It's a very great pleasure for me to find that love is being taken into consideration as a real politico-religious power. The Self is to the individual what authority is to society and without love or consciousness which is what love is really about, there's corruption.
Ó Matthew
Chrulew 2013 ISSN: 1832-5203 Foucault Studies, No. 15, pp. 9-26, February 2013
ARTICLE
Suspicion and Love
Matthew Chrulew, University of New
South Wales
ABSTRACT: Recent philosophy has witnessed a number of prominent and ambivalent en-
counters with Christianity. Alongside the retrievals of Paul and political
theology, thinkers such as Žižek and Negri argue that in our era of imperial
sovereignty and advanced global capitalism, the most appropriate politics is
one of love. These attempts to reinvigorate pro- gressive materialism are often
characterised as a break with the relativist tendencies of French philosophy,
moving from the negativity and disconnection of postmodern suspicion to a new,
constructive politics of creativity and fraternity. Deconstructive critiques
have insisted on the exclusions necessary to any such politics of love.
Foucault’s genealogy of Christianity— specifically, of the emergence from
pastoral power of modern governmentality and biopoli- tics—sketches a further
significant dimension of love’s suffocating history and contemporary risks.
Keywords: Love, pastoral power, biopolitics, Foucault, Negri.
The Politics of Love
It is perhaps only recently that
the left has come to accept that it can no longer simply discount religion as
an irritating residue of the pre-Enlightenment past. The political legacy of
Christianity has come under renewed scrutiny; scholars are trawling the
Christian archive and rediscovering remarkable expressions of spirited and
suffering life that continue to provide both sustenance and scandal to Western
self-understanding. How deeply does the religion of love in-form us? Must this
heritage be finally overcome, or can it be rekindled towards radical ends?
One of the most striking
characteristics of recent attempts at post-secular, Christian renewal is the
restoration of love as a political concept. A number of thinkers argue that, in our era of
imperial sovereignty and advanced global capitalism, we would do well to
emulate the agape of the early Christian congregations established and encouraged by Paul.
To love one’s neighbour is the political act proper to today. For all its erstwhile
value, the postmodern deconstruction of unity and belonging in favour of
irreducible difference now appears inadequate. Jean-Luc Nancy, for example,
refuses the blackmail that suspects “a kind of vague fascism” behind every
notion of community, insisting that concepts such as “love” and “fraterni- ty”
express “the residual minimum of political affect” and that such notions
persist because
9
“what is rightfully expected of
the political [...is] to take charge of a force of affect inherent in
being-with.”1 Thierry de Duve suggests that the French revolutionary triad of Liberté, Equalité, and Fraternité “translate
the three Christian maxims expressed in the ‘theological virtues,’ Faith, Hope, and Love, into the
political register,”2 but fail in fact to fully elaborate the potential of
Christianity’s “postreligious virtualities,” particularly the universally
addressed political maxim of love. Summing up such trends, Richard Beardsworth
argues that, given the diremption between the economic, political, and
religious spheres that characterises globalisation, “a new form of secular love
that bears the active promise of the community of humanity should be strongly
affirmed.”3
The contours of love’s
contemporary networks, meanings and practices have often been the object of
theoretical analysis. For sociological systems theorist Niklas Luhmann, love is
a particular modality of cybernetic communication that allows the interpersonal
management of affect.4 Following Luhmann, Dominic Pettman seeks “to locate and
identify the cultural stakes which are forged at the rhetorical intersections
between love, technology, and community.”5 Pettman aptly summarises one aspect
of love’s ambivalence:
...it is worth speculating whether
love is the only discourse still available to us that is capable of salvaging
singularity in a late capitalist epoch, or whether it is rather a case that
“love” has become (or perhaps always was) a decoy that lures us into a
libidinal economy... indifferent to individual suffering[.]6
Anthropologist Elizabeth Povinelli
further delineates love’s economies and affects in contemporary liberalism,
conceptualising it as an intimate, aleatory event, both constrictive and transformational.
Most of this discourse is focussed on eros and associated questions of romantic or domestic
intimacy, rather than the political love of agape.
Yet, the importance of this
junction is still acknowledged, as when Povinelli argues that:
...love is not merely an
interpersonal event, nor is it merely the site at which politics has its
effects. Love is a political event. It expands humanity, creating the human by
exfoliating its social skin, and this expansion is critical to the liberal
Enlightenment project, including the languages of many of its most progressive
legacies.7
1 Jean-Luc
Nancy, “Church, State, Resistance,” in Hent De Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan
(eds.), Political Theologies: Public Religions in a
Post-Secular World (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2006), 102-12 (108- 09).
2 Thierry de Duve, “Come On, Humans,
One More Effort if You Want to Be Post-Christians!” in De Vries and Sullivan
(eds.), Political Theologies, 652-670 (654).
3 Richard
Beardsworth, “A Note to a Political Understanding of Love in Our Global Age,” Contretemps vol. 6
(2006), 2-15 (6).
4 Niklas Luhmann, Love as Passion: The
Codification of Intimacy, translated by
Jeremy Gaines and Doris L. Jones (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).
5 Dominic
Pettman, Love and Other Technologies: Retrofitting Eros
for the Information Age (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2006), xiv-v.
6 Ibid., x.
7 Elizabeth A. Povinelli, The Empire of Love: Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy, and
Carnality (Durham &
London: Duke University Press, 2006), 175-6.
Chrulew: Suspicion
and Love
10
Foucault Studies, No. 15, pp. 9-26.
Similarly, for Pettman, “Where
things get increasingly sticky—and where the code threatens to crash—is in the
conflict between a communal, agapic love and an interpersonal, erotic one,”8
between, that is, love’s universal and particularistic dimensions.
Amidst the turn to religion in
contemporary thought, such explorations of
love have become exhortations to love. At the
forefront of this trend stands Slavoj Žižek. As he made his characteristically
brash way through a range of theological positions, an affirmation of “the
Christian experience”9 became increasingly central to his attempts to
articulate a radical politics combining Hegelian dialectics and Lacanian
psychoanalysis. For Žižek, only an intolerant love for what is darkest in
oneself and one’s neighbour can break through the sickly multiculturalism and
cynical consumerism of contemporary life. Whereas today’s fundamentalism and
liberalism have betrayed Christianity’s subversive core, Žižek’s rediscovery of
the true Christian stance revives it as an authentically materialist rupture.
