procrastination paradoxes, where a soothing idea has hidden barbs. You feel re-
lief when you think you can later gain command over what you currently don’t
want to do. The barb is found in practicing a negative pattern of retreat. When
you procrastinate you needlessly postpone, delay, or put off a relevant activity
until another day or time. When you procrastinate, you always substitute an al-
ternative activity for the relevant one. The alternative activity may be almost as
timely or important as the one you put off. But more likely, it will be irrelevant,
such as daydreaming instead of writing a report. 58
Knaus, 8.
the wider question of the contemporary practice of temporal counterconduct within
the context of neoliberal governmentality. It is possible to read the choice to “let it
wait,” so antithetical to the rich dad’s swaggering self-responsibility, as a specific
ambivalence within the production of the neoliberal subject as a self-producing sub-
ject. The unwilling of procrastination calls back to the unwilled realities of duration-
al temporality, cultivated in the collectivist time of social governance, and in the do-
cile time of the disciplinary society, here worked differently, mobilized as a day-
dream, against the writing of reports.
In his L’invention du Social, (1984) Donzelot traces social government to a specific set of policy debates and legislative initiatives that developed in France during the nineteenth century. With an increasingly militant labor movement and the incipient threat of socialism, liberal legislators sought policies that would mitigate antagonism between labor and capital without mandating too radical an agenda of social reform. The resulting “social rights” legislation was a specific instrument of social government meant to foster solidarity, both among workers and between labor and
capital more generally, as a means of ensuring social integration while blunting the specific indictment of the social order emerging from the socialist camp. Appropriating key Durkheimian themes, Donzelot describes the welfare state as one in which “this concept of solidarity serves to define not only the framework but also the specific mode of state intervention, one which affects the forms of the social bond rather than the structure of society itself.”
Executive Director
ACLU
excuse me for upsetting you…. it takes two ’sides’ to have an argument and i’ve always thought that it’s a shame that ’sides’ are taken…. there are too many divisions already, not enough harmony, and someone who likes to argue for the sake of arguing only adds to the problem…. rarely a solution. such is life. personally i don’t particularly like to argue, but i think you understand and acknowledge my point of view anyway, so i won’t belabor it. i apologize for interrupting the wonderful and ‘penetrating research’ you’re involved in here, you seem to enjoy your own company anyway, so i leave you to it.
Temporality itself has been socialized.”
Back to the article:
Such modes of conduct, and the specific temporalities through which they were
enacted, were for two centuries already being quietly insinuated into the conducts of
modern people through those disciplinary institutions Foucault so well documented
in Discipline and Punish—the schools, prisons, hospitals and military barracks. In-
deed, there is a specific link between the forms of social government by which risk
was transposed from individual conduct to the collective responsibility of the social
totality and the docile temporality of the disciplinary institution. Foucault has de-
scribed the specific manner in which the production of docility is accomplished
through technologies of temporalization, and specifically with the deployment of
“duration” as a temporal frame.
Better adjustment of the worker to the normalized conditions of
production reduced the risk of accidents—a key governmental objective of welfar-
ism, yet one that substituted a collectivist, institutional responsibility for the indi-
vidual culpability for output and risks. As such, life under social government was
characterized by a certain docility of conduct under the normalized conditions of an
engineered solidarity—a “unwilled collective reality” in which individual agency
was itself no longer willed, but instead suspended within a socialized horizon of ex-
pectation, futurity and temporality.
38
The emergence of durational time is often tied to the dissemination of clock-
time in the labor process.
As a durational act, the temporality of an action is
not bound to its immediate outcome—the risks it entails—which have become re-
mote from the actor, incorporated into the institutional totality within which it is ex-
ecuted. The time of the docile body (and by extension, the time of socialized risk) is
measured simply as “duration”—as abstract, homogenous time, whose ultimate mo-
tivation and endpoint is “unwilled,” remote from the responsibilities of the actor,
fixed in the remote planning schemes of the institution.
39
Ibid., 412.
37
Donzelot, “Pleasure in Work,” 255.
38
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, 151.
39
E. P. Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism.” Past and Present, 38
Linked with a wider rigidification of the intrinsic volun-
Binkley: The Work of Neoliberal Governmentality
73
tion is, in historical literature on temporality, associated with the reification of the
natural rhythm and meter of everyday practice, specifically for the purposes of a
more thorough exploitation of the productive capacity invested in the temporality of
the act.40 E. P. Thompson’s well-known study of this process uncovers the manner in
which a task-oriented temporality takes over and displaces traditional temporal sen-
sibilities tuned to the rhythms of natural processes, such as the seasonal regularities
of agriculture.41 However, durational temporality is not simply a medium for the ex-
ploitation of labor: it is a means through which labor power is produced and sus-
tained as a force, both within the individual and within the social unit as a whole.42
Foucault provides such an account in his detailed discussion of the produc-
tion of docility in the incipient institutional temporalities of early modern societies.
