 
more diverse.  Over the past century we have seen disaster relief, 
humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping replace trench warfare as core 
defence business.  Further evolution in the nature of both police and defence 
institutions may be expected in the years ahead. 
Peter Grabosky is a Professor in The Regulatory Institutions Network, Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University.  peter.grabosky@anu.edu.au. 
John McFarlane is a Visiting Fellow in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the 
University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy.  He lectures on 
transnational crime, intelligence and security issues, corruption, police peace operations, and 
related topics at ADFA, the ANU, Macquarie University, Victoria University of Wellington and 
                                                 
73 
 The AFP and Australian Defence Force are increasingly working together in peace operations 
in the region.  In the Solomon Islands, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) is a regional police-led operation with military support.  In Timor Leste, due to the 
current political situation, the military have primacy, with UNPOL in support.   
74 
 Australian Federal Police, The Australian Federal Police Submission to the Senate Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in 
Peacekeeping Operations,
Peacekeeping%20Workshop/FW:%20Peacekeeping%20submission%20[SEC=UNCLASSIFIED 
].EML/MAR%20-%20Senate%20Inquiry%20into%20peacekeeping%20-%20Submission 
%20doc%20-%2029%20Mar.doc/C58EA28C-18C0-4a97-9AF2-036E93DDAFB3/MAR%20- 
%20Senate%20Inquiry%20into%20peacekeeping%20-%20Submission%20doc%20- 
%2029%20Mar.doc?attach=1> [Accessed 22 April 2007]. 
75 
 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 21 August 2000, 
[Accessed 22 April 2007]. 
Security Challenges 
- 150 - Volume 3 Number 4 (November 2007)  
several Defence establishments.  He is a former Director of Intelligence in the Australian 
Federal Police.  j.mcfarlane@adfa.edu.au. 

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