In Alain Badiou’s influential reading of Paul, he argues that the subject, innervated
by the event, is transformed from a position of death to one of universally
addressed life, that is, love.10 Responding to Badiou, Žižek contends that
contemporary leftist politics must not only recognise its Pauline roots, but
recuperate and repeat the Christian cut through perverse fixations and
communitarian identities, as Lacan and Lenin had both done in their own
fashion: “the properly Christian way of Love ...marks a New Beginning, breaking
out of the deadlock of Law and its transgression.”11 The hedonistic enjoyment
of late capitalism must be disrupted with a politics of love anachronistically
wrested from the Pauline legacy, repeating “the active work
of love which necessarily leads to
the creation of an alternative community.”12
Certainly, Žižek recognises that
the Christian politics of love he is renovating comes with certain baggage and
risks. The historical institutionalisation of the Church returned its psychic
energies to the patterns of law, superego prohibition, and the erotic cycles of
investment and identification, and solidified its once revolutionary politics
into patterns of authority and identity. But true Pauline agape is, for
Žižek, not identifiable with such distortions. Nor is it reducible to the
Kantian duty to love, but rather overflows this superegoic law.13 Love’s cor-
8 Pettman, 35.
9 Slavoj
Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of
Christianity (Cambridge:
The MIT Press, 2003), 6. 10 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation
of Universalism, translated by
Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford Uni- versity Press, 2003), 87-8.
11 Slavoj
Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of
Political Ontology (London &
New York: Verso, 1999), 151.
12 Slavoj Žižek, The
Fragile Absolute: or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London & New York: Verso, 2000), 129-30. See also
Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five
Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion (London & New York: Verso, 2001), 50; Slavoj
Žižek, Eric L. Santner, Kenneth Reinhard, The
Neighbour: Three Inquiries in Political Theology (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago
Press, 2005); Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006), 282; Adam Kotsko, Žižek and Theology (London &
New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 96-100; Roland Boer, Criticism
of Heaven: On Marxism and Theology (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2007), 335-390. On how Žižek’s theological
turn relates to Foucault, see Matthew Chrulew, “The Pauline Ellipsis in
Foucault’s Genealogy of Christianity,” Journal
for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 11 no. 1 (Winter 2010), 1-15.
13 Žižek, The
Fragile Absolute, 100.
11
ruptibility means the true core of
Christianity is not guaranteed but contingent: “Christian charity is rare and
fragile, something to be fought for and regained again and again;”14 it is “a
struggling universality, the site of a constant battle.”15 It follows that the
Pauline passage beyond law must be forthrightly repeated and translated into
secular and political terms today. Žižek is not alone in taking up arms in this
long-fought battle.
Julia Kristeva is another advocate
of the uniqueness and depth of the Christian tradition as the pathway out of
contemporary nihilism. While not as brash in her rhetoric as Žižek, Kristeva
similarly proposes the politics of love as a risky but necessary commission
today. In a long interview outlining much of her recent work at the
intersection of psychoanalysis and the Christian experience, Kristeva expounds
with some nuance the ambivalent heritage that Christianity’s politics of love
has left us. As she sums it up most pithily: “In the beginning was the Word,
which is Love, and Logos prides itself on embracing love up until the point of
death itself... Christianity’s genius and its nightmares...”16 Her task becomes
in effect the hermeneutics of the ambivalent heritage of Christian love: “I,
for my part, attempt to interpret the meaning of the demand for love, the lack
of love and the hope of love, as well as the hate that is the inseparable other
side of this.”17
Yet for all this reserved
circumspection, the positive agenda that she does propose might well give us
pause. Speaking of the recent burning of Paris banlieus,
an event so often interpreted in
terms of religious and secular conflict, Kristeva asks:
The French republic faces a
historical challenge: can it deal with the crisis of belief religion no longer
keeps the lid on that affects the very foundations upon which human bonds are
built? The anguish paralyzing the country at this decisive moment is an expression
of its uncertainty before the size of the stakes. Are we capable of mobilizing
all the means at our disposal, police as well as economic, not overlooking
those who offer their knowledge of the soul, in order to accompany with the
necessary, fine-tuned listening process, with appropriate education and with
generosity, this poignant malady of ideality expressed by our outcast
adolescents that threatens to submerge us?18
These remarks indicate something
of the political content of Kristeva’s philosophical championing of European
and Christian values: in the face of a divisive situation cutting to the core
of French laïcité, against the destructive immigrant youth of Paris,
should be mobilised—with love, of course—the police and their handmaidens, the
professional psyfunctionaries.
14 Ibid., 118.
15 Žižek, The Parallax View, 35.
16 Julia
Kristeva, This Incredible Need to Believe, translated by Beverley Bie Brahic (New York: Columbia
Uni- versity Press, 2009), 56. See Julia Kristeva, Tales
of Love, translated by
Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); and Julia
Kristeva, In the Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and
Faith, translated by
Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), where Kristeva
conceives psychoanaly- sis as a discourse (logos) of love that inherits its
individual and social therapeutics from the Pauline over- coming of psychoses.
As Boer argues, “Kristeva invests heavily in a Paul who is good for you. Her
Paul provides a transformative focus on love [agape] and the collective
[ekklesia].” (Roland Boer, Criticism of Reli- gion: On
Marxism and Theology, II (Leiden &
Boston: Brill, 2009), 152)
17 Kristeva, This
Incredible Need to Believe, 64; cf. 25,
31.
18 Ibid.,
23.
Chrulew: Suspicion
and Love
12
Foucault Studies, No. 15, pp. 9-26.
A renewed politics of love is
likewise central to the utopian autonomism of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt.
Their rallying call for the multitude to build up their immanent, creative
productivity in opposition to the parasitic capitalism of Empire and biopower
is often expressed in the language of Christian love. The coda to Empire proposes a
“militancy [that] makes resistance into counterpower and makes rebellion into
love.”19 Among the inserts cut from that book, alongside other religious themes
such as hope and prophecy, there is an inter-
mezzo on love in
which, describing the “negative dialectics” of the likes of Derrida as
“futile,” they ask whether refusal can be presented “as a positive proposal.”20
“The truth of resistance,” they write, “consists only in this: the affirmation
of life.”21 In this positive biopolitics, “only love can construct a new
ontological condition and a new being.”22 Beyond the dead-ends of critique and
deconstruction, then, the praxis of building a new way of life is informed and
impelled by the capacities of a secularised Christian love.23
The final section of Multitude once more
defines the constituent power of the multitude as “an act of love,” arguing for
the “need to recuperate the public and political conception of love common to
premodern traditions.”24 This “love serves as the basis for our political projects
in common and the construction of a new society.”25 It is an act of production;
not just recognition or tolerance of pre-existing difference, but a matter of
self-creation and transformation, becoming-otherwise in which “singularities,
act in common and thus form a new race, that is, a politically coordinated
subjectivity... When love is conceived politically, then, this creation of a
new humanity is the ultimate act of love.”26 That we witness here the Nietzschean
theme of the overman tied to the agape of his despised St Paul demonstrates the extent to
which, in contemporary thought, religious values are certainly undergoing
another revaluation.