He describes the inscription of durational temporality as a positive operation, one
that entails the decomposition of modes of conduct into administratively discreet
moments, and their simultaneous recomposition in the sequence of a disciplinary
practice. Foucault’s account of the “temporal elaboration of the act” describes the
precise manner in which an increasingly refined demarcation and segmentation of
temporal units takes place in the marching instructions given to French foot soldiers
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wherein the simple step of the soldier is
subjected to an increasingly precise division that expands from one to four basic
movements in the course of a century.
the basis for collectivist opposition to capitalist exploitation as to ensure the condi-
tions for the extraction of profits from the bodies or workers. Similarly, durational
time is, as Donzelot has shown, a mechanism of social integration and for the forma-
tion of unwilled collective realities and de-responsibilized conducts, wherein risk is
socialized and the agency of individuals is transposed from to the horizons of indi-
vidual actions to those of institutional norms.
43
“The act is broken down into its elements;
the position of the body, limbs, articulations is defined; to each movement are as-
signed a direction, an aptitude, a duration; their order of succession is prescribed.
Time penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power.”44
This segmentation is not without aim, but neither is it specifically teleological.
It is not completed with the exploitation of labor for profit, but is instead ongoing
and productive, seeking as much to produce labor power as a permanent potential
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), 1985.
40
Zerubavel, 2-5.
41
Thompson, 61.
42
Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, 159.
43
Ibid., 151.
44
Ibid., 152.
Foucault Studies, No. 6, pp. 60-78.
74
ing of the factory, as to secure its exploitation.45 Foucault describes the production of
durational temporality: for the French foot soldier of the eighteenth century, bodily
practice was reintegrated into a new docile temporality—the military march—which
is directed to a new endpoint or goal, characterized by the general enhancement of
productive forces, both for the individual himself, and for the institution of which he
is a member. In other words, durational time acquires meaning as a permanent and
ongoing exercise. “Exercise, having become an element in the political technology of
the body and of duration, does not culminate in a beyond, but tends toward a sub-
jection that has never reached its limit.”46
Keep working, boys, but the sooner you forget about needing a paycheck, the
easier your adult life will be. Keep using your brain, work for free, and soon your
mind will show you ways of making money far beyond what I could ever pay
you. You will see things that other people never see. Opportunities right in front
of their noses. Most people never see these opportunities because they’re looking
for money and security, so that’s all they get. The moment you see one opportu-
nity, you will see them for the rest of your life.
As such, duration, measured by the
rhythms of military training, the educational calendars of the public schools or the
pay schedules imposed by the wage system, has no specific beginning and no end,
and thus inscribes no agency or telos—no will. For the worker, the prisoner, the stu-
dent or the soldier, the performance of a task is ongoing and often without purpose.
Temporality itself has been socialized.
truncation of the horizons of economic action it imposed. The way out was first through the renunciation of the mind- numbing comforts supplied by such conduct, from which would follow a revitalization of one’s willingness to confront risk, and a vast expansion of the horizon of economic opportunity. One of rich dad’s lessons involved inducing the two ten-year olds to work without pay for several weekends, under the argument that the experience would teach them that salaried labor reflected a lazy and dull-minded faith in a structured reward system, and that the true reward of work lay beyond the narrow rewards of the wage system. Rich dad explained his rationale:
The awakening intended by this exercise was one that was meant to turn the two boys to work on themselves—on the traces and residues, the inscribed habits and dispositions remaining from an earlier deployment of a collective social reality, and the displacement of responsibility and risk it entailed. The social, durational temporalities that are the residue of docility and durational time can be identified, not just in the generational rift between poor dads and their sons, but in the historical sedimentations accumulated in the bodies of those sons themselves, and in the readers to whom Kiyosaki appeals—a body that, as Foucault wrote in his essay Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, can be understood as the repository of historical inscriptions, or as he put it, the “inscribed surface of events.” Indeed, it is in this work that the ambivalence between the institutional forms of self-government, and the individual practices of self-rule, or subjection and subjectification, becomes operative.
this joy of being
this joy of life
is so deep
and so light
that even your absence
(dear, dear, dear friend),
is fine!
May love reach you every day of your life!
As a durational act, the temporality of an action is not bound to its immediate outcome—the risks it entails—which have become re- mote from the actor, incorporated into the institutional totality within which it is executed. The time of the docile body (and by extension, the time of socialized risk) is measured simply as “duration”—as abstract, homogenous time, whose ultimate mo-
tivation and endpoint is “unwilled,” remote from the responsibilities of the actor, fixed in the remote planning schemes of the institution.”
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