Hardt and Negri’s
ongoing theorisation of love culminates in Commonwealth where
they claim “love is really the living heart of the project we have been
developing, without which the rest would remain a lifeless heap.”27 Recognising
that its perceived sentimentality and religious baggage makes the term
unpopular, they nonetheless insist on its central political and philosophical
relevance, framing love as an event that, through joy, newly creates being, and
as a force of social solidarity that through cooperation builds community:
“Bringing together these two faces of love—the [ontological] constitution of
the common and the [politi-
19 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press,
2000), 413.
20 Nicholas
Brown et al., “‘Subterranean Passages of Thought’: Empire’s Inserts,”
Cultural Studies vol. 16, no. 2 (2002), 193-212 (201).
21 Ibid.,
202.
22 Ibid.
23 For an
attempt to reconstruct a “truly evangelical” anti-imperial conception of
Christian love, see Mario Costa, “A Love as Strong as Death”: Reconstructing a
Politics of Christian Love,” Journal for
Cultural and Religious Theory vol.
8 no. 2 (Spring 2007), 41-54.
24 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 351.
25 Ibid.,
352.
26 Ibid.,
356.
27 Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2009),
180.
13
cal] composition of
singularities—is a central challenge for understanding love as a material,
political act.”28
Like Žižek, Hardt
and Negri recognise the danger of an oppositional politics of love be- ing
caught up in practices of domination. Importantly, they recognise that it “is
deeply am- bivalent and susceptible to corruption.”29 In particular, they name
“identitarian love” one cor- rupt form that produces, not the common, but the same; in
the name of family, race, or nation, such corruptions of love define the
“neighbour” in terms similar to the self and seek only to couple, unify and
repeat, not to produce, create or become.30 Yet, by defining such identitarian
exclusions as not lacks or essential human nature, but rather as corruptions of love, they insist on love’s primacy and its
capacity to overcome its own distortions. Love is, they argue:
...an open field of
battle. When we think of the power of love, we need constantly to keep in mind
that there are no guarantees; there is nothing automatic about its functioning
and re- sults. Love can go bad, blocking and destroying the process. The
struggle to combat evil thus involves a training or education in love.31
A central operation
of love, then, is not only to produce the common and make the multitude, but to
set straight those corruptions of love that obstruct its work.
Deconstructing Love
As such remarks indicate, the
return of religion and of the politics of love coincides with a positive
political moment, a rejection of apophatic critique and a demand for normative
intervention, a desire and willingness to wield power, however inventively and
openly. We must move, it is said, from the negativity and disconnection of postmodern
suspicion to a new, constructive politics of creativity and fraternity. With
remarkable consistency, these attempts to reinvigorate progressive materialism
are characterised as a break with the relativist tendencies of recent French
philosophy and as a retrieval and indeed espousal of Christianity’s political
potential. Indeed, it is precisely the return to Christianity and the Pauline
politics of universal love that, it is claimed, allows one to move beyond the
impasses of the postmodern thinkers of difference, deconstruction, and
historicism, and their perceived closure of political change.
Beardsworth encapsulates this
current when he argues that “in recent French critical thought love is in
general eschewed in the political domain because of its understood associations
with universality and oneness”32—notions which, in the shadow of fascism and
state socialism, are rightly seen as intolerable and thus against which
thinkers such as Deleuze and
28 Ibid., 184.
29 Ibid.,
182.
30 Ibid.
Similarly, Hardt elsewhere affirms Paul’s “broadening the concept of love from
the mere cloister within the family or the couple. It’s recognizing love as a
properly political concept as the foundation of the community. ...love is corrosive
of identity.” (Creston C. Davis and Michael Hardt, “A Conversation with Michael
Hardt,” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 8, no. 2 (Spring 2007), 163-188 (186-7)) See also
Antonio Negri and Anne Defourmantelle, Negri
on Negri, translated by
M.B. DeBevoise (New York & Lon- don: Routledge, 2004), 147-149.
31 Hardt and
Negri, Commonwealth, 195.
32 Beardsworth, 8.
Chrulew: Suspicion
and Love
14
Foucault Studies, No. 15, pp. 9-26.
Derrida have insisted that
difference and singularity are untotalisable. However, given that our post-Cold
War context of twenty-first century global capitalism is characterised more by
fragmentation and separation, Beardsworth argues that “recent French
thought[‘s...] basic gesture of critical suspicion is not appropriate to our
historical age.”33 Rather, it is time to move on from the negative model of
critique to reclaim universalism and fraternity.
Yet others remain suspicious of
love. There has certainly been a significant (and often vehement) backlash
against this so-called “return of religion,” whether in the name of the Enlightenment,
secular humanism, and the separation of church and state, or indeed of seemingly
outmoded postmodern critique. Roland Boer proposes a half-century moratorium on
discussions of “the political cul-de-sac of love.”34 Lorenzo Chiesa and Alberto
Toscano criticise Žižek’s endorsement of the Christian legacy in a time of
fundamentalist presidents, “clash of civilisations” rhetoric and what they see
as ludicrous “Christian values.”35 Melissa Gregg ex- presses reservations about
Hardt and Negri’s optimism: “How can love retain its political potential, when
its registers and genres are so regularly ‘corrupted’ at the hands of the
state, the corporation, and the family?”36 On this view, the proponents of political
love are naively sanguine about the possibilities of unshackling love from
contemporary networks of capitalism and the interlinking of intimacy and
ownership in middle-class morality.
For many, the inevitable conflict
between the universal and particular dimensions of Christian love entirely
disqualifies it as a political enterprise. “What is startling,” David Nirenberg
argues, “is that those who prescribe love and its politics are untroubled by or
unaware of its long history of disappointment.”37 Through a “survey of the
foundations of these political theologies” he seeks to make “plausible the
suspicion that their promise of universal love depends upon and produces the
very exclusions and enmities it claims to be overcoming.”38 The belief that a
politics of love can free human society from instrumentalisation and interest,
argues Nirenberg, leads directly to the exclusion of those who, it is decided,
are incapable of
33 Ibid.
34 Roland
Boer, Criticism of Theology: On Marxism and Theology,
III (Leiden & Boston: Brill,
2011), 301n72. Throughout these volumes, Boer argues that the enthusiasm of
Žižek, Kristeva, Negri and others for political love too quickly bypasses the
important step of articulating a materialist grace.
35 Lorenzo Chiesa and Alberto Toscano, “Agape and the
Anonymous Religion of Atheism,” Angelaki vol. 12, no. 1 (2007), 113-26. It is notable, however,
that even they ultimately argue that a form of political love is needed in our
times, even if it will not be identifiable with any Christian formulation.
36 Melissa
Gregg, “The Break-Up: Hardt and Negri’s Politics of Love,” Journal of Communication Inquiry vol. 35, no. 4 (2011), 395-402 (396).
37 David
Nirenberg, “The Politics of Love and Its Enemies,” Critical
Inquiry vol. 33
(2007), 573-605 (575). Pro- zorov makes a similar claim regarding Hardt and
Negri’s “oblivion of the extent to which the modern biopolitical tradition is already based on
love.” (Sergei Prozorov, “The Unrequited Love of Power: Biopolitical In-
vestment and the Refusal of Care,” Foucault Studies no. 4 (2007), 53-77 (66))
38 Ibid., 603. In a similar fashion,
Regina Schwartz explores how Biblical monotheism’s ideas of love are of- ten
tied to themes of possession (of land and women), identity, scarcity and
restriction (of divine favour), and jealousy: “The logic of scarcity even
governs love. We have seen how in the case of land the principle of scarcity
engenders violence, and this is also true of emotional scarcity where the
consequences are equally devastating.” (Regina M. Schwartz, The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1997), 81) Here the blessing of one people implies the curse of another.
15
such love. This logic is
exemplified in Christianity which, commanding that one love one’s enemies,
created as an enemy the Pharisees and Jews who would not accede to these loving
demands.39 As Nietzsche put it:
...what they hate is not their
enemy, oh no! they hate “injustice,” “godlessness;” what they believe and hope
for is not the prospect of revenge ...but the victory of God, the just God, over the
Godless; all that remains for them to love on earth are not their brothers in
hate but their “brothers in love,” as they say, all good and just people on
earth.40
This critique resonates with that
of Gil Anidjar, who traces the fundamental exclusions in operation in the
supposed universality of Christian Europe.41 In a deconstructive reading across
the domains of philosophy, literature, law, and theology, he explores how the
production of the Jewish and Arabic enemy is an inescapable consequence of the
Christian commandment to love. It is this violent history that is dangerously
reproduced in attempts today to reclaim Paul and Christian love. Both Anidjar
and Nirenberg perform quite explicitly a Derridean maneuver—found, for example,
in The Politics of Friendship, where he argues that “every choice of friend
require[s] the unethical exclusion of the nonfriend”42—that deconstructs the
politics of inclusion by demonstrating the exclusions that it necessarily
produces. In the history of the Church, indeed from its very origins, Christian
love has been particularised, conditioning its supposedly universal address:
the loving brotherhood of men here implies the inhumanity of those who refuse
fraternity.
Žižek defends against such attacks
by claiming that:
Christian universality, far from excluding some subjects, is formulated from the position of those
excluded, of those for whom there is no specific place within the existing order,
although they
39 Alberto
Moreiras argues along similar lines: “If the subjectivity of the subject is a
function of the Pauline virtues of faith, love, and hope, if only those virtues
can sustain the political decision, as Badiou says and Žižek ultimately
subscribes, then subalternity emerges against the grain of Žižek and Badiou’s
thought as the position occupied by the faithless, the loveless, and the
hopeless. Are they purely and simply the enemy? Do they simply follow the path
of death?” (Alberto Moreiras, “Children of Light: Neo-Paulinism and the
Cathexis of Difference (Part II),” The Bible and
Critical Theory vol. 1, no. 2
(2005), 1-13 (1)); see also Alberto Moreiras, “Children of Light: Neo-Paulinism
and the Cathexis of Difference (Part I),” The
Bible and Critical Theory vol. 1, no. 1
(2004), 1-16.
40 Friedrich
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, translated by Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2006), I. §14, 28-9. For Nietzsche, “In the final analysis,
‘love of one’s neighbour’ is always something secondary, partly conventional
and arbitrarily illusory in relation to fear
of the neighbour.” (Ibid., 149)
41 Gil Anidjar, The Jew, The Arab: A History of the Enemy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
42 Nirenberg,
583. See Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship (London & New York: Verso, 2005). John Caputo
takes a more open tack: “Derrida makes explicit the undecidability that
inhabits faith, hope, and love ... Undecidability does not undo faith, hope,
and love but provides them with their condition of possibility, supplying their
element, the night in which they are formed and performed.” (John D. Caputo,
“What Do I Love When I Love My God? Deconstruction and Radical Orthodoxy,” in
John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley and Michael J. Scanlon (eds.), Questioning God (Bloomington
& Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), 291-317 (313-4))
Chrulew: Suspicion
and Love
16
Foucault Studies, No. 15, pp. 9-26.
belong to it; universality is
strictly codependent with this lack of specific place/determination.43
Hardt and Negri, when asked in an
interview about “the importance of love to the politics of the present—and the
democracy that is to come,” opposed, to that “notion of love in which all
difference is lost in the embrace of a binding unity,” a notion of “love based
on multiplicity,” which involves “recognizing the other as different and
recognizing that the relationship with that other increases our power.”44 They
have long responded to “deconstructionist” criticisms of their work that
question who and what is disqualified by their new political subject of the
multitude—”the excluded, the abject, or the subaltern”45—by confidently
claiming that the multitude embraces both the singular
and the common.
Love as the production of
singularities in common overflows the restrictive and exclusive economies of
identity.
Such are the vicissitudes of love
in our postsecular moment, both timely and timeless, both roundly condemned and
earnestly upheld. For all that these thinkers recognise love’s ambivalence—its
inescapable corruptibility, its violent history, its continual risks—they
persist in affirming it with remarkable enthusiasm. As Nirenberg argues, “the
vocabulary of love has a most peculiar virtue. Through it we fantasize the
overcoming of those very exclusions that the history of its use has
generated.”46 This history of exclusion continues to weigh heavily on a perhaps
indispensable element of our cultural repertoire. For all its supposed urgency,
we should not forget that two millennia of Christianised history have been
saturated with precisely this obstinate motivation. Love has not been immune
from complicity with empire, indeed perhaps it has produced it; but it has also
been anti-imperial. Both the family and the ecclesia
occur under its sign, both
identitarian community and the community to come. Love has been a uniquely
productive and tenacious technology of the self—in relation to others, to
oneself, to truth, and to God—a technology of subjectification and of power
that can be both freeing and dominating, both resisting and restricting. In
writing the history of the present, our task becomes one of discriminating this
Christian heritage and the possibilities for freedom, affiliation, and
affirmation it allows us. It is in negotiating this complex and overdetermined
legacy that Foucault’s work provides us with key resources.
Foucault and Love
As much as Foucault’s thought is
already multiply implicated in this domain—as a precursor for Hardt and Negri,
as an adversary for Žižek—the relevance of his genealogy of Christianity, and
the continued importance of his critical impulses, is not often clearly
perceived. Foucault was, at times, quite capable of employing recognisably
Pauline rhetoric of love against law, as when in a late interview he spoke of
the disturbances produced by gay friendships:
43 Žižek, The Parallax View, 35.
44 Nicholas
Brown and Imre Szeman, “What Is the Multitude? Questions for Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri,” Cultural Studies vol. 19, no. 3 (2005), 372-87 (386, 387).
45 Hardt and
Negri, Multitude, 225.
46 Nirenberg, 605.
17
...that individuals are beginning
to love one another—there’s the problem. The institution is caught in a
contradiction; affective intensities traverse it which at one and the same time
keep it going and shake it up. ...These relations short-circuit it and
introduce love where there’s supposed to be only law, rule, or habit.47
Here the force of love is
portrayed as possessing its own disturbing vitality. Yet resorting to such easy
to hand Pauline language is rare. Love was not at all central to Foucault’s conceptu-
al vocabulary. When it did appear it was overwhelmingly as eros rather than agape.48 His po-
litical philosophy was more concerned with freedom—liberté—than equality and
fraternity, and indeed often cast the latter as totalising and individualising
forces. Yet Foucault did have a stronger interest in religion than is often
recognised, proposing a fragmented yet substantial genealogy of Christianity
that was of great significance for his overall project.49 While at times he
certainly valorised the Greco-Roman care of the self, he was not simply
anti-Christian but recognised numerous Christian practices of resistance and
freedom, such as the eremitic ascet- icism of the Desert Fathers, the
parrhesiastic pole of mysticism, and other anti-pastoral coun- ter-conducts.
Thus, while love rarely figures explicitly in Foucault’s thought, we can in
fact regard him as implicitly theorising the ambivalence of love, both on a
general conceptual lev- el, and in the specific details of his genealogy of
Christianity. In his elaboration of the diagram of pastoral power, Foucault
targeted the tightening of power relations carried out in the name of, and
indeed through, love of God, self, and neighbour.
J. Joyce Schuld works patiently to
relate Foucault’s postmodern theory of power to Au- gustine’s premodern theory
of love, demonstrating subtle resemblances between the thought of these
seemingly incongruous figures.50 This encounter, she argues, mutually
illuminates and deepens their respective critiques of political and religious
authority. Power and love are each decidedly relational, omnipresent and
morally ambiguous elements of social relations. For Schuld, the comparison with
love opens up the seeming oppressiveness of ubiquitous power in Foucault,
revealing each, in their overlap, as formative, creative, and transformative:
“As with power, love exists only in and through dynamic and interactive social
desires, habits, and deeds,” it “above all leads individuals by patterning
their fluid yearnings, impulses, and
47 Michel
Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life,” in Ethics:
Subjectivity and Truth, edited by
Paul Rabinow (Essential Works of Foucault:
1954-1984, 1; London:
Penguin Books, 2000), 135-40 (137).
48 See, for example, “True Love,” part V of Michel
Foucault, The Use of Pleasure (The History of Sexuality, 2; London: Penguin Books, 1992), 229-246.
49 On Foucault’s
philosophy of religion, see Jeremy R. Carrette, Foucault
and Religion: Spiritual Corporality and Political Spirituality (London & New York: Routledge, 2000); James
Bernauer and Jeremy Carrette, eds. Michel Foucault and
Theology: The Politics of Religious Experience (Aldershot & Burlington: Ashgate, 2004); John
McSweeney, “Foucault and Theology,” Foucault Studies no. 2 (2005), 117-44.
50 J. Joyce
Schuld, Foucault and Augustine: Reconsidering Power and
Love (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2003), especially 7-45. Likewise for Jonathan Tran, Foucault and Theology (London &
New York: T&T Clark, 2011), 114-9, Foucault’s emphasis on the care of the
self and practices of truth can be linked to the Augustinian relational
ontology of love. Thomas Lynch argues that Foucault’s critique of Augustine in
his (as yet unpublished) 1980 course fails to undermine a properly articulated,
orthodox Augustinian subjectivi- ty. Thomas Lynch, “Confessions of the Self:
Foucault and Augustine,” Telos no. 146 (2009), 124-39. For a different reading of the
moral imperialism of Augustine’s politics of love, see William Connolly, The Augus- tinian Imperative: A Reflection on the Politics of Morality (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993).
Chrulew: Suspicion
and Love
18
Foucault Studies, No. 15, pp. 9-26.
activities.”51 However, another
effect of this analysis is that the greater the commonality be- tween relations
of love and power, the more the former can be seen through the lens of the
latter. Due to its relational omnipresence, love can operate as a vehicle for
influence and con- trol: “Love, for Augustine, saturates every single
relationship, bringing the sway of power into all personal, interpersonal, and
political dynamics.”52 Therefore love does not supersede cri- tique, but rather
demands it, insofar as its relational fragility leaves it vulnerable to
infiltration: by sovereign violence, by racist divisions, by the principal of
obedience to ecclesial hierarchies and other stratifications of power, as well
as numerous other pervasive incitements and costly investments.
Yet for all Foucault’s suggestive
similarities to Augustine, a much closer and more di- rect influence can be
found in Nietzsche’s famously vicious suspicion of Christian morality. For
Nietzsche, Christianity’s much vaunted message of love in fact grew out of
weakness and resentment: “from the trunk of the tree of revenge and hatred...
which created ideals and changed values, the like of which has never been seen
on earth—there grew something just as incomparable, a new
love, the deepest
and most sublime kind of love.”53 Nietzsche’s genealogy charted the devaluation
whereby noble values were slowly taken over by the reactive forces of herd
morality that esteemed the superiority of meekness, humility and truth,
shielding weak souls from pain and suffering and denying reality and life: “The
point was to devise a religion in which love is possible: with that one is beyond
the worst that life can offer—one no longer even sees it. So much for the three
Christian virtues faith, hope and charity: I call them the three Christian shrewdnesses.”54 Nietzsche
traced how these shrewd and vengeful virtues were wielded by ascetic priests as
technologies of control over their closely watched, diligently loved flock.
Much of Foucault’s work could be
aptly characterised as an expansion of Nietzsche’s genealogy of the Christian
revaluation of values. While neither so blunt nor so wholly invest- ed in a
confrontation with Christianity’s lies, Foucault was nonetheless regularly
drawn to stage an insistent and ambivalent encounter with Christian
technologies of power and their modern, scientific legacies. He especially
followed Nietzsche in tracing one particular front in the battle over love—the
manipulation of slave morality by the priestly caste—through his analysis of
obedience and confession in the Church’s ascetic institutions.
An analysis of pastoral power was
central to Foucault’s evolving genealogy of the de- siring subject in the mid-
to late seventies. His initial focus was on the practices of confession and
spiritual direction, and their demands of supervision, obedience, and
intervention, which expanded and intensified towards the permanent and
continuous management of individuals. This developed into a broader analysis of
pastoral power as a whole, of which his 1977-80 courses provide the fullest
treatment. Foucault emphasised that the pastorate was modelled on the Hebrew theme
of the shepherd-flock relationship—a beneficent power organised around care for
life, whose principal force and medium is sacrificial love. It focuses on the
51 Schuld, 20,
25.
52 Ibid.,
31.
53 Nietzsche,
Genealogy, I. §8, 18.
54 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the
Idols/The Anti-Christ, translated by
R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1990), §23, 145.
19
interior, rather than the
exterior, on love rather than violence: concerned with the well-being of the
flock, “pastoral power does not have as its principal function doing harm to
one’s ene- mies; its principal function is doing well for those over whom one
watches.”55 This beneficent power seeks to nourish and provide for the flock.
This is not “the striking display of strength and superiority” but “zeal,
devotion, and endless application.”56 The shepherd devotes him- self dutifully
to care for his flock. He keeps watch, takes care of others, and will even be
called upon to sacrifice himself. His vigilant gaze provides constant and
individual attention, at all times and over each.
This pastoral theme of the
shepherd and flock, Foucault argued, eventually came to be institutionalised in
relations of power within the church, a dimorphism of clergy and laity, priest
and penitent, imposed through elaborate and exhaustive obligations of conduct
and speech:
In Christianity the pastorate gave
rise to an art of conducting, directing, leading, guiding, taking in hand, and
manipulating men, an art of monitoring them and urging them on step by step, an
art with the function of taking charge of men collectively and individually
throughout their life and at every moment of their existence.57
The Greco-Roman “care of the self”
that Foucault analysed in his late work was here “inte- grated, displaced,
reutilized in Christianity. From the moment that the culture of the self was
taken up by Christianity, it was, in a way, put to work for the exercise of a
pastoral power to the extent that the epimeleia heautou [care of the self] became, essentially, epimeleia tōn allōn—the care of others—which was the pastor’s job.”58 The pastorate saw “the
development of power techniques oriented towards individuals and intended to
rule them in a continuous and per- manent way.”59 In particular it established
“a link between total obedience, knowledge of oneself and confession to someone
else.”60 The result was tight bonds of mutual expectation fortifying the flock:
“The Christian pastor and his sheep are bound together by extremely complex and
subtle relationships of responsibility.”61
It was from this religious
apparatus of pastoral power that, alongside the deductive power of sovereignty,
the productive power of modern biopolitics and governmentality emerged. It was
only through Christianity, Foucault argues, that detailed, positive interven-
tion in the lives of individuals became a properly political problem with the
intensification and transmission (via Reformation and Counter-Reformation
battles over spiritual direction) of the pastoral power elaborated in the
Church into the modern secular arts of government, with their investment in the
management and optimisation of a healthy, secure population
55 Michel
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the
Collège de France, 1977-78, edited by
Michel Senellart, translated by Graham Burchell (Houndmills & New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 123.
56 Ibid., 127.
57 Ibid., 165.
58 Michel
Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” in Ethics, 253-280
(278). 59 Michel
Foucault, “Pastoral Power and Political Reason,” in Religion
and culture by Michel Foucault, edited by Jeremy Carrette, (New York: Routledge, 1999), 136.
60 Ibid.,
143.
61 Foucault,
Security, Territory, Population, 168.
Chrulew: Suspicion
and Love
20
Foucault Studies, No. 15, pp. 9-26.
through the scientific
normalisation of sexuality and behaviour. This heritage of course pas- sed
through numerous breaks and dispersions. The disciplines “swarmed” from their
monas- tic laboratories to new and wider domains, implanting ascetic practices among
workers, sol- diers, and criminals.62 Priests battled with doctors as religious
concerns became increasingly supplanted by those of science. The
problematisation of sex in terms of concupiscence and sin was replaced by a
medicalised morality concerned with norms and abnormality: “The flesh was
brought down to the level of the organism.”63 Foucault characterised the
mutation of the pastorate as follows:
...it was no longer a question of
leading people to their salvation in the next world, but ra- ther ensuring it
in this world. And in this context, the word salvation
takes on different meanings:
health, well-being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security,
protec- tion against accidents. A series of worldly aims took the place of the
religious aims of the traditional pastorate.64
Religious technologies were
generalised, adapted, and disseminated, and thereby the pastoral diagram of
loving individualisation went on to colonise new populations and domains of in-
tervention.
Yet, Foucault did not understand
this emergence of biopower and governmentality from the pastoral power of the
Church as a process of secularisation. Insofar as the secular political reason
of modernity did not overcome but rather further instilled and intensified the
diagram of the pastorate, which proliferated in new spheres of investment, it
is better under- stood as what he calls an in-depth Christianisation. In his
1974-5 Collège de France lecture course Abnormal,
Foucault affirmed and extended
historian Jean Delumeau’s thesis that the Reformation and Counter-Reformation
were not periods of secularisation after a Christian Middle Ages but, rather,
represented a new wave of Christianisation of previously relatively unaffected
populations.65 The end of the Middle Ages, he argues, was:
...not characterized by the
beginning of de-Christianization, but rather... by a phase of in- depth
Christianization. The period that stretches from the Reformation to the
witch-hunts, passing through the Council of Trent, is one in which modern
states begin to take shape while Christian structures tighten their grip on
individual existence.66
62 Michel
Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (Penguin Books, 1991).
63 Michel
Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, translated by Robert Hurley (The History of Sexuality, 1; Penguin Books, 1998), 117.
64 Michel
Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Be- yond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983),
208-226 (215).
65
See Jean Delumeau, Catholicism between Luther
and Voltaire, a New View of the Counter-Reformation, translated by J. Moiser (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1977).
66 Michel
Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France,
1974-1975, edited by
Valerio Marchetti, et al., translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Picador,
2003), 177.
21
The post-Tridentine pastoral
augmented the techniques of confession with the practice of spir- itual
direction, and gave rise to waves of external and internal colonisation marked
by the struggles over witchcraft and the convulsions of the possessed. For
Foucault, modernity’s lai- cisation of Christian morality consisted not in the
jetissoning of religious baggage but, rather, in an in-depth Christianisation
by which technologies of power, developed within the isolated strata of
Christian practice that were monasteries and seminaries, became generalised
political technologies for the government of the broader population, implanted
deeper and more com- prehensively into souls and bodies.
While Foucault did not explicitly
thematise love as a core element of pastoral power, it is clear that the pastorate
and the biopower that emerged from it are, indeed, a particular, his- torically
triumphant mode of elaboration and institutionalisation of Christian
sacrificial and individualising love. Others have made this link more explicit:
Mika Ojakangas argues that “It is precisely care, the Christian power of love
(agape), as the opposite of all violence that is at issue in bio‐power,”67 at
least in its origins, while Sergei Prozorov likewise holds that “the
Judeo-Christian ‘shepherd-flock game’, from which there descends the
...tradition of Western pastoral power, [is] based on love (agape) and care of
the living.”68 Biopower’s investment in and control over life for its own sake
is an extension and intensification of the pastoral love of the shepherd for
his sheep; we remain within the loving embrace of a familiarly pastoral dia-
gram of power today.69
One example indicates the role of
love within pastoral power. In Abnormal, love ap- pears as one of the important characteristics
that qualified a priest as a confessor to whom a penitent could confess his
sins well. According to the rules outlined by Habert, the confessor must possess
“a ‘benevolent love,’ a love that ‘attaches the confessor to the interests of
others.’ It is a love that combats those, whether Christian or non-Christian,
who ‘resist’ God.”70 It is instructive to note the characteristics that
Foucault relates: “a zealous and benevolent love that brings the confessor near
the penitent.”71 What this passage suggests is that, if we understand power
relations as conduct of others’ conduct, this institutionalised form of
Christian love serves to tighten those bonds: to further oblige the penitent to
their priestly superior, who has appropriated God’s right to forgive; to foster
the pastor’s surveillance; in sum, to bring the sheep closer within the fold.
In more general terms, love is here a suffocating force that inten-
67 Mika
Ojakangas, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault,” Foucault Studies no. 2 (2005),
5-28 (20). See also the exchange that follows in that issue.
68 Sergei
Prozorov, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 104-5.
69 Debate
continues over the nature of this connection between Christianity and biopower.
According to John Milbank, “only St. Paul points us authentically beyond the
order of the biopolitical.” John Milbank, “Paul against Biopolitics,” Theory, Culture & Society vol. 25, nos. 7-8 (2008), 125–72 (136). Mika Ojakangas, on the other
hand, argues that “rather than offering us means of resistance against
utilitarianism and instrumental reason Paul, in fact, is one of the most
important historical sources for the alleged contemporary nihilism.” Mika
Ojakangas, “Apostle Paul and the Profanation of the Law,” Distinktion vol. 18
(2009): 47-68 (48). See also Mika Ojakangas, “On the Pauline Roots of
Biopolitics: Apostle Paul in Company with Foucault and Agamben,” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 11, no. 1 (Winter 2010), 92-110; and the rest of
issue 11:1 of JCRT, ed. Sophie Fuggle and Valérie Nicolet Anderson, on “Foucault and Saint
Paul.”
70 Foucault, Abnormal, 178. 71 Ibid., 179.
Chrulew: Suspicion
and Love
22
Foucault Studies, No. 15, pp. 9-26.
sifies power relations, saturating
the lives of the community, bringing subjects nearer one an- other,
strengthening attachments and obligations (to authority figures, to communities
and identities), multiplying the opportunities for intervention in the actions
of others, and, there- fore, reducing the openings in which one might maneuver
or resist. The spread of Christian love, on this view, goes hand in hand with
the spread of forms of surveillance, of direction, of obedience, of morality,
of incitement and expectation. Such power effects can not be set aside as
avertable corruptions of a fragile absolute or an onto-political creation of
the common, as Žižek, Hardt and Negri, and others might like, but must be
recognised and analysed as the political dangers internally produced in the
very elaboration of true Christian love.
Suspicion and Love
Foucault’s genealogy of pastoral
power can thus be justly (re)described as tracing the histori- cal developments
by which obedience, submission, and the exaction of truth were introduced into
the apparatus of the religion of love, and subsequently implanted throughout
the secular social body. In Nietzschean terms, the pastorate is the means of
Christian “revenge,” in its insinuation into common motives and activity of the
paradoxical and weak values of humility, love, and the salvation of all. As
Moreiras sarcastically puts it in a critique of Badiou and Žižek, “The problem
appears when the law of love falls into the hands of the priests, of course:
but doesn’t it always?”72 Foucault’s rogues gallery included not only
Nietzsche’s vengeful priests, but an array of modern caring shepherds: the
police as agents of charity, doctors and psychiatrists, ministers of
government, and other hermeneuts, therapists, and administrators of life.
Thus, Foucault’s genealogy of
Christianity complements the deconstructions of love discussed above by situating
repressive and violent practices (for example, the exclusion of the unloving
and unloved Jew and Arab) within the frame of a positive diagram of power whose
main task is the production of a community of loving and loved Christian
subjects. If Christi- anity is the religion of love for self and neighbour, it
is also the religion that inserted obedi- ence, surveillance, sacrifice and
knowledge at the core of these relations—an historical legacy we are far from
surpassing today. For Beardsworth, Foucault’s failure to “affirm a collective
understanding of love” (given his suspicion of such concepts as “reason” and
“community”) marks his thought as inadequate to our age.73 But Foucault’s
suspicion of positive political projects, and the way in which their most
well-intentioned efforts to heal or unite always in- troduce new dangers and
threats, is far from irrelevant—indeed, it is most relevant precisely at the
moment when calls for the reaffirmation of a political love are at their
strongest pitch. Foucault argues that “the analysis, elaboration, and bringing
into question of power relations and the ‘agonism’ between power relations and
the intransitivity of freedom is a permanent political task inherent in all
social existence.”74 The same must be said for relations of love, however
universally addressed or politically inventive. While love might legitimately
be identified as a progressive force of freedom and commonality—one that frees
the subject from
72 Moreiras,
“Part II,” 12n5.
73
Beardsworth, 3.
74 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 223.
23
its neuroses (for Žižek and
Kristeva), one that produces new ecclesial communities (for Hardt and
Negri)—love is also the force that congeals such revolutionary energies into
the strictures of obedience and the proliferation of care. Whatever creative
capacity for liberty it possesses, it is equally capable of being co-opted and
stratified, and thus demands, even produces, the need for perpetual suspicion.
We must ask: will the call for a universal politics of love ad- dressed to our
fragmented globe not instead serve as the alibi for another wave of in-depth
Christianisation of new populations and domains? We must ask: are love’s
dangers best com- bated by love itself, or by a refusal to be loved in that
way, by them, quite so much?75 We must ask, modifying an important Foucauldian
question: what is the price of the demand to love?
Foucault’s fragmented genealogy of
this ambiguous and fragile love came to an unfin- ished end in his crucial
final lecture at the Collège de France. Having spent much of the last few years
delineating the roles of parrhēsia or free and frank speech in ancient philosophy, on
this day he finally crossed the threshold to briefly indicate some of its
mutations in Christiani- ty. As well as identifying some continuities between
Cynic and Christian asceticism, he em- phasised that Christianity introduced
not only a relation to the other world beyond, but par- ticularly the principle
of obedience to God and His representatives. Parrhēsia
here undergoes a reversal of
values, developing an ambivalence which is tied, moreover, to the question of
love. In the New Testament, it appears as both the “apostolic virtue” of
courageous preaching of the gospel, and confidence in God’s love entwined with
obedience to His will. In the first century ascetics, the courageous parrhēsia of the martyrs
becomes obscured by “the principle of trem- bling obedience” and its attendant
mistrust, decipherment, and renunciation of the self.76 The pastorate would of
course come to develop and strengthen this rule of submission. Yet oppo- site
the ascetic pole of silent, obedient self-hermeneutics that would lead to
pastoral power, Foucault referred to mysticism as an example of “what could be
called the parrhesiastic pole of Christianity, in which the relation to the
truth is established in the form of a face-to-face relationship with God and in
a human confidence which corresponds to the effusion of divine love.”77 Love
here appears as a fragile and ambiguous element of Christian experience insofar
as it structures both the parrhesiastic confidence in God’s love and the
anti-parrhesiastic de- mand for obedience to God and His pastoral delegates.
Unfortunately, Foucault could not go on to further explore this split within
the Christian experience of love and parrhēsia: to ask, for
75 Prozorov
argues that “resistance to biopower must abandon its fixation on the figure of
the sovereign and instead take the form of the refusal
of care, an attitude
of indifference no longer to the threat of power, but to its loving embrace.
That is, “one should not love power either, neither in the sense of being obsessed
with seizing it nor in the sense of reciprocating its agape
in the utopia of a ‘better’
biopolitics.” Rather, “To assert one’s power as a living being against the power,
whose paradigm consists in the ‘care of the living,’ is to affirm the radical
freedom of the human being that precedes governmental care and does not require
gov- ernmental love to sustain its life. The method of antibiopolitical
resistance is to externalise power from hu- man existence and thereby leave its
agape unrequited.” (Prozorov, Foucault, Freedom and
Sovereignty, 111)
76 Michel
Foucault, The Courage of Truth (The Government of Self and
Others II): Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983-1984, edited by Frédéric Gros, translated by Graham Burchell
(Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 331, 333.
77 Ibid., 337.
Chrulew: Suspicion
and Love
24
Foucault Studies, No. 15, pp. 9-26.
example, how it might relate to
the gospel commands to love God, one’s neighbour (e.g. Matt. 22:34-40), and
one’s enemy (Matt. 5:43-48), or to a universal notion of political love as
identi- fied in Paul by the likes of Badiou. In this final lecture, in words we
can now only read with pathos, Foucault suggested with reference to the
modifications of asceticism and parrhēsia in Christianity that “Maybe I will try to explore
these themes a little next year—but I cannot guarantee it.” The analyses that
he suggests in “a very brief sketch” are offered as “an encour- agement... if
you take them up in turn.”78
The proponents of political love
today would do well to heed Foucault’s encourage- ment. Given that love is in
essence “corruptible” (Augustine), “undecidable” (Derrida), “dan- gerous”
(Foucault), enthusiasm must not be allowed to overrun suspicion any more than
sus- picion should be devoid of hope. Returning to the interconnected virtues
that de Duve refers to as our “postreligious virtualities”—faith/liberty,
hope/equality and love/fraternity—we find that some remarks of Foucault’s on
the first two can be applied equally as well to the one he most neglected.
Justifying the necessity of suspicion, he remarks: “Liberation paves the way
for new power relationships, which must be controlled by practices of
freedom.”79 Or, re- sponding to his interviewers’ suggestion that he was overly
critical and pessimistic in what they recognised as a surprisingly Christian
tone:
I don’t think that to be
suspicious means that you don’t have any hope. ...And if you are suspicious, it
is because, of course, you have a certain hope. The problem is to know which
kind of hope you have and which kind of hope it is reasonable to have in order
to avoid what I would call not the “pessimistic circle” you speak of but the
political circle which in- troduces in your hopes, and through your hopes, the
things you want to avoid by these hopes.80
The same can be said for the
third, “the greatest of these” (1 Cor. 13:13): the politics of love opens up
new relationships of power; to be suspicious of these does not mean you do not
have any love. The problem is to know what kind of love will avoid the
“political circle,” which would introduce in and through your loves precisely
the things this love seeks to avoid. Per- haps, as Hardt and Negri write, “love
is an essential concept for philosophy and politics, and the failure to
interrogate and develop it is one central cause of the weakness of contemporary
thought. It is unwise to leave love to the priests, poets, and
psychoanalysts.”81 Yet it is equally unwise to replicate their shrewdnesses, or
to suppose that, in the midst of this battle, love al- lows us to exit the
political circle and leave suspicion behind. Foucault’s genealogy of Christi-
anity—specifically, of the emergence from pastoral power of modern
governmentality and biopolitics—sketches a further significant dimension of
love’s suffocating history and contem- porary risks. Only through attention to
the dangers of our in-depth Christianisation could a politics of love be
articulated that might unravel, rather than intensify, the diagram of power
relations.
78 Ibid., 316.
79 Michel
Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Ethics, 281-301
(283-4). 80 Quoted
in James Bernauer, “Cry of Spirit,” in Carrette (ed.) Religion
and Culture, xi–xvii
(xvi).
81 Hardt
and Negri, Commonwealth, 179.
25
Chrulew: Suspicion
and Love
Matthew Chrulew University of New
South Wales Sydney Australia mchrulew@gmail.com
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